Armen Marsoobian

__The Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy_ offers the most ambitious survey to date of American philosophical thought._ Provides a comprehensive history of philosophical thought in America. Brings together 24 newly commissioned essays written by leading scholars in American philosophy. Covers all of the major eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophical movements in America including idealism, pragmatism and naturalism. Examines the major figures and themes in American philosophical thought. Includes useful bibliographies.

_Criticism and Compassion: The Ethics and Politics of Claudia Card_ offers a unique perspective on the range of issues explored by Card during her distinguished career in philosophy. Investigates her work as an early leader in the development of feminist philosophy, challenging many preconceptions about the society’s norms regarding gender, marriage, and motherhood Crossing many disciplinary boundaries, her concept of social death has come to play a significant role in multidisciplinary field of genocide studies This volume combines many of Claudia Card’s important essays with recently commissioned essays by leading philosophers whose work has been influenced by Card The full scope of Card’s philosophy is presented here - both in her own words and those of her critics and interpreters.

_The Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy_ offers the most ambitious survey to date of American philosophical thought. Provides a comprehensive history of philosophical thought in America. Brings together 24 newly commissioned essays written by leading scholars in American philosophy. Covers all of the major eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophical movements in America including idealism, pragmatism and naturalism. Examines the major figures and themes in American philosophical thought. Includes useful bibliographies.

__The Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy_ offers the most ambitious survey to date of American philosophical thought._ Provides a comprehensive history of philosophical thought in America. Brings together 24 newly commissioned essays written by leading scholars in American philosophy. Covers all of the major eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophical movements in America including idealism, pragmatism and naturalism. Examines the major figures and themes in American philosophical thought. Includes useful bibliographies.

Eleven Cambridge academics approach philosophy from various fields, to broaden its practical and theoretical applications. Guides a tour through various academic departments—including history, political science, classics, law, and English—to ferret out the philosophy in their syllabi, and to show philosophy's symbiotic relationship with other fields Provides a map of what philosophy is considered to be at Cambridge in the early twenty-first century, about a hundred years after the "founding fathers" of analytic philosophy reigned at Cambridge Offers useful new directions for the study and application of philosophy, and how other fields can influence them.

_Putting Information First_ focuses on Luciano Floridi’s contributions to the philosophy of information. Respected scholars stimulate the debate on the most distinctive and controversial views he defended, and present the philosophy of information as a specific way of doing philosophy. Contains eight essays by leading scholars, a reply by Luciano Floridi, and an epilogue by Terrell W. Bynum Explains the importance of philosophy of information as a specific way of doing philosophy Focuses directly on the work of Luciano Floridi in the area of philosophy of information, but also connects to contemporary concerns in philosophy more generally Illustrates several debates that arise from core themes in the philosophy of information.

The Armenian world was shattered by the 1915 genocide. Not only were thousands of lives lost but families were displaced and the narrative threads that connected them to their own past and homelands were forever severed. Many have been left with only fragments of their family histories: a story of survival passed on by a grandparent who made it through the cataclysm or, if lucky, an old photograph of a distant, silent, ancestor. By contrast the Dildilian family chose to speak. Two generations gave voice to their experience in lengthy written memoirs, in diaries and letters, and most unusually in photographs and drawings. Their descendant Armen T. Marsoobian uses all these resources to tell their story and, in doing so, brings to life the pivotal and often violent moments in Armenian and Ottoman history from the massacres of the late nineteenth century to the final expulsions in the 1920s during the Turkish War of Independence. Unlike most Armenians, the Dildilians were allowed to convert to Islam and stayed behind while their friends, colleagues and other family members perished in the death marches of 1915-1916.Their remarkable story is one of survival against the overwhelming odds and survival in the face of peril.

This article argues for the claim that we are morally responsible (in the qualified sense proposed in the article) for the crimes of our ancestors if our ancestors, as a collectivity, were part of a community for whose sake and in whose name crimes were committed that meet the definition of the crime of genocide. This claim of ‘‘vicarious intergenerational moral responsibility’’ is supported by two arguments. The first counters the claim that one cannot have responsibilities for events in the past by arguing that this claim oversimplifies one’s relationship to one’s past and the collectivities in which people live. Such collectivities, both ethnic and religious, have identities across time; identification with these collectivities involves accepting certain moral obligations. The second argument is based on the following premise: the political, social, cultural, and educational institutions that mark all large collectivities, such as nations, provide a degree of moral reliability that is necessary for individuals to carry out their legitimate interests. We count on such institutions to exemplify the values that allow individuals to flourish in their life activities. These institutions are by their very nature intergenerational. The moral reliability of such institutions thus requires that we endeavor to acknowledge and repair the damage caused by the failure of these institutions in the past. Accordingly, their health engenders a moral obligation on our part. Vicarious intergenerational moral responsibility is a responsibility not to the past per se but to the past as it plays an active role in the present.

This dissertation critically examines the nature and meaning of metaphysics in the philosophy of John Dewey. This is accomplished by focusing our analysis of Dewey's metaphysics upon the level of generality appropriate to the study of human experience. Central to Dewey's metaphysics is the category of the consummatory or what he alternatively calls the qualitative. An analysis of this category serves as the basis for our reflections upon the adequacy of Dewey's entire categorical framework. Our concern with the consummatory is to clearly spell out how this category hinders or aids in the successful articulation of the significant traits of experience. Our analysis begins with Dewey's critical identification of the limitations of Greek metaphysical thinking engendered by its misappropriation of the qualitative element into a metaphysics of being. This is followed by chapters on Dewey's general theory of experience and his more specialized theories of art and inquiry. We conclude that Dewey's categorical framework does not succeed in meaningfully distinguishing these domains of art and inquiry within a generalized account of human experiencing. Dewey's categories generate certain complications, a number of which are explored in the course of this work. ;Our thesis is that these complications result from the fact that Dewey has framed his major categories at a level incommensurate with the proposed theoretical ends of his philosophy of experience. It is often the case that a category is framed by Dewey so as to set a standard or an ideal by which to judge the worth of a certain aspect of experience, as opposed to providing an account of that aspect regardless of its worth. Dewey's categorial framework does not allow him to consistently recognize the parity between all aspects of experience as experience. Dewey has taken a particular "ideal" of experience as a general structural feature of all experience and by doing so is unable to acknowledge that the "best" may neither be the most pervasive nor the most distinctive of human traits