Axel O. Karamercan

In this article, I elucidate Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of Soph-ocles’ tragedy Antigone from a topological point of view by focusing on the place-character of Antigone’s poetic ethos. Antigone’s decision to defy Creon’s order and bury her brother Polynices is discussed as a movement that underpins her poetic disposition as a demigod. Antigone’s situatedness between gods and hu-mans is identified as the place of poetic dwelling, and the significance of Antig-one’s relation to the polis is explained. The main argument of the article is two-fold: 1) When we read Antigone focusing on the notion of dwelling, we can better make sense how Heidegger’s engagement with the question of finitude closes the envisioned gap between ontology and ethics. 2) The idea of poetic dwelling is a confrontation with spatio-temporal limits of human existence, and requires a more holistic way of thinking about the place of humans in the world, thinking beyond being-action dichotomy.

What is the philosophical significance of Heidegger’s interpretation of the Japanese notion of kotoba (言葉) for Japanese philosophy? Was his conversation with Tezuka Tomio a real dialogue or not? To answer to these correlated questions, I elucidate Heidegger’s 1954 essay “A Dialogue on Language” by following a topological mode of thinking, and I inquire into the way-making of a “thinking conversation”. First, I problematize whether Heidegger engaged in a genuine dialogue with Tezuka. To that end, I distinguish the hermeneutic horizon of the actual encounter between Tezuka and Heidegger from Heidegger’s essay which places Tezuka (the Japanese) and Heidegger (the Inquirer) in a fictional philosophical conversation. Second, I argue that Heidegger’s topological method of interpretating kotoba can be read as a poetic means of thematizing East-West dialogue. Third and finally, exploring the topological sense of kotoba, I engage with third generation Kyoto School thinker Ueda Shizuteru’sideaof“hollow words” of language, situated in a twofold view of the world. I conclude that the true character of Heidegger’s conversation with Tezuka can be identified neither in Heidegger’s “actual” encounter with Tezuka, nor merely in Heidegger’s “hollow” essay. Departing from Ueda’s account of kotoba, it appears that a genuine conversation with language can be located in the dialogue of actuality and hollowness, which finds it expression in poetic language.

In “Topology of Balasaguni’s Kutadgu Bilig: Thinking the Between,” Onur Karamercan focuses on the philosophical dimension of Kutadgu Bilig, a poetic work of Yūsuf Balasaguni, an 11th century Central Asian thinker, poet, and statesman. Karamercan pays special attention to the meaning of betweenness and, in the first step of his argument, discusses the hermeneutic and topological implications of the between, distingushing the dynamic sense of betweenness from a static sense of in-betweenness. He then moves on to analyze Balasaguni’s notion of language, which he interprets as an early critique of the instrumental account of language and, by examining several selected fragments from Kutadgu Bilig, illustrates Balasaguni’s designation of language as an inexhaustible phenomenon. In the process, he also points to the possible parallels between Balasaguni’s and Heidegger’s ideas of language. In the final section of the article, building on his argument, Karamercan thematizes the margins of Turkic languages and of Islamic philosophy, suggesting that they need to be reexamined. He problematizes the very meaning of Asia itself by decentering what he calls “its internal East–West antagonism” and puts forth instead a framework based on in-betweenness reinterpreted from a topological perspective, proposing it as an alternative view which might help us make sense of the hermeneutic neighborhoods of Asian philosophies.

I elucidate Heidegger’s understanding of the “place-being” of the “question of being.” My premises are: 1) Heidegger’s “question of being” can be appropriately made sense of as the “question of language.” 2) The “question of language” requires a topological approach that looks into the link between the place-nature of language and the open-bounded essence of human existence. First, I explain the topological underpinnings of Heidegger’s later thought of being as the clearing and language; second, I examine Sheehan’s phenomenological reading of Heidegger by focusing on the relationship between alētheia and appropriation. In the first section, I explain the correlation between place and language within the context of the “question of being” and display how understanding the former is crucial in having a more complete perspective for the latter. In the second section, I examine Sheehan’s acknowledgment of Heidegger’s idea of place in his understanding of the nature of human existence in relation to Ereignis, while criticizing the “metaphorical” reading of the “placebeing” of the clearing.

