Arthur Bueno

This article engages with Amy Allen’s critique of Adorno’s account of modern subjectivity as marked by a “paradox of authoritarianism”. Faced with the authoritarian dissolution of individuality in post-liberal capitalism, Adorno appears to find no option but to rely on the same repressive ego he previously criticised. In response to this impasse, Allen turns to Kleinian psychoanalysis to conceptualise an alternative, non-coercive mode of psychic integration. Still, her framework does not account for how the transition between authoritarian and emancipatory forms of subjectivity might unfold in social reality – a gap I term the “paradox of emancipation”. Revisiting Adorno’s analysis, I argue that it does not culminate in a paradox but rather in a dialectical account of the modern subject, where ego strength and ego weakness are inextricably intertwined. This interpretation provides a framework for rethinking his diagnosis of an authoritarian “end of psychology”: precisely where his analysis appears to reach a political impasse, one can discern the persistence of psychological conflict, signalling a latent potential for autonomy. As I argue, Adorno conceives the modern subject’s inclination towards self-destruction as harbouring, in dialectical tension, a countertendency towards emancipation.

On the basis of an analysis of Brazil’s political history from 2013 to the present, this essay advances the idea that the current rise of the far right – in that country and possibly elsewhere – can be understood as one among various political expressions of a ‘post-depressive constellation.’ Such a diagnosis takes its cue from analyses which, in the 1990s and 2000s, recognised in the rapid increase in the depression rates an index of major social transformations occurring in the last decades of the 20th century. The foregrounding of depression in clinical diagnoses was considered, then, the sign of a new social order: one in which individuals were faced with ever stronger requirements of self-responsibility and authentic self-realization in a context of declining social support and escalating inequality, competition and precariousness. Today, however, we seem to have reached a point at which the tensions of this order – which can be designated, metonymically, as the ‘depressive society’ – intensified to such an extent that its persistence appears to be seriously compromised. It is in this sense that we may speak of a post-depressive constellation: a situation in which the social psychological tensions of the depressive order have reached a peak, leading to a variety of reactions and struggles but not yet to the establishment of a new consensus and a stable institutional framework. While suggesting that such a diagnosis might be significant for understanding contemporary political processes in many parts of the world, this essay will focus on how these dynamics have unravelled in Brazil’s recent political life – from the mass demonstrations of June 2013 to the rise of new right-wing movements that culminated in the election of Jair Bolsonaro. The Brazilian case seems, indeed, particularly well-suited to examine the contours and outcomes of this possibly broader process. It allows, in particular, for the distinction of two political forms that have taken centre stage in the past years and can be understood as reactions to core tensions of the depressive order: ‘post-depressive effervescence’ and ‘post-depressive authoritarianism’.

This paper discusses the relationship between Axel Honneth’s intersubjective theory of recognition and his political theory of democratic ethical life by addressing the potentials and difficulties attached to the notion of social pathology. Taking into account the diverse uses of this concept throughout Honneth’s oeuvre, it focuses initially on two of its formulations: first, the more recent discussions presented in “The Diseases of Society”, some of which can be read in continuity with arguments presented in Freedom’s Right; second, an implicit conception of social pathology that can be found in Struggle for Recognition. These formulations involve contrastingly different premises with regard to phenomenological, methodological, social-ontological and etiological matters. I argue that such differences can be better grasped if one bears in mind two distinctive ways of understanding the fundamental intuition at the basis of the notion of social pathology: either as an analogy or as a homology. By disclosing the actual or potential discrepancies between both conceptions, the aim is to outline the grounds on which they could be brought together within the framework of a comprehensive concept. With this purpose, I then critically examine a third conception of social pathology which was first presented in Suffering from Indeterminacy and later developed, with some restrictions, in Freedom’s Right. Finally, a definition of social pathology is suggested which can bring together the different contributions of each conception while avoiding their pitfalls.