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4The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2015.Examines the nature of cognitive penetrability hypothesis, which holds that our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. Assesses both cognitive penetrability and impenetrability and explores their philosophical consequences.
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20Does the Emotional Modulation of Visual Experience Entail the Cognitive Penetrability of Early Vision?Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1-24. forthcoming.Empirical research suggests that motive states modulate perception affecting perceptual processing either directly, or indirectly through the modulation of spatial attention. The affective modulation of perception occurs at various latencies, some of which fall within late vision, that is, after 150 ms. poststimulus. Earlier effects enhance the C1 and P1 ERP components in early vision, the former enhancement being the result of direct emotive effects on perceptual processing, and the latter bein…Read more
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48Cognitive Penetrability: An OverviewIn John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 1-56. 2015.
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187The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2015.According to the cognitive penetrability hypothesis, our beliefs, desires, and possibly our emotions literally affect how we see the world. This book elucidates the nature of the cognitive penetrability and impenetrability hypotheses, assesses their plausibility, and explores their philosophical consequences. It connects the topic's multiple strands (the psychological findings, computationalist background, epistemological consequences of cognitive architecture, and recent philosophical developme…Read more
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16Studies on cognitively driven attention suggest that late vision is cognitively penetrated, whereas early vision is notBehavioral and Brain Sciences 39. 2016.
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14Introduction: The 5th Hellenic Conference on the History, Philosophy and Science Teaching “The Great Scientific Theories in the Teaching of Natural Sciences”Science & Education 20 (10): 937-941. 2011.
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Cognitive penetrability and consciousnessIn John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2015.
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The cognitive penetrability of perception : an overviewIn John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. 2015.
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9Précis of "Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception"Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (3): 355-362. 2020.
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21Object individuation by iconic content: How is numerosity represented in iconic representation?Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (1): 42-70. 2020.: Fodor argues that perceptual representations are a subset of iconic representations, which are distinguished from symbolic/discursive representations. Iconic representations are nonconceptual and they do not support the abilities afforded by concepts. Iconic representations, for example, cannot support object individuation. If someone thinks that perception or some of its parts has imagistic NCC, they face the following dilemma. Either they will have to accept that this NCC does not allow for …Read more
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26Cognitive Penetrability and the Epistemic Role of PerceptionSpringer Verlag. 2019.This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs. It examines the impact of the epistemic role of perception in defining cognitive penetrability and the relation between the epistemic role of perceptual stages and the kinds of cognitive effects on perceptual processing. The book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neithe…Read more
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7Pre-cueing, the Epistemic Role of Early Vision, and the Cognitive Impenetrability of Early VisionFrontiers in Psychology 8. 2017.
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12Abduction, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Scientific Practise: The Case of Newton’s OpticsIn Lorenzo Magnani & Claudia Casadio (eds.), Model Based Reasoning in Science and Technology. Logical, Epistemological, and Cognitive Issues, Springer Verlag. 2006.Hintikka argues that abduction is ignorance-preserving in the sense that the hypothesis that abduction delivers and which attempts to explain a set of phenomena is not, epistemologically speaking, on a firmer ground than the phenomena it purports to explain; knowledge is not enhanced until the hypothesis undergoes a further inductive process that will test it against empirical evidence. Hintikka, therefore, introduces a wedge between the abductive process properly speaking and the inductive proc…Read more
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12Editorial: Pre-cueing Effects on Perception and Cognitive PenetrabilityFrontiers in Psychology 9. 2018.
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13Lessons from the History of the Concept of the Ray for Teaching Geometrical OpticsScience & Education 20 (10): 1007-1037. 2011.
