Aysenur Unugur Tabur

The present paper contests Hume’s objection to Cleanthes’ first design argument by focusing on the problems concerning Hume’s causal account which relies on two grounds: causal connection between a simple impression and its corresponding idea, and the generalization of it to the causal relation between impressions based on the notion of “custom”. On both versions, Hume appeals to experience and a belief accompanying this experience to explain the notion of causation. His analysis of “belief” traces back to the quality of vivacity and to the degree of vivacity that an idea incorporates and transmits to another idea. I argue that the quality of vivacity cannot establish a ground for explaining the causal connection between impressions or ideas given that the relation of vivacity to the idea and the transition process of vivacity already presume a causal relation. In doing so, I aim to undermine the way Hume derives the principle that “similar effects are produced by similar causes” from experience and show that his attack to the design argument on the grounds that it violates this principle does not pose any considerable threat to the argument.

This article concerns the problem of eternal hell in Islam as an aporetic problem of evil with a focus on Aijaz's description of the Islamic soteriology. I contest his description of Islamic culpability and his claim that all non-Muslims are regarded as kâfir and consigned to eternal hell. First, I aim to illustrate the pitfalls in his line of argumentation such as crude generalizations and selective reading of the Islamic sources, which seem to render his argument a strawman fallacy. I offer a more accurate analysis of the Islamic view, by arguing that only a limited group of people who fight against truth through evil actions are considered as kâfir. Second, building on my analysis of the notion of kâfir, I address the question whether God's perfect love and wisdom are compatible with limited salvific exclusivism. Thus, I aim to elaborate on the rationale behind the prescription of eternal punishment for the kâfir in the Quran in the rest of the article, by arguing that the kâfir is incapable of genuine repentance due to his character formed by his free choices. This, in turn, makes it impossible to achieve retributive justice through a finite punishment concerning the kâfir's evil actions.

In the present paper, the three most prominent formulations of the ontological argument will be analysed, namely the classical argument which renders existence a perfection, Norman Malcom’s modal version of the argument which labels not existence but necessary existence a perfection, and Alvin Plantinga’s modal version of the argument which appeals to the possible worlds semantics to prove the necessity of God’s existence. According to Kant’s objection, the ontological argument takes existence to be a predicate that adds up a further perfection to the concept of God and thereby entails either a reference problem between the actual object and its concept or infers God’s actual existence in a tautological way. Despite its impact, Kant’s objection to the argument has been criticised for his ambiguous employment of the notion of existence as well as for being irrelevant to the ontological argument and to the modal ontological argument by Plantinga. In the present study, I aim first to show that Kant’s objection is not only relevant to the classical version of the argument but also to the modal formulations of it as opposed to Plantinga’s claim. In doing so, I argue that it is not Kant’s use of the notion of existence that is ambiguous, but it is the classical and modal versions of the ontological argument which gain their apparent strength from their ambiguous employment of the notion of existence. Second purpose of the paper is to give an alternative analysis of the notion of existence based on Avicenna’s metaphysics and thereby to point towards an alternative ground for a possible reformulation of the ontological argument, which could avoid Kant’s objection.

The present paper aims to show that Ibn Sina’s (Avicenna) analysis of existence in modal terms and his theory of concomitance concerning God’s properties can solve the problems faced by those contemporary theories that are committed to a non-nominalistic and non-Platonic realistic framework. In doing so, it first analyzes three contemporary views on abstract objects, namely divine conceptualism, theistic activism and divine simplicity, then addresses the problems that they are confronted with, with a particular focus on the grounding problem of divine attributes in God. Afterwards, it examines a prominent Mu’tazilite theory of predication, namely, the states (ahwāl) theory, as it foreshadows Ibn Sina’s solution to the grounding problem. Finally, it analyzes how Ibn Sina’s account of predication, which bears considerable similarities to the statestheory, can help the theistsolve the grounding problem without violating divine aseity or sovereignty, nor resulting in the bootstrapping problem.

This book investigates the compatibility between the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS, hereafter) and divine free action primarily in the works of Avicenna and Anselm with an analytical approach. The book has three main objectives: (1) to thoroughly analyse both philosophers’ views on DDS, divine free will, and their compatibility; (2) to put them into the context of the contemporary discourse of the philosophy of religion, by investigating whether it is possible to have freedom without the ability to do otherwise (as proposed by both philosophers for divine free will) with a reference to the prominent contemporary discussions initiated by Harry Frankfurt’s counterexamples; and (3) to show the plausibility of the agent-causal view for divine freedom (as defended by Anselm and Avicenna) by briefly sketching an alternative account based on Anselmian intuitions (the meta-awareness account) which can avoid the reasons-explanation objection and the luck objection against the libertarian agent-causal view.

U ovom radu analizirat će se tri najistaknutije formulacije ontološkog argumenta, uključujući klasični argument prema kojemu je postojanje jedno od savršenstava, modalna verzija argumenta Normana Malcoma prema kojemu savršenstvo nije postojanje, već nužno postojanje, te modalna verzija argumenta koju nudi Alvin Plantinga koja se poziva na semantiku mogućih svjetova. Prema Kantovom prigovoru, ontološki argument pretpostavlja da je postojanje predikat koji dodaje još jedno savršenstvo pojmu Boga i time implicira problem referencije između stvarnog predmeta i njegovog pojma ili tautološki povlači da Bog stvarno postoji. Unatoč svom utjecaju, Kantov prigovor argumentu kritiziran je zbog njegove dvosmislene upotrebe pojma postojanja, kao i zbog nerelevantnosti za ontološki argument i modalni ontološki argument kojeg nudi Plantinga. U ovom radu prvo želim pokazati da, nasuprot Plantinginoj tvrdnji, Kantov prigovor nije relevantan samo za klasičnu verziju argumenta, već i za njegove modalne formulacije. U tom smislu, tvrdim da nije dvosmislena Kantova uporaba pojma postojanja, već da su klasične i modalne verzije ontološkog argumenta one koje svoju prividnu snagu dobivaju dvosmislenom uporabom pojma postojanja. Druga svrha rada je dati alternativnu analizu pojma postojanja koja se temelji na Aviceninoj metafizici i time ukazati na alternativni temelj za potencijalnu preformulaciju ontološkog argumenta, čime bi se izbjegao Kantov prigovor.