This paper examines the role of the notion of hope in Leibniz’s philosophy and argues that contrary to what has been claimed by recent commentators, Leibniz should not be counted among the philosophical proponents of hope. I argue, firstly, that there are insufficient textual grounds for making ‘hope’ a central concept in Leibniz’s philosophical apparatus; as it figures in his writings, it does not appear to serve a distinct function. However, this textual insignificance points to a deeper issue…
Read moreThis paper examines the role of the notion of hope in Leibniz’s philosophy and argues that contrary to what has been claimed by recent commentators, Leibniz should not be counted among the philosophical proponents of hope. I argue, firstly, that there are insufficient textual grounds for making ‘hope’ a central concept in Leibniz’s philosophical apparatus; as it figures in his writings, it does not appear to serve a distinct function. However, this textual insignificance points to a deeper issue in his philosophy: is there need - or even room - for hope in the best of all possible worlds? In the final part of the article, I argue that Leibniz’s brand of optimism makes hope theologically redundant. Although this tendency sets Leibniz apart from the Augustinian-Lutheran strain of Christianity, it reflects a tension that is inherent in Christianity itself, namely one between hope and faith.