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13The Phenomenal Content of ExperienceMind and Language 21 (2): 187-219. 2006.We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottom‐up from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. T…Read more
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72Cognitive Penetration Lite and Nonconceptual ContentErkenntnis 82 (5): 1097-1122. 2017.The Macpherson :24–62, 2012) argued that the perceptual experience of colors is cognitively penetrable. Macpherson also thinks that perception has nonconceptual content because this would provide a good explanation for several phenomena concerning perceptual experience. To have both, Macpherson must defend the thesis that the CP of perception is compatible with perception having NCC. Since the classical notion of CP of perception does not allow perception to have NCC, Macpherson proposes CP-lite…Read more
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Abductive Inference in Late VisionIn Woosuk Park, Ping Li & Lorenzo Magnani (eds.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science Ii: Western & Eastern Studies, Springer Verlag. 2015.
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243Perceptual systems and realismSynthese 164 (1). 2008.Constructivism undermines realism by arguing that experience is mediated by concepts, and that there is no direct way to examine those aspects of objects that belong to them independently of our conceptualizations; perception is theory-laden. To defend realism one has to show first that perception relates us directly with the world without any intermediary conceptual framework. The result of this direct link is the nonconceptual content of experience. Second, one has to show that part of the no…Read more
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100Descartes’ Proof of the Essence of Matter and the Cartesian Scientific SystemJournal of Philosophical Research 21 209-229. 1996.It has been a traditional claim that Descartes sought to construct a deductive scientific system in which everything could be deduced from a priori truths. I shall call this thesis strong a priorism. In view of the overwhelming amount of evidence that Descartes thought experience to be a necessary part of his method, the traditional interpretation has undergone several transformations. One interpretation resulting from this transformation holds that Descartes sought to prove the first principles…Read more
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433Was cartesian science ever meant to be a priori? A comment on HatfieldPhilosophy of Science 62 (1): 150-160. 1995.In a recent article G. Hatfield claims that Descartes for a certain time thought a purely a priori science to be possible. Hatfield's evidence consists of his reading of the Cartesian method in the Regulae and of a letter to Mersenne, written in May 1632. I argue that Hatfield misinterprets the Cartesian method and Descartes' claim in the letter to Mersenne. I first show that the latter does not argue for an a priori science. Then, I show that the method of the Regulae is not a priori. Finally, …Read more
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74The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual contentPhilosophical Psychology (5): 1-20. 2013.I elaborate on Pylyshyn's definition of the cognitive impenetrability (CI) of early vision, and draw on the role of concepts in perceptual processing, which links the problem of the CI or cognitive penetrability (CP) of early vision with the problem of the nonconceptual content (NCC) of perception. I explain, first, the sense in which the content of early vision is CI and I argue that if some content is CI, it is conceptually encapsulated, that is, it is NCC. Then, I examine the definitions of N…Read more
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54Nonconceptual content: A reply to Toribio's “Nonconceptualism and the cognitive impenetrability of early vision”Philosophical Psychology 27 (5): 643-651. 2014.No abstract
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72Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints (edited book)Nova Science. 2005.The chapters in this book address directly the issue of the cognitive penetrability of perception.
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71Cartesian analysis and synthesisStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (2): 265-308. 2003.This paper aims to provide an explication of the meaning of ‘analysis’ and ‘synthesis’ in Descartes’ writings. In the first part I claim that Descartes’ method is entirely captured by the term ‘analysis’, and that it is a method of theory elaboration that fuses the modern methods of discovery and confirmation in one enterprise. I discuss Descartes’ methodological writings, assess their continuity and coherence, and I address the major shortcoming of previous interpretations of Cartesian methodol…Read more
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879The phenomenal content of experienceMind and Language 21 (2): 187-219. 2006.We discuss at some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottomup from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually unmediated ways. Th…Read more
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237Reentrant neural pathways and the theory-ladenness of perceptionPhilosophy of Science 68 (3). 2001.In this paper I argue for the cognitive impenetrability of perception by undermining the argument from reentrant pathways. To do that I will adduce psychological and neuropsychological evidence showing that (a) early vision processing is not affected by our knowledge about specific objects and events, and (b) that the role of the descending pathways is to enable the early-vision processing modules to participate in higher-level visual or cognitive functions. My thesis is that a part of observati…Read more
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University of CyprusRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
General Philosophy of Science |