Asadullah Khan

This paper traces the development in Heidegger’s thinking of truth from the early drafts of “On the Essence of Truth” (1930) to the published essay of 1943/49. It argues that the shift from the early thinking of truth, which understands truth as disclosure in terms of horizonal projection, to the later conception, which understands truth as disclosure granted by the open-region (die Gegnet), marks a deepening that entails significant development in Heidegger’s thinking as a whole. This paper follows the development of the relation between comportment, letting-be, disclosure, and concealment in early drafts, and shows how the later published version rethinks these in light of a more primordial openness that had remained unthought in the early drafts.

Clinicians have an obligation to ensure that patients with adequate capacity can make autonomous decisions. Thus, patients who choose to forego treatment and leave hospitals “against medical advice” are typically allowed to do so. But what happens when they require clinicians’ assistance to physically leave? Is it incumbent upon clinicians to not only respect and fulfill patients’ requests with which they disagree, but to physically assist in their fulfillment? We attempt to develop an ethical framework wherein clinicians can honor patients’ wishes without necessarily sacrificing their own moral position.

RésuméJe soutiens, à travers Heidegger, que la notion de τὸ ἐξαίφνης dans le Parménide ne signifie pas l’éternité, ou une trace d’éternité dans le temps, mais implique plutôt une conception primordiale du temps. Dans la déduction numéro deux, la relation entre la stasis et la kinesis devient problématique à cause de la notion de τὸ νῦν. Cela conduit Parménide, dans la déduction numéro trois, à poser la notion de τὸ ἐξαίφνης pour résoudre cette relation problématique, ce qui implique une conception primordiale du temps.