B. Kyle Keltz

The contemporary debate over the problem of evil in analytic philosophy of religion is prone to focusing solely on the problem as an abstract dialectical issue that only concerns philosophers. However, this focus on abstract solutions to the problem of evil can seem to be less compelling in the face of personally experienced suffering, and it has given rise to newer approaches to the problem of evil, including anti-theodicy, which is the idea that theodicy itself is morally problematic. To remedy these issues, theists must turn to rhetoric to supplement theodicy. George Campbell’s view of rhetoric provides great insights into possible solutions, showing how including biblical narratives in theodicy can provide more comprehensive and compelling explanations for why God allows evil.

For decades, the debate over the problem of evil in analytic philosophy has focused on the existence of evil mainly considering God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence. But this is neglecting other attributes of God, like justice, mercy, and patience. And this omission of these attributes in the debate is striking because it is not clear how the existence of evil is logically incompatible with a more complete list of God’s attributes. So, this article considers a fuller understanding of God’s attributes to show that the problem of evil is more of a rhetorical than a merely logical problem. After showing that the problem of evil is more of a rhetorical problem, this article emphasizes rhetorical stases that provide a framework for the explanatory and rhetorical power of various theodicies and defenses. Also, this article discusses how including Biblical stories can supplement theodicy by providing emotionally stirring examples of how and why God allows evil. Overall, it will be recommended that Christian philosophers and theologians should be mindful of the rhetorical nature of the problem of evil and of rhetorical strategies that can help with this issue.

Most theistic responses to the problem of animal suffering either include a rejection of phenomenal pain consciousness in non-human animals or the idea that the only way for God to create a world for humans was to utilize a lengthy evolutionary process involving non-human animal suffering. However, a neo-Thomistic response to the problem of animal suffering follows neither path. It includes an Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of non-human animal minds with a distinction between rational (human) and non-rational animal souls, both of which are assumed to possess phenomenal consciousness. And, while a neo-Thomistic response does make predictions about what kind of universe God would make, it does not include the idea that God must relinquish His sovereignty in nature. This chapter will summarize the neo-Thomistic theodicy discussed in Thomism and the Problem of Animal Suffering (2020) and then move beyond that discussion by emphasizing a major issue concerning the question of non-human animal minds and the implications a neo-Thomistic response has for animal ethics.

In the current literature on the problem of animal suffering, most theists assume that non-human animal suffering is morally significant. However, this assumption goes against the approach to the problem taken by most ancient and medieval Christians. Moreover, this assumption causes drastic theological problems. So, in this chapter, my goal is to discuss theistic views of non-human animal minds to raise awareness among theists (and non-theists) in the hopes that they will reconsider their approach to non-human animal minds when considering the debate over the problem of animal suffering. In this chapter, I will first discuss reasons why traditional views are held and then briefly survey current theistic views. After this, I discuss methodological and worldview issues that are involved with studying non-human animal minds from theistic and naturalistic perspectives. Finally, I will highlight logical and theological puzzles that need addressing when considering the problem of animal suffering.

The problem of animal suffering is a subset of the problem of evil within the field of the philosophy of religion. Proponents of the problem formulate arguments concluding that the God of monotheism likely does not exist because of the existence of great amounts of non-human animal death, disease, and suffering found both in the natural history of the earth and still today. Major theistic responses to the problem include the denial that non-human animal suffering is morally significant as well as various other theodical explanations providing possible reasons God might want or need to allow animal suffering depending on God’s purposes for creating. The problem of animal suffering is debated within the philosophy of religion, but it is very much so an interdisciplinary issue that concerns not only the philosophy of religion but also theology, biblical studies, animal cognition studies, comparative psychology, ecology, and others. This chapter will introduce the problem of animal suffering, survey the major issues involved in the problem, and then provide a preview of the major sections and chapters in this handbook.

Atheists argue that animal pain, disease, suffering, and death cause a problem for theism because they believe that an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good God would not use millions of years of animal suffering just to make a world suitable for humans. Animal suffering was not a concern for theism through the medieval period, but it has been increasingly discussed in philosophy of religion since modern times, and there is especially a large and growing amount of literature on this subject that has been published in the last few decades. This handbook serves as a guide for those interested in the literature on the problem by bringing together experts in the philosophy of religion, theology, environmental ethics, and the philosophy of animal minds. It not only presents major formulations of the problem of animal suffering and major theodicies, but it also discusses metaethical issues regarding animal suffering, the question of animal consciousness and self-awareness and their implications for animal suffering, and what implications available theodicies might have for animal ethics.

Building on the thought of ancient and medieval philosophers, Thomas Aquinas provided a robust, classical theology of God and creation, and he included in his writings his thoughts on whether God could create a best possible world. Aquinas differs from Leibniz in that Aquinas argues that God cannot create a best possible world despite God’s infinite perfection, knowledge, and power. Nonetheless, contemporary objections aimed at Aquinas include objections similar to those aimed at Leibniz, but since Aquinas’s theological optimism differs from Leibniz, there are also other objections specifically aimed at Aquinas, including the problem of no best world. This chapter provides a discussion of contemporary objections to Aquinas, a brief historical background for Aquinas’s thought on God and best worlds, an explanation of Aquinas’s thoughts relevant to best possible worlds, and then a discussion of how Aquinas avoids contemporary objections.

