•  21
    I maintain that among the main views concerning the central questions of epistemology (in particular, the question of justified belief) are evidentialism, (Pyrrhonian) scepticism and fideism. In this paper, I first present the arguments in favour of a form of evidentialism, according to which no false belief can be epistemically justified on the basis of evidence. Second, I consider the historical emergence of evidentialism during the period of the early Enlightenment. In particular, I explore t…Read more
  •  11
    Justification Épistémique
    L’Encyclopédie Philosophique (Version Grand Public). 2018.
    Certaines croyances sont justifiées tandis que d’autres ne le sont pas. Si je crois que la Terre est ronde, on peut considérer que ma croyance est justifiée, alors que si je crois qu’elle est plate, elle ne l’est pas. Qu’est-ce qui différencie les unes des autres ? Une croyance justifiée doit-elle toujours être fondée sur une autre croyance justifiée ? Comment pouvons-nous éviter la conclusion sceptique selon laquelle nous ne sommes pas justifiés à croire quoi que ce soit ? Ces questions classiq…Read more
  •  7
    On Williamson's Account of Propositional Evidence
    Logique Et Analyse 56 (223): 347-354. 2013.
    In this paper I examine Williamson’s (2000) claim that all evidence is propositional. I propose to reject this claim. I give two objections to two premises of Williamson’s argument. The first is a critique of Williamson’s claim that we choose between hypotheses on the basis of our evidence. The second objection is that Williamson’s claim that evidence is an explanandum of an hypothesis leads to counter-intuitive consequences and thus is not central to what evidence is, at least on an ordinary un…Read more
  •  102
    Save the children!
    Analysis 76 (4): 418-422. 2016.
  •  93
    Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge.
    Filosofia Unisinos 17 (3): 302-307. 2016.
    According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more gene…Read more
  •  91
    On Having Evidence: A Reply to Neta
    Logos and Episteme 6 (3). 2015.
    According to one line of thought only propositions can be part of one’s evidence, since only propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence. Ram Neta has challenged this argument. In this paper I respond to Neta’s challenge.
  •  67
    In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.
  •  9
    Knowledge, Practice, and Merit
    Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2): 133-152. 2012.
    In this paper I discuss the role that knowledge plays with regard to rational action. It has been recently argued that knowledge determines appropriate action. I examine this proposal, consider objections against it, and finally propose a defense of it.
  •  37
    In this paper, I argue against recent versions of justification norms of action and practical deliberation . I demonstrate that these norms yield unacceptable results in deception cases. However, a further modification of justification norms in the light of these results appears to be ad hoc. Hence, I claim, we should reject justification norms of action and practical deliberation.