Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup

In recent years increasing attention has been given to systematic comparison of theories of consciousness. Laudable practical projects have emerged in this regard, such as adversarial collaboration and the development of databases lending themselves to comparisons of empirical support for theories. In addition to the practical advances, theoretical advances have been made, such as a list of issues a theory of consciousness must address. We propose adding the issue of the ontogenetic emergence (O-emergence) of consciousness to the list of issues we use to evaluate theories of consciousness. O-emergence concerns how and when consciousness emerges ontogenetically in human beings. The underlying assumption is that there exists a point in the development of a human individual before which that individual is not and cannot be conscious. This assumption, in turn, depends on a widely shared assumption of cognitive neuroscience, which is that consciousness somehow depends on — or derives from — brain activity. In this paper, we lay out the O-emergence criterion and investigate whether it can be accounted for within the Global Neuronal Workspace theory, the Self-Organizing Meta-representational Account, and the Reorganization of Elementary Functions framework.

A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics’ performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which — hopefully — will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step.

I present an empirically based argument for the plausibility of misrepresentation as posited by some higher-order theories of consciousness. The argument relies on the assumption that conscious states are generated by processes in the brain. The underlying idea is that if the brain generates conscious states then misrepresentation may occur. The reason for this is that brain states can be corrupted and, accordingly, a conscious state that is at least partly caused by a corrupted brain state may be a misrepresentation. Our body of knowledge from cognitive and behavioral neuroscience lends support to the idea that corruption of neural states is both possible and relatively frequent. If this is the case, I argue, it is plausible that occasionally such corruption may result in misrepresentation. I support this claim by arguing that the most prevalent theoretical alternative to the occurrence of misrepresentation—the so-called no-consciousness reply—seems less supported by our current knowledge in the domain of consciousness and cognition. This way of arguing for misrepresentation is different from other empirically based arguments in the debate because it is a meta-level argument resting on a general premise that most participants in the debate can accept.

I present two caveats to the meta-problem challenge to theories of consciousness. Chalmers suggests that a theory of consciousness that solves the hard problem should also inform us about the meta-problem, and vice versa. The first caveat is the view that mechanism M, the mechanism through which content becomes conscious, may be neutral with respect to the content it renders conscious. This means that there can be no systematic connection between M and conscious content. The second caveat concerns how we should treat the problem intuitions fueling the meta-problem. I argue that we should award them no special status with respect to their explanatory power in relation to the hard problem.

There is a fact of the matter about the nature of the human will and whether it can be considered ‘free’. To investigate this fact is attempting to answer what can be termed the metaphysical question of free will. The M-question is not identical to the problem of free will. ‘The problem of free will’ is often presented as one of two distinct problems. The first problem is whether free will is possible given determinism or indeterminism. The second problem is whether free will is necessary for responsibility and morals. I argue that in providing an answer to the M-question, one should disregard both of these problems. The two ‘problems of free will’ need not- and should not- yield any influence on the answer to the M-question. The normative claim, ‘that they should not’ is based on considerations of prudence recommending that care should be taken to avoid introducing elements that create arbitrary biases on subjects with which they may have no necessary connection. Traditionally theories of free will have taken either determinism or indeterminism as a precondition. However, we can do without a definite answer to the D/I-issue, if the answer provided to the Mquestion needs no precondition. This would make it compatible in a certain overarching way i.e. ‘supercompatible’. Do not confuse this idea with compatibilism. Rather supercompatibilism is a constraint, not a theory. Supercompatibilism is the doctrine that theories of free will should be broadly compatible with regard to the D/I-issue. Broad compatibility thus entails a threshold to the severity of the consequences any definite answer to the D/I-issue can have. A strong supercompatibilist accepts no consequences, and thus set the threshold at zero. In contrast, a weak supercompatibilist will have a higher threshold. She can accept that different outcomes of the D/I-issue prompt changes in her theory, as long as those changes are non-critical. Naturally one cannot be a supercompatibilist if any outcome on the D/I-issue makes one’s theory unfeasible. Prudency recommends supercompatibilism because presently the relation between either determinism or indeterminism and the M-question can at best be contingent. It can at best be contingent because either of the theses may eventually be discovered to be false. Since the matter is scientifically and theoretically unsettled, taking any outcome of the D/I-issue as a precondition will be the result of arbitrary convictions and preferences of the theorizer. I submit that the most prudent way to deal with this contingency is adopting supercompatibilism. Like with the D/I-issue, prudency recommends keeping the R/M-issue apart from the M-question. This prudency is based on asymmetrical influence between the R/M-issue and the M-question. It is possible to both pose and answer the question “do humans have any sort of free will?” without any reference to the R/M-issue. Therefore the answer to the M-question must be essentially independent of any conclusions regarding the R/M-issue. So, since the M-question is independent of whatever is the case on the R/M-issue, this cannot be allowed to influence the M-question. The independency the M-question from the R/M-issue is often overlooked, one reason for which might be because the reverse is not obviously the case. At least some theories on the R/M-issue could be affected by some answers to the M-question, but this is irrelevant to work on the M-question. What matters is that no theories from the R/M-issue can influence the answer to the M-question therefore the prudent scientist should avoid mention of the former from discussion of the latter.

