Artur Szutta

This paper critically evaluates the libertarian theory of evictionism as a proposed solution to the moral and legal problem of abortion. Evictionism, defended by Walter Block, attempts to reconcile pro-life and pro-choice intuitions by distinguishing between eviction (removal of the fetus) and killing, grounding the permissibility of abortion in absolute property rights and bodily autonomy. The paper systematically examines Block’s defence of evictionism, addressing key claims such as those about the status of the fetus as a trespasser, the absoluteness of property rights, and the acceptability of lethal eviction in early pregnancy. Drawing on thought experiments and the principle of proportionality, I argue that evictionism fails to account for moral responsibility toward dependent beings and leads to ethically implausible conclusions. Furthermore, I show that evictionism contradicts the proviso Block himself accepts, ultimately concluding that the theory is internally inconsistent.

The article is devoted to selected new trends in metaethics, ethics, political philosophy, and the practice of philosophy with the use of artificial intelligence. It consists of five parts. In the first part, I analyze the meaning of the question about new trends in analytical philosophy. In the second part, I present the latest trends in metaethics. In the third part, I briefly characterize the ethics of artificial intelligence. The fourth part, devoted to political philosophy, includes a presentation of the latest publications on meritocracy. The article concludes with considerations about practising philosophy in the age of artificial intelligence.

Artykuł stanowi odpowiedź na Stanisława Judyckiego argument z odwróconego spektrum aksjologicznego za koniecznością odwołania się do Bożych nakazów dla uzasadnienia naszych przekonań moralnych. Tekst składa się z trzech części. W pierwszej prezentuję Judyckiego argument z odwróconego spektrum aksjologicznego oraz odwołanie się do Bożych nakazów dla uzasadnienia naszych moralnych przekonań. Na potrzeby tego tekstu uznaję potrzebę odwołania się do teizmu dla pokonania sceptycyzmu moralnego. W części drugiej wysuwam zarzut, że stanowisko Judyckiego popada w błędne koło. W części trzeciej proponuję alternatywną wersję teistycznego uzasadnienia wiedzy moralnej, zgodnie z którą możemy odwołać się do Boga jako tego, który stworzył ludzi w taki sposób, aby dysponowali zdolnością wiarygodnego poznania moralnego.

Author: Szutta Artur Title: WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ’S CONCEPT OF THE ‘THIRD STATES’ (Stany trzecie w ujęciu Władysława Tatarkiewicza) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.13/14, number: 2011/2-3, pages: 617-627 Keywords: “THIRD STATES”, LEISURE, PHILOSOPHY, THEORY, INTELLECT, SENSE OF LIFE, WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ, JOSEPH PIEPER Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The article treats on the concept of “third states” (as opposed to the other two kinds of states: those of work and entertainment) introduced by Władysław Tatarkiewicz in his treatise On Happiness. A thorough analysis of the passage on “third states” as well as of the very concept allows to see its relevance to the considerations on such important philosophical questions as those of the nature of doing philosophy, the meaning of life, intellectual intuition, theoria or contemplation. The paper consists of five parts. The first part is focused on Tatarkiewicz’s understanding of “third states” as well as on a phenomenological analysis of the concept itself. The second part is a kind of extension of the analysis enriched by Josef Pieper’s interpretation of the idea of leisure which I find very close to what Tatarkiewicz means by “third states”. In the light of the analysis the concept of the ‘third states’ turns out to be very inspiring and useful in dealing with a number of philosophical questions, which is shown in the fourth part of the paper. The final step consists of questioning the above conclusion by short outlining a possible naturalistic interpretation of the ‘third states’ in the light of which the picture of philosophy, human life or human cognition, based on the concept of the ‘third states’ might turn out to be a mere illusion. I do not give a final answer to this question but treat the conclusion of the paper as an invitation to a deeper consideration of the matter

Przedmiotem artykułu jest krytyka Arystotelesowskiego republikanizmu, którą przeprowadza Kymlicka, oraz jego alternatywna propozycja tzw. republikanizmu instrumentalnego. Podejmę dyskusję ze stanowiskiem Kymlicki, która skoncentruje się wokół dwóch kwestii. Po pierwsze, czy celem życia ludzkiego jest uczestnictwo w polityce? Po drugie, czy cnoty powinny być traktowane przez państwo jako coś więcej niż środki konieczne do utrzymania i dobrego funkcjonowania jego instytucji, to znaczy jako konieczny (autoteliczny) element dobrego życia, który winien stać się przedmiotem zabiegów państwa?

The article concerns the question of civic virtues, the aim being to present and argue for the personalist conception of citizenship. It consists of four parts. Inthe first part, following Will Kymlicka, I argue for the need of active citizenship; my claim is that personalism offers an attractive concept of such attitude. In thesecond part I make an outline of the personalist idea of authentic community, including the idea of authentic political community, and thus set the necessaryconceptual context for further considerations. In the third, central part I focus on characterizing authentic civic attitudes that constitute a true political community.In the fourth part I supplement the outline of civic attitudes with the characterization of unauthentic attitudes. In the conclusion, I briefly point out in what waythe personalist concept of authentic citizenship presented here may find a fruitful application to the contemporary debates in political philosophy.

In this paper I focus on Roger Crisp’s objection to moral intuitionism. The objection is that in the face of disagreement, especially between ethical experts (understood here as epistemic peers), the mere fact of one’s having a moral intuition, even after reflection, is insufficient to hold a given moral belief. The core assumption of the objection is the consensus condition (or Sidgwick’s principle) according to which in the face of reasonable disagreement with one’s epistemic peers one should suspend one’s contested view. My goal is a critical analysis of this objection (with special attention paid to the idea of consensus condition). I offer five counter-arguments to show that Crisp’s argumentation is not conclusive. They are as follows: an argument from self-reference, from the doubt about the possibility of voluntarily suspending one’s judgment, from the priority of the first-person evidential basis, from epistemic luck, and from practical consequences of observing the consensus condition.