Avner de Shalit

Should political institutions be designed so that individuals reap the benefits of their good choices and suffer the costs of their poor choices? This chapter argues for the ‘weak asymmetry thesis’: that people should be allowed to benefit from their choices that turn out well to a greater extent than they should have to bear the costs of those that turn out badly. The thesis is defended against the practical challenge that it would be impossible to implement and ethical challenges that argue in favour of symmetry.

Two models of environmentalism are considered. One — hard line environmentalism — is a theory which unites environmental ethics and political theory; the other — soft environmentalism — is a package of the two as two distinctive levels of moral reasoning. It is argued that hard‐line environmentalism is a‐democratic, rests on wrong methodological assumptions, and is friendly to the environment just so long as being so serves a sought‐after ‘psychological revolution’. Soft environmentalism is to be preferred also because its idea of democracy must be national and international rather than local. Since in the ‘new’ Europe people will move very often and will therefore fail to develop a sense of ‘place’ which is local, it may be a waste of time to emphasise ‘localism’ as part of environmentalism.

ABSTRACT It is widely recognised that we hold certain moral obligations to future generations. Robert Elliot argues that we can base these obligations on the rights of future people. I accept his argument that future people are moral agents who possess rights. However, I argue that the main question for political and moral philosophers is whether it is possible to find the balance between the obligations to, and the rights of, contemporaries, and the obligations to, and the rights of, future people. By analysing the notions of ‘human rights’and ‘welfare rights’of future people, I argue that this question can be tackled only in terms of welfare rights. But the latter make sense only in the context of community of provision. This implies that we must first examine the ‘trans‐generational’community that includes contemporaries and future generations. Thus a theory of justice between generations cannot be purely ‘rights‐based’. However, by describing the ‘trans‐generational community’I argue that it can serve as the moral grounds for our obligations to future generations.

The transgenerational community is based on moral similarity between contemporary and future people, referring to an ongoing moral deliberation across generations. It justifies obligations of justice towards the not yet born. Prioritarianism gives extra weight to the wellbeing of the least advantaged. I argue that both sentiments are egalitarian, and ask whether there is any tension between them. If we assume economic growth, and/or technological improvements and/or inflation, then prioritarianism prima facie implies that we should prefer to spend any dollar on today’s disadvantaged than on future generations, hence is in tension with the demands of the transgenerational community. Analyzing four ways of meeting this challenge, I argue that the two principles are not in tension.

Is the argument that we can only conceive of the ‘environment’ in political terms far‐fetched? Is an objective understanding of the concept of the ‘environment’ possible? By an analysis of three phases in the relationship between Zionism and the environment, it can be argued, first, that not only the developmental but also the romantic attitudes to the environment regard the latter instrumentally and both constitute political definitions of the environment; and second, that a direct transition from a romantic‐ruralist attitude to the environment to a modern, scientifically‐based environmentalism is — at least in Israel ‐ impossible, and that the anti‐thesis of the ethos of development has been necessary for the instrumental and political approach to the environment to be abandoned and the environment related to as it is. Further, the shift from the objective to the political conception of the environment raises certain general theoretical questions.

Moral dilemmas that arise from environmental policies are varied. Over and above relations between human beings and either animals or nature, these include relations between contemporaries and future inhabitants of our world. In that sense many environmental policies can be seen as a matter of distribution of access to goods between contemporaries and future generations. In light of this argument a comprehensive theory of justice between generations seems needed to enable political theorists to evaluate environmental problems and to discuss ecological questions with a new approach.

ABSTRACT In a democracy what people think matters. Political philosophers are mostly democrats. They often justify deliberative and participatory democracy. And yet when it comes to philosophizing they often turn a blind eye to what people think; they sometimes even express profound doubts about what people think and about consulting the public. I call this the political philosophy gap. It has been justified in several ways. In this paper I first consider and dismiss the most common justifications. I then suggest a democratic and an epistemological reason why political philosophers should consider what people think when they formulate their theories. I put forward a proposal for a method of doing so, which I call public reflective equilibrium, and which consists of four stages of research and philosophy. Finally, I suggest that not only is it doable, but it has a potential to contribute a lot to contemporary political philosophy. It should not come instead of traditional ways of conducting political philosophy but as an additional, perhaps more political, method of political philosophy.

In my book, Cities and Immigration, I suggest shifting responsibilities for the integration of immigrants from the state to the city level. The articles in this issue challenge some of my suggestions. I discuss these challenges with regard to three questions: should a city enjoy greater autonomy to decide who, and how many, immigrants should settle within its borders? Should immigrants enjoy local voting rights even before naturalization? And is there a morally preferable model for integrating immigrants into the city?

Thirty years ago the American philosopher Holmes Rolston published a seminal article in Ethics announcing the birth of a new sub‐discipline in philosophy: environmental ethics. However, while environmental ethicists focused on meta‐ethical questions, the public needed answers to many political questions and dilemmas. This gave rise to some fascinating works in environmental political theory. This essay analyses their achievement – what has been solved and what still remains to be studied – focusing on three main topics: justice and the environment, democracy and the environment, and globalism and the environment.

What does it mean to be disadvantaged? Is it possible to compare different disadvantages? What should governments do to move their societies in the direction of equality, where equality is to be understood both in distributional and social terms? Linking rigorous analytical philosophical theory with broad empirical studies, including interviews conducted for the purpose of this book, Wolff and de-Shalit show how taking theory and practice together is essential if the theory is to be rich enough to be applied to the real world, and policy systematic enough to have purpose and justification. The book is in three parts. Part 1 presents a pluralist analysis of disadvantage, modifying the capability theory of Sen and Nussbaum to produce the 'genuine opportunity for secure functioning' view. This emphasises risk and insecurity as a central component of disadvantage. Part 2 shows how to identify the least advantaged in society even on a pluralist view. The authors suggest that disadvantage 'clusters' in the sense that some people are disadvantaged in several different respects. Thus identifying the least advantaged is not as problematic as it appears to be. Conversely, a society which has 'declustered disadvantaged' - in the sense that no group lacks secure functioning on a range of functionings - has made considerable progress in the direction of equality. Part 3 explores how to decluster disadvantage, by paying special attention to 'corrosive disadvantages' - those disadvantages which cause further disadvantages - and 'fertile functionings' - those which are likely to secure other functionings. In sum this books presents a refreshing new analysis of disadvantage, and puts forward proposals to help governments improve the lives of the least advantaged in their societies, thereby moving in the direction of equality.