•  18
    The illusion of the relevance of difficulty in evaluations of moral responsibility
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    A common intuition is that the more difficult it is for someone to do the right thing, the more praiseworthy she is for succeeding and the less blameworthy she is for failing. Here, I call this the ‘Difficulty Thesis’ and argue that the Difficulty Thesis is false. In Section 2, I briefly describe what I mean by ‘difficulty’ and the Difficulty Thesis. The Difficulty Thesis has strong prima facie appeal, however, why exactly difficulty is morally relevant remains an open and interesting philosophi…Read more
  •  21
    Facilitating Curiosity and Mindfulness: A Socio-Political Approach
    with Perry Zurn
    Precollege Philosophy and Public Practice 3 (4): 67-90. 2021.
    As an outgrowth of experiential and critical pedagogies, and in response to growing rates of student anxiety and depression, educators in recent years have made increasing efforts to facilitate curiosity and mindfulness in the classroom. In Section I, we describe the rationale and function of these initiatives, focusing on the Right Question Institute and mindfulness curricula. Although we admire much about these programs, here we explore ways to complicate and deepen them through a more sociall…Read more
  •  115
    Nonhuman Animals Are Morally Responsible
    American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2): 135-154. 2019.
    Animals are often presumed to lack moral agency insofar as they lack the capacities for reflection or the ability to understand their motivating reasons for acting. In this paper, I argue that animals are in some cases morally responsible. First, I outline conditions of moral action, drawing from a quality of will account of moral responsibility. Second, I review recent empirical research on the capacities needed for moral action in humans and show that animals also have such capacities. I concl…Read more
  •  21
    Review of Josh May, Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind (review)
    Ethics 130 (1): 129-135. 2019.
  •  94
    Good Moral Judgment and Decision‐Making Without Deliberation
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1): 68-95. 2017.
    It is widely accepted in psychology and cognitive science that there are two “systems” in the mind: one system is characterized as quick, intuitive, perceptive, and perhaps more primitive, while the other is described as slower, more deliberative, and responsible for our higher-order cognition. I use the term “reflectivism” to capture the view that conscious reflection—in the “System 2” sense—is a necessary feature of good moral judgment and decision-making. This is not to suggest that System 2 …Read more