I contend that standard psychological accounts of time distortion, such as in depression, schizophrenia, and "flow" experiences, are inadequate because of difficulties in their underlying philosophical presuppositions. The most problematic of these is the premature assumption that human consciousness is essentially atemporal. This assumption leads some theorists, e.g., to hold that we experience time by somehow apprehending it, as if it were a purely external event; thus they regard time distort…
Read moreI contend that standard psychological accounts of time distortion, such as in depression, schizophrenia, and "flow" experiences, are inadequate because of difficulties in their underlying philosophical presuppositions. The most problematic of these is the premature assumption that human consciousness is essentially atemporal. This assumption leads some theorists, e.g., to hold that we experience time by somehow apprehending it, as if it were a purely external event; thus they regard time distortions as mere errors in apprehension. However, psychologists S. Mo, F. Melges, and others are working towards a more adequate model of psychological time, in which human experience is seen as inherently temporal. This model promises to articulate time distortions with greater precision and more organization of data than standard accounts, but it needs certain philosophical underpinnings. Drawing from M. Merleau-Ponty, I suggest a framework for a new account of both abnormal and normal time experience which can provide such underpinnings. According to this framework, normal human experience involves a complex temporally extended interaction between perception of the given world and future-directed purposiveness. Thus, the time distortions of "flow" experiences might be integrally connected to the expansion of purposiveness characteristic of these experiences. The distortions of some schizophrenics might conversely be connected to the frequent schizophrenic disturbances in purposiveness