The question of whether the existence of evil in the world is compatible with the existence of an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good God has been debated for centuries. Many have addressed classical arguments from evil, and while recent scholarship in analytic philosophy of religion has produced newer formulations of the problem, most of these newer formulations rely on a conception of God that is not held by all theists. In Bringing Good Even Out of Evil: Thomism and the Problem of Evil, B. Kyle Keltz defends classical theism against contemporary problems of evil through the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and his interpreters. Keltz discusses Aquinas’s thought on God, evil, and what kind of world God would make, then turns to contemporary problems of evil and shows how they miss the mark when it comes to classical theism. Some of the newer formulations that the book considers include James Sterba’s argument from the Pauline principle, J. L. Schellenberg’s divine hiddenness argument, Stephen Law’s evil-god challenge, and Nick Trakakis’s anti-theodicy.

Recently the intramural debate among Christians over the correct interpretation of Genesis 1 and the age of the earth has become heated between leaders of certain science-based ministries. A major point of contention revolves around the question of whether there was animal death before Adam and Eve’s first sin. Many young-earth proponents charge that if God allowed death before Adam and Eve sinned, then God would not be morally perfect. In this paper I propose and critique a logical argument from these charges. First, I formulate a logical problem based on the claims of young-earth proponents. Next, I discuss several theistic interpretations of God’s moral perfection and explain how deontological and consequentialist interpretations are problematic. After this I discuss Aquinas’ interpretation of God’s moral perfection. Finally, I provide a solution to the problem of death before the fall using Aquinas’ interpretation. I conclude that it is not logically contradictory to believe that God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good and that He created a world that initially contained animal death.

The problem of animal suffering is the atheistic argument that an all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good God would not use millions of years of animal suffering, disease, and death to form a planet for human beings. This argument has not received as much attention in the philosophical literature as other forms of the problem of evil, yet it has been increasingly touted by atheists since the time of Charles Darwin. While several theists have attempted to provide answers to the problem, they disagree with each other as to which answer is correct. Also, some of these theists have given in to the problem and believe it entails that God is limited in certain ways. B. Kyle Keltz seeks to provide a classical answer to the problem of animal suffering inspired by the medieval philosopher/theologian Thomas Aquinas. In doing so, Keltz not only utilizes the wisdom of Aquinas, but also contemporary insights into non-human animal minds from contemporary philosophy and science. Keltz provides a compelling neo-Thomistic answer to the problem of animal suffering and explains why the classical God of theism would create a world that includes animal death.

Proponents of the problem of animal suffering claim that the millions of years of apparent nonhuman animal pain and suffering provides evidence against the existence of God. Neo-Cartesianism attempts to avoid this problem mainly by denying the existence of phenomenal consciousness in nonhuman animals. However, neo-Cartesian options regarding animal minds have failed to compel many. In this essay, I explore an answer to the problem of animal suffering inspired by the medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas. Instead of focusing on phenomenal consciousness, the neo-Thomistic view of animal minds focuses on self-awareness. After proposing and providing evidence for this view, I conclude that nonhuman animal suffering is not morally significant.

Stephen Law’s evil-god challenge is the argument that since an evil god is just as likely as the God of theism, there is no reason to believe that theism is true over believing there is a god who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnimalevolent. There have been several attempts to answer the challenge, but recently John Collins has defended the evil-god challenge and also extended the argument past Law’s original formulation. In this article, I defend the classical theism of Thomas Aquinas against the evil-god challenge. In particular, I explain how Aquinas’s theodicy involving God’s goodness and Aquinas’s privation view of evil avoid the challenge.

The problem of animal suffering considers whether God would allow millions of years of animal pain, disease, and death. Philosophers who debate this issue often assume that pain and suffering are evils a loving God would not allow without good reason. Moreover, a considerable amount of the debate regarding the problem of animal suffering involves whether animals are capable of experiencing pain and suffering. But this raises the question of whether pain and suffering are intrinsically evil. In this essay I explore the nature of pain and suffering from a Thomistic perspective. First I briefly explain how the intrinsic values of pain and suffering are crucial regarding the problem of evil and the problem of animal suffering in particular. Next I explain the Thomistic concepts of pain and suffering and show that they do not contradict their contemporary philosophical and scientific counterparts. Afterward I determine whether pain and suffering are intrinsically evil experiences that an all-good God should refrain from causing. I conclude that pain and suffering are not intrinsically evil and that the problem of animal suffering is not a problem in addition to the problem of natural evil.

Thomas Aquinas is often mentioned in the debate regarding best possible worlds. Some philosophers believe Aquinas’ writings entail that God must create a best possible world while most think he rejects the notion. Additionally, it is thought that Aquinas’ position falls prey to the problem of no best world. However, a closer examination of Aquinas’ metaphysical views shows that he has been misunderstood in the current debate. In this essay, I first examine some contemporary views regarding Aquinas’ thought on best possible worlds. Afterward, I discuss Aquinas’ concepts of God’s goodness and God’s purpose for creating and determine their implications for his position regarding best possible worlds. Understanding these concepts helps to show why Aquinas’ position has been misrepresented. I conclude that while Aquinas does reject the popular notion of a best possible world, his arguments are not susceptible to the problem of no best world.

Proponents of the problem of animal suffering state that the great amount of animal death and suffering found in Earth’s natural history provides evidence against the truth of theism. In particular, philosophers such as Paul Draper have argued that regardless of the antecedent probability of theism and naturalism, animal suffering provides positive evidence for the truth of naturalism over theism. While theists have attempted to provide answers to the problem of animal suffering, almost none have argued that animal suffering and death can be seen as positive evidence for theism. This essay will discuss several arguments from the writings of Thomas Aquinas that can be used to show that animal suffering and death are to be expected in theistic universes. In the first section, I discuss evidential arguments for naturalism from animal suffering. Next, I provide an overview of Aquinas’ arguments, particularly in Book II of the Summa Contra Gentiles. After this, I discuss the implications these arguments have for theistic universes. Finally, I conclude that these arguments refute evidential arguments for naturalism from animal suffering and also provide evidence that favors theism.