• Epistemic sensitivity and evidence
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6): 1348-1366. 2024.
    In this paper, we put forth an analysis of sensitivity which aims to discern individual from merely statistical evidence. We argue that sensitivity is not to be understood as a factive concept, but as a purely epistemic one. Our resulting analysis of epistemic sensitivity gives rise to an account of legal proof on which a defendant is only found liable based on epistemically sensitive evidence.
  • Legal Proof Should Be Justified Belief of Guilt
    Legal Theory 30 (3): 129-141. 2024.
    This article argues that legal proof should be tantamount to justified belief of guilt. A defendant should be found guilty just in case it is justified to believe that the defendant is guilty. My notion of justified belief implies a threshold view on which justified belief requires high credence, but mere statistical evidence does not give rise to justified belief.