Ashoka Tarai

A number of contemporary scholars find certain similarities between both Indian and Greek philosophical traditions with regard to inferential reasoning by arguing that these two systems might have influenced each other. Such a persisting belief generates a debate further that whether the structure of Nyāya syllogism is influenced by Aristotelian structure or the vice versa. The purpose of this paper is to examine the mentioned debate. This paper attempts to present that the mentioned controversy is grounded on the false belief that Nyāya and Aristotelian possess the similar pattern of syllogism. To establish the same, the paper addresses two prime arguments. One: Nyāya syllogism and Aristotelian syllogism cannot be translatable into one another. Second: There are fundamental differences between Nyāya syllogism and Aristotelian syllogism. Two major differences are highlighted in this paper. The first difference is about the distinct nature of ‘Inference’ and ‘Argument’; and the second difference is about the different application of the meaning of the Terms. Furthermore, the paper aims to provide a new reading of this presumed confusion that these two models of syllogisms are structurally different. Thereby these two systems allegedly having borrowed insights from one another is untenable.

This paper explores the philosophical relationship between Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism and Ludwig Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy, particularly focusing on the echoes of Kant's ideas in Wittgenstein's work. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason argues that human cognition is shaped by a priori categories, which structure our experience of phenomena but leave the noumenal realm unknowable. Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, similarly examines the limits of what can be known; suggesting that language mirrors reality but also has its limits in expressing what lies beyond logic. In his later work, Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein emphasizes the social and contextual nature of meaning, developed through "language games" and "forms of life". This paper argues that while Wittgenstein shifts from Kant’s universal transcendental structures to a more pragmatic view of language, both philosophers share a concern with the limits of human knowledge and expression. Furthermore, both thinkers acknowledge the ineffable about Kant’s noumenal world and Wittgenstein’s mystical realm as crucial yet unreachable domains. This comparative analysis contributes to contemporary discussions in epistemology and philosophy of language, demonstrating the enduring relevance of Kant’s transcendental insights in Wittgenstein’s linguistic turn.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) turns hundred years of its publication in the year 2021. The book has received several interpretations during this period of hundred years. However, in the last three decades, the interpretations of TLP have taken a very tenacious position with regard to the debates among scholars concerning whether there is any metaphysical significance in the text. The debates primarily offshoot in the rise of anti-metaphysical or often known as resolute reading that challenges the standard or metaphysical reading. The present paper, however, goes beyond this debate between the resolute and standard reading of TLP. The paper aims at addressing various types of metaphysical reading(s) that has not been perhaps the centre of discussion because the resolute reading takes on only standard reading. Thus, the present paper attempts to show the variety of metaphysical interpretations of the text in some of the recent literatures.

This paper discusses certain anti-metaphysical readings of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The metaphysical and anti-metaphysical readings can be divided on the interpretations of textual fidelity. The anti-metaphysical readings can be differentiated in taking into account two different understandings with regard to Wittgenstein’s pronouncement of nonsense in Tractatus. One is the logical positivists’ understanding of nonsense and the other is the resolute reading of the text that emerged as an opposite to the orthodox or standard reading. The aim of discussing these anti-metaphysical readings is to highlight whether a metaphysical reading is possible.