Artyom Ukhov

Vladimir Solovyov’s historiosophy emerged from late nineteenth-century Russia’s geopolitical tensions and intellectual debates concerning the menace from the East. Influenced by Leont’ev’s conservatism, Danilevsky’s cultural theories, and Dostoyevsky’s idea of East and West cultural synthesis, he developed his own conception of cultural unity based on the idea of Christian progress. His critiques of Byzantine Orthodoxy and the Russian state–church dynamic underscored a broader rejection of stagnation. It is concluded that the roots of Solovyov’s pan-Mongolism lie in his theocratic views and his historiosophical search for ways to overcome the division of the Western world on the religious ground of the Universal Church. Solovyov appears to highlight the Chinese experience of constructing a theocratic state not by accident; through this, he aimed to demonstrate a model for a future theocratic state based not on paganism, but on Christianity. He warned of an apocalyptic “Eastern danger” while advocating cultural synthesis over isolation. Although neo-Eurasianists later misappropriated his ideas, Solovyov’s vision emphasized Russia’s Western Christian identity and moral accountability, framing Eastern threats as divine retribution for spiritual decline. His works, blending prophecy and philosophy, remain pivotal in discussions of Russia’s Eurasian identity and civilizational discourse.

The article reveals the problem of the ultimate base of cognition as one of the most important since formation of gnoseology and actual in the modern philosophy. The conclusion is drawn that, despite the logic uncertainty, the analysis of a problem of the ultimate bases of knowledge represents methodologically valuable criterion of true. Thus use of the given criterion probably only at synthesis of logic and anthropological aspects that assumes unity of sensual, rational and intuitive ways of knowledge. It allows avoiding the conflict of theory of knowledge and psychology while decision of a problem of the ultimate bases, preserving scientific principles of objectivity and consistency.

The article is about one of the vital problem for analytic philosophy which is how to define truth value for sentences which include their own truth predicate. The aim of the article is to determine Saul Kripke’s approach to widen epistemological truth to create a systemic model of truth. Despite a lot of work on the subject, the theme of truth is no less relevant to modern philosophy. With the help of S. Kripke’s article “Outline of the Theory of Truth” and R. L. Kirkham’s work “Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction” the author tried to represent a non-classical approach which is now known as Saul Kripke’s truth value gaps theory. Considering his solving of the Liar Paradox, as well as the Strenghened Liar, it is obvious that there could be the circumstances (or facts) that make sentences have no truth value. In that case the solving of the paradox attracts Kleene’s non-classical three-valued logic which contains the third way and the solution falls into the gap between truth and falsity. Hence there are no relevant and full satisfactory ways to solve the Liar’s Paradox by the language-levels ap- proach. The task consists in an extension of the approach to natural languages and elimination of an ad hoc element as well. Besides that, the language-levels approach refers to the speaker that means that only the last one is allowed to define the hierarchy of the levels and truth value of sentence, but often he does not know what level he is speaking of. As Kripke stated, contingent facts can lead to a paradox which isn’t allowed for a logical point of view. However usage of mathematical apparatus allows the theory in question to be universalized and moreover paves the way to futher epistemological develop- ment of the problem in question. As Kripke’s theory is formalized and presented as a functional series, it gives access to a system model of truth whose elements would be epistemological theories (concepts) of truth. Such a model, for instance, confirms the validity of the deflationary concept of truth. Refs 7.

Kirkham’s book is not a plain attempt of asking the questions like ‘What is truth?’ since it would, according to him, be one more mistake followed by confusion. The components of this four-dimensional confusion (vagueness, ambiguity, several ways of describing the same project, and one answer for two distinctly different questions about truth) find its original explanation in Kirkham’s book. Having stated that all of the previous theories of truth were just irrelevant to the question of “What is truth” because when asking different questions about truth, he draws his non-trivial approach of assigning each theorist to the particular question (or ‘project’) he or she was trying to answer with his or her theory of truth. So, the main merit of Kirkham’s work is the clarification of this most urgent philosophical problem of truth on the way of metaphysics.