Some proponents of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness defend the view that higher-order misrepresentation is possible. In support of this view they have proposed various pieces of empirical evidence. This paper examines one such piece of proposed empirical evidence; Change blindness. CB occurs when a subject fails to detect salient changes in visual scenes. I propose an alternative interpretation of the CB phenomenon on which misrepresentation does not occur. Finally, I examine three lines of reply that might be pursued to defend the claim that CB is evidence of misrepresentation against my interpretation. I conclude that none of the lines of reply succeed in preserving CB as evidence of misrepresentation. The upshot is that, pending further evidence, CB cannot be deployed as empirical evidence in the debate on misrepresentation.

Abstract: To evaluate the explanation of change blindness in terms of misrepresentation and determine its role for Rosenthal’s higher-order thought theory of consciousness, we present an alternative account of change blindness that affords an independent outlook and provides a viable alternative. First we describe Rosenthal’s actualism and the notion of misrepresentation, then introduce change blindness and the explanation of it by misrepresentation. Rosenthal asserts that, in change blindness, the first-order state tracks the post-change stimulus, but the higher-order state misrepresents it. We propose the alternative that both post-change and pre-change content can be tracked by the first-order state, and that in change blindness the higher-order thought represents the pre-change state, resulting in a good-enough representation: true but not veridical. We compare the two explanations with respect to available data and analyse the principal theoretical claims. Discussing the rationale of the alternative account, we conclude that there is good reason to conceive of the mind as satisficing, geared towards reliability instead of truth-tracking, and guided by representations that are good enough as opposed to complete or corresponding to the facts. We end with some methodological remarks concerning the risk of cognitive biases in interdisciplinary research that brings together empirical and philosophical claims.

Recently the account of free will proposed by Harry Frankfurt has come under attack. It has been argued that Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness is in conflict with prevalent intuitions about free will and should be abandoned. I will argue that empirical data from choice blindness experiments can vindicate Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness. The choice blindness phenomenon exposes that individuals fail to track their own decisions and readily take ownership of, and confabulate reasons for, decisions they did not make. Traditionally this has been taken to be problem for the notion of free will. I argue that Frankfurt’s account does not face this problem. Instead, choice blindness can be fruitfully applied to it, and vice versa. Frankfurt’s notion of wholeheartedness, I suggest, delineates the range of the choice blindness effect. This makes wholeheartedness a useful meta-theoretical concept for choice blindness research. I conclude that, pace the recent criticism, wholeheartedness is a useful notion and should not be abandoned

I will start by noting that Harry Frankfurt’s concept of wholeheartedness is in conflict with the intuition that free will should be efficacious in general, rather than pertain only to a small subset of decisions. To replace wholeheartedness I introduce a heuristic account for deliberation and decisions. I will show that introspective activity can lead to the individual having two types ‘introspective revelations’. By the onset of the introspective revelations a self-perpetuating loop is initiated. The loop consists of two elements positively reinforcing each other. The two elements are introspective activity and introspective revelations. The effect is a propensity to ask oneself “what do I want?” whenever faced with a choice. This propensity, I submit, can give us what we want when we want free will

Recently, the possibility of misrepresentation has resurfaced in the debate between higher-order thought theorists and their opponents. One new element in the debate has been the rare cases of Charles Bonnet syndrome , proposed as empirical evidence for misrepresentation as posited by the higher-order theories. In this article I will spell out the argument supposedly underlying the claim that the RCB cases are genuine empirical evidence of misrepresentation. I will then proceed to show that this argument relies on a hidden premise. With this premise exposed the argument cannot support the notion of misrepresentation posited by higher-order theories