•  13
    Moral rights without balancing
    Philosophical Studies 1-21. forthcoming.
    How should we think about apparent conflicts of moral rights? I defend a non-balancing and holistic specification model: non-balancing because moral rights have absolute deontic stringency regardless of any balance of independent values; holistic because the content of moral rights is limited only by that of other moral rights. Holistic Specification, as I call the model, offers a principled, non-consequentialist explanation of exceptions to moral rights. Moreover, Holistic Specification explain…Read more
  •  66
    Relational Primitivism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2): 401-422. 2021.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  •  6
    Humanity without Equality?
    Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche. forthcoming.
  •  30
    The Relational Structure of Human Dignity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4): 738-752. 2018.
    ABSTRACTThis article argues that received accounts of the concept of human dignity face more difficulties than has been appreciated, when explaining the connection between human dignity and the duty of respect that dignity is supposed to generate. It also argues that a novel, relational, account has the adequate structure to explain such connection.
  •  30
    Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons
    European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4): 921-943. 2017.
    In spite of the burgeoning philosophical literature on human dignity, Stephen Darwall's second-personal account of the dignity of persons has not received the attention it deserves. This article investigates Darwall's account and argues that it faces a dilemma, for it succumbs either to a problem of antecedence or to the wrong kind of reasons problem. But this need not mean one should reject a second-personal account. Instead, I argue that an alternative second-personal conception, one I will ca…Read more
  •  24
    Human Dignity
    Philosophy Compass 11 (4): 201-210. 2016.
    This article focuses on human dignity as a moral idea and, in particular, on a single but fundamental question: what conception of human dignity, if any, can generate an egalitarian duty to respect all persons? After surveying two mainstream and two alternative conceptions, the article suggests that explaining how human dignity generates an egalitarian duty of respect may be more difficult than has been appreciated
  •  29
    The two standard interpretations of Kant’s view of the relationship between external freedom and public law make one of the terms a means for the production of the other: either public law is justified as a means to external freedom, or external freedom is justified as a means for producing a system of public law. This article defends an alternative, constitutive interpretation: public law is justified because it is partly constitutive of external freedom. The constitutive view requires conceivi…Read more
  •  24
    Human rights and the rights of states: a relational account
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3): 291-317. 2016.
    What is the relationship between human rights and the rights of states? Roughly, while cosmopolitans insist that international morality must regard as basic the interests of individuals, statists maintain that the state is of fundamental moral significance. This article defends a relational version of statism. Human rights are ultimately grounded in a relational norm of reciprocal independence and set limits to the exercise of public authority, but, contra the cosmopolitan, the state is of funda…Read more
  •  15
    The Very Thought of (Wronging) You
    Philosophical Topics 42 (1): 153-175. 2014.
    Claiming rights against one another is a perfectly familiar phenomenon. We express the elementary thought you cannot do that to me in a variety of ways. And yet, in spite of the perfect familiarity of this phenomenon, the two standard philosophical theories of rights face notorious difficulties in accounting for it. My aim in this paper is to introduce a distinctive, second-personal account of rights. I will call this the independence theory of rights, the view that rights are specifications of …Read more
  •  23
    The Indivisibility of Human Rights
    Law and Philosophy 36 (4): 389-418. 2017.
    This article defends a novel, normative conception of the indivisibility of human rights. Human rights are indivisible because normative commitment to one mutually entails normative commitment to another. The normative conception enables us to defend three important theoretical and practical corollaries. First, as a conceptual thesis normative indivisibility lets us see how human rights constitute a unified system not liable to the typical counter-examples to indivisibility as mutual indispensab…Read more