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1273Why do we need perceptual content?Philosophical Psychology 29 (5): 776-788. 2016.Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.
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987A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitionsSynthese 198 (3): 2169-2191. 2021.There are passages in Kant’s writings according to which empirical intuitions have to be (a) singular, (b) object-dependent, and (c) immediate. It has also been argued that empirical intuitions (d) are not truth-apt, and (e) need to provide the subject with a proof of the possibility of the cognized object. Having relied on one or another of the a-e constraints, the naïve realist readers of Kant have argued that it is not possible for empirical intuitions to be representations. Instead they have…Read more
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918My general worry is that Schellenberg’s arguments against naive realism, generalism, and Russellian representationalism do not seem to be successful. Thus her attempt at ruling these views out fails. Her main arguments rely on a shared premise whose plausibility, in the absence of an appropriate theory of particulars, is hard to assess (§2.1). Apart from that, these arguments rely on an under-specified notion of constitution; there seems to be no sense of the term that makes all the premises of …Read more
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127Seeing Without DiscriminatingAustralasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.Some philosophers claim that to see something, you must discriminate it from other things, as opposed to merely seeing it as being some way or another. These philosophers often do not clarify what they mean by 'discrimination.' I distinguish five types of discrimination and argue that the plausibility of the claim that seeing something requires discriminating it, as opposed to simply attributing some properties to it, hinges on the type of discrimination under consideration. A weak form of discr…Read more
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31Reference, Representation-as, and DiscriminationDissertation, University of California, San Diego. 2024.I develop a theory of (mental) reference according to which there are two ways of referring to an object. One can refer to an object by relying on a previous instance of successful reference to that (or some other) object. I call this type of reference 'dependent reference'. Alternatively, one can refer to an object 'independently'. A referential attempt is independent if and only if it is not dependent. I argue that these two types of reference differ as they adhere to different norms. While it…Read more
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Construction and Inference in Perception |