The main goal of this article is to examine the link between the idea of language, being and nothingness by comparing 16th century Turkish-Azeri poet Fuzûlî’s poetry and 20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s philosophy departing from the latter’s thinking of being. There are similarities between Heidegger and Fuzûlî’s respective thoughts concerning the role of the human being’s relation to finitude which grounds the relationship between being and nothingness. The article consists of three sections. The first section makes sense of Heidegger’s early and late thought in terms of its ontological unity, explaining the ways in which being and nothingness topologically co-determine one another in poetic language. The second section focuses on clarifying the sources that nourish Fuzûlî’s poetry, such as Sufism and the literary style of “Rind” as observed in classical Ottoman poetry, elucidating how these influences underpin the philosophical foundations of Fuzûlî’s poetry. The third section offers a philosophical interpretation of Fuzûlî’s lyric poems by illustrating how and why being and nothingness are not to be thought as mere opposites, pointing out their ontological belonging together. In the concluding section, it is argued that a poetic mode of existence necessitates an authentic experience of human finitude both for Heidegger and Fuzûlî. Although Fuzûlî’s poetry involves onto-theological influences from Sufism, Fuzûli manages to form an original idea of poetic existence, emphasizing that the poetic agent needs to take a step back from the mundane world of multitudes in order to unify with Being itself. As for Heidegger, it is doubtful whether there is such a mystical idea of being. Nonetheless, for both figures the more originary experience of finite human existence lies in the poetic interplay between being and nothingness. The poetic meaning of being comes to manifest itself in the process of one’s existential annihilation, which takes place in the movement of being-towards-death. Accordingly, exploring how the meaning of being requires the poetic experience of nothingness and how such an experience appears through language in Fuzûlî’s lyric poems provides a more comprehensive account of his thinking.

Although Heidegger’s explicit account of “poetic dwelling” belongs to his later philosophy, there are important indications that he was already engaging with the core matter of the notion in his early thought. Contrary to the idea that in Being and Time, “dwelling” amounts to mere practical coping with the environment, we would like to demonstrate that the notion is already a poetic issue in his early thought, as it requires the appropriation of our relation to the world via an authentic experience of finitude. Following a topological mode of thinking, the paper thematizes the connections between Heidegger’s early and later thought, and elucidates the following three points: First, “freeing” and “letting” appears as the appropriate ethos of a poetic experience of finitude, one that maintains the “clearing” of meaningfulness. Second, a topological reading of Being and Time can explicate the notions of authenticity and inauthenticity as different disclosures of the clearing where human being-world correlation occurs. Third, the notion of “keeping-still” (Schweigen) can be interpreted as an authentic disposition that frees space for the disclosure of existence. The paper concludes that an authentic experience of finitude through “stillness” appears to reorient human ethos by releasing “discourse” from absorption in “idle-talk” and that such an act of existential re-orientation of one’s disposition towards the world is the essence of “authenticity,” and Heidegger’s early “poetic dwelling”.

In this article, I elucidate the significance of Heidegger’s ‘question of being’ from a topological point of view by explaining the relationship between his thought of place and language. After exploring various hermeneutic strategies of reading Heidegger’s oeuvre, I turn to Richard Capobianco’s interpretation of Heidegger and critically engage with his idea of the experience of being itself as the ‘luminous selfshowing of logos’. In doing so, I explain the later turn from ‘truth’ to ‘place’ and articulate why logos needs to be conceived as the gathering site of the presencing of being. In arguing against the primacy of passive receptivity and active projection, I put forward the primacy of language as the topos and logos of being. In returning to the Capobianco-Sheehan debate, I conclude by explaining why Heidegger’s placerelated notions cannot be thought metaphorically.

In this article, the idea of space colonization is critically examined by drawing from Martin Heidegger’s topological philosophy of technology and dwelling. Heidegger’s ideas from his 1966 interview with German journal Der Spiegel are examined in light of his relevant philosophical texts to interpret his claims concerning The Blue Marble image. This article defends the view that Heidegger does not take a moral stance against space colonization as such; rather, he elucidates the existential grounds of our relation to modern technology, and the sense of unsettledness that stems from the lack of an appropriate relation to place.

