Cambridge University
Faculty of Philosophy
PhD, 2001
CV
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Religion
PhilPapers Editorships
Religious Skepticism
  • An argument against causal decision theory
    Analysis 81 (1): 52-61. 2021.
    This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.
  • Suppose you’d like to believe that p, whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry : you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is to show that reflections on intentionally biased inquiry s…Read more