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18Locke, liberty, and law: Legalism and extra-legal powers in the Second TreatiseEuropean Journal of Political Theory 21 (2): 230-252. 2022.The apparent inconsistency between Locke’s commitment to legalism and his explicit endorsement of the extra-legal power of prerogative has confounded many readers. Among those who don’t ignore or dismiss it, the common approach is to qualify the role or scope of prerogative. The article advocates the opposite approach. It argues that Locke’s legalism should be understood within the context of his oft neglected conception of political liberty in terms of self-government. This not only allows for …Read more
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16Locke, liberty, and law: Legalism and extra-legal powers in the Second TreatiseSage Publications: European Journal of Political Theory 21 (2): 230-252. 2019.European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 230-252, April 2022. The apparent inconsistency between Locke’s commitment to legalism and his explicit endorsement of the extra-legal power of prerogative has confounded many readers. Among those who don’t ignore or dismiss it, the common approach is to qualify the role or scope of prerogative. The article advocates the opposite approach. It argues that Locke’s legalism should be understood within the context of his oft neglected co…Read more
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1Justice and the MarketIn Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Privitization. pp. 85-101. 2021.
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37Locke, liberty, and law: Legalism and extra-legal powers in the Second TreatiseSage Publications: European Journal of Political Theory 21 (2): 230-252. 2019.European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 230-252, April 2022. The apparent inconsistency between Locke’s commitment to legalism and his explicit endorsement of the extra-legal power of prerogative has confounded many readers. Among those who don’t ignore or dismiss it, the common approach is to qualify the role or scope of prerogative. The article advocates the opposite approach. It argues that Locke’s legalism should be understood within the context of his oft neglected co…Read more
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58Populism and democracy: The challenge for deliberative democracyEuropean Journal of Philosophy 27 (2): 359-376. 2018.European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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788Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it?Synthese 190 (14): 2731-2748. 2013.The idea that knowledge can be extended by inference from what is known seems highly plausible. Yet, as shown by familiar preface paradox and lottery-type cases, the possibility of aggregating uncertainty casts doubt on its tenability. We show that these considerations go much further than previously recognized and significantly restrict the kinds of closure ordinary theories of knowledge can endorse. Meeting the challenge of uncertainty aggregation requires either the restriction of knowledge-e…Read more
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27Action, Voluntariness and Consent: On John Hyman’s Action, Knowledge, and WillJurisprudence 7 (3): 678-684. 2016.
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387Mr. Magoo’s mistakePhilosophical Studies 139 (2): 289-306. 2008.Timothy Williamson has famously argued that the principle should be rejected. We analyze Williamson's argument and show that its key premise is ambiguous, and that when it is properly stated this premise no longer supports the argument against. After canvassing possible objections to our argument, we reflect upon some conclusions that suggest significant epistemological ramifications pertaining to the acquisition of knowledge from prior knowledge by deduction.
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596Dogmatism repuzzledPhilosophical Studies 148 (2). 2010.Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.
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435Replies to Comesaña and YabloPhilosophical Studies 174 (4): 1073-1090. 2017.There are few indulgences academics can crave more than to have their work considered and addressed by leading researchers in their field. We have been fortunate to have two outstanding philosophers from whose work we have learned a great deal give ours their thoughtful attention. Grappling with Stephen Yablo’s, and Juan Comesaña’s comments and criticisms has helped us gain a better understanding of our ideas as well as their shortcomings. We are extremely grateful to them for the attentiveness …Read more
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652Evidence and the openness of knowledgePhilosophical Studies 174 (4): 1001-1037. 2017.The paper argues that knowledge is not closed under logical inference. The argument proceeds from the openness of evidential support and the dependence of empirical knowledge on evidence, to the conclusion that knowledge is open. Without attempting to provide a full-fledged theory of evidence, we show that on the modest assumption that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation, or, alternatively, that information that reduces the probability of a proposition cannot constitute e…Read more
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