Onur Karamercan, Heidegger'de Sanat Eserinin Yeri: Sanal Müzeler Çağında Sanat ve Mekân adlı yazısında, iki yıldır yaşamakta olduğumuz salgınla birlikte çok daha sık biçimde görülmeye başlayan “sanal müze” veya “elektronik müze” uygulamalarına yakından bakar. Dünyanın en meşhur müzelerinin ve sanat galerilerinin sanatsal ve kültürel etkinliklerden mahrum kalmak istemeyen ziyaretçilerine "kapılarını" elektronik ortamda açtığı ve birçok müzenin de koleksiyonlarını tamamen ya da kısmen dijitalleştirdiği bu ortamda, şu iki soruyu yanıtlamayı amaçlar: 1) Bir mekân olarak bir müzeyi uzaktan ziyaret etmek ve bir müzede sergilenen sanat eserlerini internet üzerinden “deneyimlemek” ne anlama gelmektedir ve 2) bu estetik-dijital “deneyim” (Erlebnis) insanın sanat ve mekân ile olan ilişkisi ve sanat eserinin “tecrübesine” (Erfahrung) dair ne söylemektedir?

In this article, I elucidate the meaning of the act of philosophizing as a research activity in academia. My main thesis is that, as academic philosophers, we need to change our existing relation to thinking in academia, which requires a radical re-evaluation of the ēthos, or, the dwelling-place of philosophy. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s thought, I offer a place-based thinking, taking up the issue of being-in-academia as part of the question of dwelling. First, I explore the technological nature of being-in-academia departing from Heidegger’s account of scientific research as ‘constant activity’. After identifying the ontological character of our situation in academia as captivation in the world, I bring up the matter of overcoming modern academia, discussing the possibility of orienting ourselves at the limits of education. I argue that reassessing our utilitarian relation to world and language, and recognizing the meontological dimension of thinking, is key for being able to de-structure academia and make room for ‘ontological freedom’. I conclude that the emergence of a new dwelling-place requires a poietic process of place-making at the limits of academia.

This article offers a topological account of Martin Heidegger’s 1942 lecture course on the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin’s hymn Der Ister. The main goal of the article is to explore the relationship between the poetic disclosure of place and the place of poetic disclosure in Heidegger’s thought in the 1940s. Firstly, the backward streaming of the river is identified as the central theme of the hymn, which leads to Heidegger’s idea of dwelling as poetic homecoming. Secondly, after elucidating the link between the Danube river and Antigone, and assessing the philosophical underpinnings of Heidegger’s withdrawal from politics, Heidegger’s pre-political idea of the polis is examined as tied to his thinking of place-making. Finally, the interplay between journeying and remaining is issued to clarify Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, time, and place and his critique of the metaphysical conception of space and time.

In this article, I elucidate the significance of Heidegger’s ‘question of being’ from a topological point of view by explaining the relationship between his thought of place and language. After exploring various hermeneutic strategies of reading Heidegger’s oeuvre, I turn to Richard Capobianco’s interpretation of Heidegger and critically engage with his idea of the experience of being itself as the ‘luminous self-showing of logos’. In doing so, I explain the later turn from ‘truth’ to ‘place’ and articulate why logos needs to be conceived as the gathering site of the presencing of being. In arguing against the primacy of passive receptivity and active projection, I put forward the primacy of language as the topos and logos of being. In returning to the Capobianco-Sheehan debate, I conclude by explaining why Heidegger’s place-related notions cannot be thought metaphorically.

This article critically discusses Hubert Dreyfus’s idea of mindless-skillful coping, arguing that this notion provides an incomplete picture of human dwelling. While contemporary scholarship addressed the problematic aspects of Dreyfus’s pragmatic approach to Martin Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world, a concentrated effort to show the discord between Dreyfus’s skillful coping and Heidegger’s account of dwelling is wanting. Refuting the idea that the most complete version of human dwelling only signifies immersion in bodily practical skills, the article brings into view the significance of the confrontational nature of dwelling, which requires a hermeneutic capacity of defamiliarization from our everyday worlds and habits. Explaining how humans’ relation to the world is different than those of robots or computers does not suffice to explicate authentic human dwelling. The author elucidates why Dreyfus’s prioritization of the practical over the theoretical and the corporeal over the mental leads to a dualistic mode of thinking. Finally, returning to the discussion of existential spatiality in Being and Time, the author identifies Dreyfus’s lack of an explicit understanding of place, one that would be necessary for a coherent account of poetic human dwelling.