Arthur de Castro Machado

The aim of this work is to present an attempt to respond directly to the problem of cognitive balance. This problem consists in explaining the balance between, on one side, a linguistic agent with finite capabilities for storing and processing information, and, on the other side, an open number of sentences. The direct response I propose consists in postulating a generative mechanism in cognition whose behavior is described by a formal-modular theory. This response requires a psychological interpretation of the compositional mechanism, responsible for generating the reading of an open output from a limited number of items as input, as well as a specific reading of semantic processing. The structure of this work is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, I motivate the problem of cognitive balance and the postulation of a generative mechanism; then I show that this mechanism has a structure composed of lexicon+rules, which seems at least structurally similar to the composition of a formal theory, lexicon+rules; and, in the case of formal theory, there is a compositional mechanism capable of dealing with an open output; however, there are at least three readings of this mechanism, and among them, only the psychological one contributes to a direct response to the problem of cognitive balance. In the second chapter, I present the modularist background which underpins my response, and I provide some empirical arguments in favor of the thesis that semantic processing requires a modular approach. Finally, in the third chapter, I show that this response to the problem of cognitive balance, while leading to a conception of meaning as something mental, is not irreconcilable with Frege's rejection of psychologism; furthermore, I also show that, by adopting a computational approach to the mind, this response resolves a contrast within Fregean theory between two conceptions of meaning, one as something internal and the other as external.

In this article, I analyse the coextensionality and compatibility between personal identity and survival from the neolockean’s perspective. The article’s content is divided in four parts. First, I present the personal identity problem and the neolockean’s perspective of the problem. Second, I present the theory of the philosopher Derek Parfit (1942-2017), who distinguishes personal identity from survival, treating this last one as the one that gives importance to identity. Third, I present David Lewis’s (1942-2017) objection to Parfit’s theory as well as Lewis’s theory, which rescues the compatibility between personal identity and survival from their coextensionality. Fourth, I offer some conclusions and guesses having in mind the exposed discussion.