AScholl Scholl

Context: Niklas Luhmann is considered to be a major proponent of the constructivist movement who based his highly complex sociological theory on constructivist concepts such as Maturana’s autopoiesis and Spencer Brown’s distinction. Problem: Despite heavily borrowing from constructivism, there are doubts as to whether his epistemological standpoint was properly constructivist. Method: In six papers and 14 Open Peer Commentaries, Luhmann’s epistemological understanding, understanding of science, and use and development of constructivist concepts is examined. Results: The authors’ papers and commentaries cover a broad range of topics including the concepts of the observer, meaning, environment, and structural coupling

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: Matuszek’s article criticizes Luhmann’s systems theory in particular and constructivism in general with respect to philosophical inconsistency caused by some ontological implications of constructivist epistemology. Providing a coherent interpretation of ontology and epistemology is worth the effort in order to solve philosophical problems. However, the question arises of whether philosophical reasoning actually is of any relevance for empirical research. I argue that both Luhmann’s operative constructivism and constructivism in general already comply with Matuszek’s suggestions

Upshot: New publications about Niklas Luhmann and his theory of social systems address the question of Luhmann’s epistemological standpoints. A publication on the “ontologies of the modern world” hastily describes social conventions and processes of stabilization as modern ontologies and a new handbook on Luhmann’s life, oeuvre and impact underestimates the major contribution of constructivism in Luhmann’s theory. Although the two books are comprehensive and informative, they do not make enough use of the constructivist potential to explain both Luhmann’s theory as founded upon constructivist epistemology and the processes of modernization

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt > Upshot: Radical Constructivism should be strictly process-oriented to avoid hidden ontology. S. J. Schmidt provides such a strict process-orientation from a very philosophical viewpoint that, however, still lacks access to empirical research. The purpose of this commentary is to show a way to apply Schmidt’s philosophical framework to empirical research

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivism as a Key Towards Further Understanding of Communication, Culture and Society” by Raivo Palmaru. Upshot: Palmaru addresses several problems with respect to radical constructivism, in particular the relationship between the micro-level and macro-level of social phenomena, i.e., communication, culture, and society. Related to this, I dispute three of Palmaru’s key claims: the relationship between micro-social and macro-social phenomena is a specific problem of radical constructivism; radical constructivism does not solve the problem of the micro-macro-link; the author’s solution to the respective problem is necessary and sufficient.

Problem: Is Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems based on a constructivist or on a realist epistemology? Luhmann’s own elaborations seem to oscillate between both standpoints. Method: The argumentation provided in this article starts with a detailed reconstruction of Luhmann’s epistemology and of Luhmann’s criticism towards radical constructivism and then examines the consequences for a comparison of systems theory and (radical) constructivism. Results: Although Luhmann’s operative constructivism can be distinguished from radical constructivism, the differences are not considered fundamental. Luhmann’s epistemology is clearly nearer to constructivism than to realism and it shares most of constructivism’s key concepts, such as self-referential logic, a strict relation between observer and observed, and the relativism of reality construction. Implications: Luhmann’s criticism of radical constructivism must be understood in the context of his sociological background. Most of his arguments against radical constructivism can be considered apprehensions of misleading interpretations of radical constructivism rather than of substantial criticism. They may help to clarify a radical constructivist epistemology. Constructivist content: The paper attempts to check whether Luhmann’s theory of social theory is based on (radical) constructivist epistemology