Asad Zaman

This paper examines the influence of positivist conceptions of scientific knowledge on contemporary economic methodology. While such views have been extensively critiqued within the philosophy of science, they continue to shape standard economic reasoning, often in simplified or implicit forms. The paper identifies several core misconceptions associated with positivism—particularly concerning the role of unobservables, causality, and the relationship between theory and evidence—and argues that these hinder the development of an adequate understanding of economic phenomena. Drawing on well-known themes such as the underdetermination of theory by evidence and the theory-ladenness of observation, the paper shows that empirical data alone cannot uniquely determine theoretical conclusions. These considerations have important implications for economics, where the search for universal, context-independent laws has often led to neglect of historical, social, and institutional specificity. The paper argues that recognizing the limits of positivist methodology supports a pluralist approach, in which economic theories are understood as historically situated and context-dependent.

This paper surveys a wide range of empirical evidence that challenges the descriptive adequacy of neoclassical utility theory as a model of human behavior. Contrary to its textbook presentation as a positive, empirically grounded theory, utility maximization rests on normative assumptions about rationality that are systematically violated in observed decision-making. Drawing on findings from behavioral economics, experimental game theory, psychology, and cross-cultural studies, the paper documents persistent divergences between theoretical predictions and actual behavior across domains including fairness, altruism, cooperation, intertemporal choice, risk assessment, and preference formation. These anomalies are not isolated but form a coherent pattern: human motivations are plural and socially embedded; cognitive capacities are bounded; and preferences are context-dependent and often constructed rather than given. The cumulative weight of this evidence undermines the claim that utility theory provides even an approximate first-order model of behavior. The paper argues that attempts to accommodate these findings within the orthodox framework have had limited success, and that the scale and systematic nature of the empirical failures place increasing pressure on its core assumptions. Notably, much of this evidence has accumulated over several decades, yet remains largely absent from standard textbook presentations of economic theory. This suggests the need for a reconsideration of the conceptual foundations of economics. More broadly, the case raises philosophical questions about the status of economic models, the role of normative assumptions in ostensibly positive science, and the criteria by which theories are retained despite persistent empirical refutation.

This paper addresses a persistent anomaly in the philosophy of economics: the continued use of theories that are widely known to be empirically false. Drawing on examples such as utility maximization, monetary neutrality, and equilibrium labor markets, it argues that standard explanations—methodological inertia, technical limitations, or slow paradigm change—are insufficient. Instead, the paper advances a structural thesis: economic theories function not primarily as truth-seeking devices but as ideological instruments that sustain existing power relations. Through historical and conceptual analysis, it shows how core theoretical constructs (e.g., marginal productivity theory, scarcity, and self-correcting markets) embed normative claims about justice, distribution, and social order while presenting themselves as value-neutral science. The persistence of these constructs, despite systematic empirical refutation, is explained by their role in legitimizing the interests of economic elites. Situating this argument within broader debates in philosophy of science, the paper suggests that economics exemplifies a “post-real” discipline in which theoretical survival is decoupled from empirical success. The analysis calls for a re-evaluation of the aims and standards of economic inquiry, with greater attention to its normative foundations and its entanglement with political power.

In the early twentieth century, under the influence of logical positivism, Lionel Robbins changed the definition and the central concern of economics. Abandoning "material welfare" as unobservable and hence unscientific, scarcity was made the new foundation of the discipline. Despite apparent objectivity, this concept embed three major normative assumptions, as this paper shows. The first of these is the "exogeneity" of tastes, which prevents examination of how capitalism shapes tastes to sustain overproduction, while staying within discipline boundaries. The second is the assumption that human welfare is maximized by preference satisfaction - people always choose what is best for them. This justifies libertarian and laissez-fair economics, but empirical results from behavioral economics show frequent violations - people often make choices which harm their welfare. The third assumption is a Lockean commitment to private property. This means that one cannot contemplate redistributive policies which would improve collective welfare. The message is that these normative commitments are concealed within the methodological framework, while claims of objectivity and value-neutrality are made for the discipline.

Polanyi's book, The Great Transformation, provides an analysis of the emergence and significance of capitalist economic structures which differs radically from those currently universally taught in economic textbooks. This analysis is based on a methodological approach which is also radically different from existing methodologies for economics, and more generally social science. This methodology is used by Polanyi without explicit articulation. Our goal in this article is to articulate the methodology used in this book to bring out the several dimensions on which it differs from current approaches to social science. Among the key differences Polanyi provides substantial scope for human agency and capability to change the course of history. He also shows that the social, political and economic spheres of human existence are deeply interlinked and cannot be analysed in isolation, as current approaches assume.

This review evaluates Ziauddin Ahmad’s Islam, Poverty and Income Distribution within the broader landscape of Islamic economics. It distinguishes between two dominant approaches in the field: neoclassical adaptations with Islamic elements and more holistic but often speculative Islamic visions. Ahmad’s work is identified as a significant contribution for grounding its analysis in Islamic sources and historical practice, particularly in emphasizing the eradication of poverty as the central objective of an Islamic economic system. The review highlights the book’s strengths in articulating institutional mechanisms for poverty alleviation, while also noting limitations, especially regarding the treatment of monetary policy and the lack of detailed historical analysis. Overall, the work is seen as opening a promising and underdeveloped line of inquiry in Islamic economics.

This paper is concerned with the evaluation of the performance of the normality tests to ensure the validity of the t-statistics used for assessing significance of regressors in a regression model. For this purpose, we have explored 40 distributions to find the most damaging distribution on the t-statistic. Power comparisons are conducted to find the best performing test against these distributions. It is found that Anderson-Darling statistic is the best option among the five normality tests, Jarque-Bera, Shapiro-Francia, D'Agostino & Pearson, Anderson-Darling, & Lilliefors.