Areti Theofilopoulou

Many individuals experience frustration with their work. In some cases, this is because an individual learns that the industry in which she finds herself is simply not for her, and that, if she were starting out again, she’d choose to do something very different with her time. These are instances of what economists tend to call ‘job lock’ and situations that psychologists tend to refer to in terms of individuals being ‘stuck at work’. Our aim in this paper is to explore some of the moral dimensions of this important but neglected set of cases, in which individuals feel trapped in their current line of work. Our headline conclusion is that some of the complaints to which these concerns give rise are valid and weighty ones, and that, consequently, governments have a duty to lower the social and economic costs of switching careers. Finally, we comment explicitly on the implications of our arguments for firms, arguing that, under a range of plausible circumstances, they too have a moral duty to lower the social and economic costs of switching careers, which we can conceive of as part of the demands of corporate social responsibility.

Contemporary history is, unfortunately, full of examples of democratic societies in which many citizens came to hold deeply unjust views. One cause of this phenomenon is that unjust views spread intergenerationally within the family. This paper questions how parents are to be prevented from transmitting unjust views onto their children. The standard response is that states have a duty to contain these views and ensure that they do not spread to future adults. I argue that this response is incomplete because state policies that are likely to be effective are unjustifiable, and policies that are justifiable are unlikely to be sufficiently effective. By contrast, I defend an alternative view: individuals who have access to the children of parents who hold unjust views have a duty to bear costs, such as time and emotional labour, in order to influence these children. I defend two arguments in favour of this duty and then respond to the objection that it is unfair to hold individuals liable for the costs of unreasonable parents’ decisions.

Credentialism refers to the practice of hiring or promoting applicants on the basis of their educational qualifications. In this paper, we argue that this can amount to wrongful discrimination against the less qualified. A standard way to defend credentialism appeals to the fact that it minimizes the costs of production. We argue that this argument has unacceptable implications in some cases involving disability- and gender-based discrimination. We claim that, once we appropriately revise this argument, credentialism is revealed to be similarly wrongfully discriminatory. We then consider two objections and draw some preliminary lessons for policymaking.

Empirical evidence shows that certain parental behaviours cause pervasive harms for children. These behaviours are not limited to abuse and neglect but include other non-abusive, non-neglectful behaviour such as invalidation. In this article, I argue that such cases of dysfunctional upbringing are unjust on three broad grounds. First, they seriously interfere with the ideal of equality of opportunity. Second, they entail violations of children's basic rights and interests, including their interest in developing the capacity for autonomy and their interest in enjoying the intrinsic goods of childhood. And third, they are criminogenic and raise a host of problems for criminal justice. For these reasons, justice requires preventing unjust parental behaviours, rather than attempting to redress them once they have already occurred. To identify the appropriate forward-looking interventions, I distinguish the epistemic from the psychological causes of dysfunctional parental behaviours and argue that different interventions are required to tackle each cause. The former should include mandatory education on the potential harms of certain parental behaviours, while the latter should focus on therapeutic measures that address the unconscious and emotional mechanisms of our behaviour.

This thesis focuses on what I call the question of exclusion. This question, I argue, is one that poses serious challenges to social contract approaches to justice and political legitimacy. In an intuitive way, the exclusion of some individuals seems to be a corollary of the social contractualist approach, which ascribes justice or legitimacy to a social arrangement insofar as it can be regarded as the product of the (actual – expressed or tacit – or hypothetical) consent of specified parties. Consequently, this approach excludes those whose consent is not required in order to view an arrangement as legitimate or just. Given the enormous and continuing influence of John Rawls’s social contract theory, I take the Rawlsian view as my primary focus, concentrating on the way in which the question of exclusion raises challenges for Rawlsian contractualism. According to Rawls’s theory, those who participate in the hypothetical contract and to whom political power ought to be justifiable are reasonable and rational. They are reasonable in the sense that they understand and are willing to comply with the requirements of justice and they are rational in that they have the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. This gives rise to two categories of exclusion. In the first part of the thesis, I examine the exclusion of those who will develop the two moral powers sufficiently only if those who are represented in the social contract act (or refrain from acting) in certain ways. This category includes children, foetuses, and unreasonable citizens. Intuitively, justice issues in requirements in at least some of these cases, but it is hard to make sense of this on the Rawlsian approach. In the second part of the thesis, I address the question of exclusion regarding those who will never develop the two moral powers to the requisite degree, such as individuals with severe cognitive disabilities and non-human animals. Again, intuitively, justice issues in requirements here, but their justification is not clear on the contractualist approach. My conclusion is threefold. First, I argue that the problems the question of exclusion poses cannot be addressed by a single solution. Second, I safeguard Rawlsian contractualism by showing how each problem can be resolved. Third, I offer policy-prescriptions on a number of issues, such as education, abortion, and the criminal justice system.

It has been suggested that the era of genetic interventions will sound the death knell for luck egalitarianism, as it will blur the line between chance and choice, on which theories of distributive justice often rest. By examining the threats posed to these theories, a crucial assumption is exposed; it is assumed that a commitment to the neutralisation of the effects of luck implies the endorsement of even the most morally controversial enhancements. In antithesis, I argue that an attractive theory of luck egalitarianism, Dworkinian liberal equality, enables us to deduce plausible implications for genetic engineering. By focusing on the abstract moral commitments at the heart of Dworkin’s theory, a twofold purpose is served. First, they reveal in what ways the criticisms misfire, thereby safeguarding luck egalitarianism. Second, Dworkinian luck egalitarianism is further strengthened, as it produces plausible guidelines for public policy on genetic engineering in liberal societies.

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I defend and expand the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment. Second, I argue that this theory implies that non-consensual neurointerventions – interventions that act directly on one’s brain – are permissible. According to the FTP, punishment is justified as a way of ensuring that citizens who infringe their duty to demonstrate the reliability of their moral powers will thereafter be able to comply with it. I claim that the FTP ought to be expanded to include citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. Thus, states must ensure that their citizens develop their moral reliability, not only because they must enforce their citizens’ compliance with certain duties, but also because states have the duty to maintain the conditions for stability and satisfy their citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. According to this account of the FTP, if neurointerventions are the only or best way of ensuring that offenders can discharge their fortificational duties, states have strong reasons to provide these interventions.

In this paper, I argue that, contrary to what some critics suggest, political liberalism is not exclusionary with regards to the rights and interests of individuals with cognitive disabilities. I begin by defending four publicly justifiable reasons that are collectively sufficient for the inclusion of members of this group. Briefly, these are the epistemic uncertainty that inevitably exists about individuals’ actual capacities, the political liberal duty to treat parents fairly, the social framework that is required for the fulfilment of parental duties, and the necessity of cultivating certain emotions that are strongly associated with reasonableness. These reasons show why a more inclusive reading of political liberalism is plausible, and how this can be achieved without abandoning or revising the theory’s commitment to public reason, the political conception of the person, and the role of social cooperation. I then turn to the question of what a more inclusive political liberalism would look like. More specifically, I argue that, although it would not require the participation of individuals with cognitive disabilities in the practice of legitimation, it would require their full inclusion in the realm of justice as equal rights-bearers.