University of Arizona
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1977
Raleigh, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory
Areas of Interest
Value Theory
  • "Postema's Account of Integrity"
    In Thomas da Rosa de Bustamante & Thiago Lopes Decat (eds.), Philosophy of law as an integral part of philosophy: essays on the jurisprudence of Gerald J. Postema, Hart Publishing, an Imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 47-79. 2020.
    In his “Integrity: Justice in Work Clothes,” Postema assumes the task of showing that integrity is a genuine moral value of political communities, distinct from other values such as justice and fairness. Postema’s conception of integrity borrows much from Dworkin’s, but also differs from it in an important respect. As anyone familiar with Dworkin’s theory would expect, Postema’s idea of integrity is a kind of fidelity in laws (“practical directives”) and policies to principles arising from wh…Read more
  • The social fact thesis, is, roughly, that law is ultimately a matter of social fact. Mark Greenberg and Kevin Toh have launched transcendental arguments against important or interesting general versions of the social fact thesis. Together, they can be read as posing a dilemma for the thesis. Suppose that many correct assertions of law are normative. Then, according to Toh, the considerations in virtue of which they are correct cannot ultimately be social facts, because the derivation of any …Read more
  •  6
    The retroactivity problem
    In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity, Bradford. 2010.
    This chapter discusses the retroactivity problem and how it arises when the idea that events occurring after a person’s life can harm that person is pursued. The common objection to this dilemma is the “no subject” type of response. The retroactivity problem is the result of making several assumptions jointly, many of which are initially plausible but none of which are actually defended. The first of these assumptions is referred to as Worse-Off, which states that an event harms a person only if…Read more
  • Mark Greenberg on Legal Positivism
    In Torben Spaak (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism, Cambridge University Press. 2021.
    Mark Greenberg has made a transcendental attack on a metaphysical position that some notable legal positivists have held -- namely, that law is ultimately grounded in social facts. He has also pressed legal positivism at a point of perceived vulnerability – the failure of such positivists to develop and defend a compelling theory of legal content. Moreover, in his Moral Impact Theory of law, he preserves a necessary connection between legal obligations and good reasons for action that is absen…Read more
  • Disposition of Remains
    In Christopher Berry Gray (ed.), The philosophy of law: an encyclopedia, Garland. 1999.
  • Postema's account of integrity
    In Thomas da Rosa de Bustamante & Thiago Lopes Decat (eds.), Philosophy of law as an integral part of philosophy: essays on the jurisprudence of Gerald J. Postema, Hart Publishing, an Imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing. 2020.
  • The relevance of literary interpretation
    In Thomas da Rosa de Bustamante & Margaret Martin (eds.), New essays on the Fish-Dworkin debate, Hart Publishing, an Imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing. 2023.
  •  24
  • Does dignity help in thinking about paternalism?
    In Salman Khurshid, Lokendra Malik & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Dignity in the legal and political philosophy of Ronald Dworkin, Oxford University Press. 2018.
  • Examining Legal Restrictions on the Retarded
    In L. M. Kopelman & J. C. Moskop (eds.), Ethics and Mental Retardation, Springer Verlag. pp. 209-221. 1984.
  • Prohibiting Attempts and Preparations
    University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 49 41-63. 1980.
  • On Universal Relevance in Legal Reasoning
    Law and Philosophy 3 1-23. 1984.
    The purpose of this essay is to defend a claim that a certain consideration, which I call unworkability, is universally and necessarily relevant to legal reasoning. By that I mean that it is a consideration that must carry legal weight in the justification of some judicial decisions in every legal system in which (1) all disputed matters of law can be adjudicated, and (2) all judicial decisions are to be legally justified. Unworkability's necessary relevance has important implications for a theo…Read more
  • Responsibility and the Normative Order Assumption
    Law and Contemporary Problems 49 (summer): 81-88. 1986.
  • Mark Greenberg on Legal Positivism
    In Torben Spaak (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism, Cambridge University Press. 2021.
    In various works, Mark Greenberg has positioned himself as an important critic of legal positivism. He has made a transcendental attack on a metaphysical position that some notable legal positivists have held -- namely, that law is ultimately grounded in social facts. He has pressed legal positivism at a point of perceived vulnerability – the failure of such positivists to develop and defend a compelling theory of legal content. Moreover, in his Moral Impact Theory of law, he preserves a nece…Read more
  •  1
    Disposition of Remains
    In Christopher Berry Gray (ed.), The philosophy of law: an encyclopedia, Garland. 1999.
    This is a reference work surveying the literature (as of the publication date) on treatment of the remains of human beings. I discuss leading views on the possibility of posthumous harm, posthumous rights, and rights of the living in the bodies of the dead.
  •  1
    The Law of the Street
    In James Penner & Mark McBride (eds.), New Essays on the Nature of Legal Reasoning, Hart Publishing. 2022.
    Everyone agrees that law is a constituent of social reality. Law seems to be a system by which conduct is governed and guided. Its usefulness consists, in part, on its ability to govern and guide conduct in its characteristic way. If laws guides the conduct of lay law subjects, then it must be (really) possible for the content of the laws governing their conduct to be known by them under standard social conditions. Moreover, if some degree of efficacy in guiding and governing the conduct of …Read more
  •  39
    A puzzle about legal systems and democratic theory
    Jurisprudence 11 (2): 157-168. 2020.
    Older statutes sometimes alter the legal content of newer statutes in a way not apparent from the text of the newer statutes. The puzzle is how, even if a new statute is the choice of the current polis, the legal content created in part by the elderly statute is also the choice of the current polis. I consider several possible answers, including a legislative intent account and Dworkin’s, and argue that none of them is satisfactory. I then offer my own account, the De Re Account, which depends…Read more
  • The social fact thesis, is, roughly, that law is ultimately a matter of social fact. Mark Greenberg and Kevin Toh have launched transcendental arguments against important or interesting general versions of the social fact thesis. Together, they can be read as posing a dilemma for the thesis. Suppose that many correct assertions of law are normative. Then, according to Toh, the considerations in virtue of which they are correct cannot ultimately be social facts, because the derivation of any …Read more
  •  49
    D-theories, Discretion, and the Justification of Adjudication
    Social Theory and Practice 5 (3-4): 331-345. 1980.
    This essay challenges Dworkin's account of the virtues and consistency of applying the right answer as given by a certain interpretive theory of local law (hereafter, the D-theory) with democratic theory. D-theory adjudication does not have all the virtues Dworkin claims for it. It may involve judicial law-creation as well, rather than being confined to the discovery of preexisting legal rights. It may also involve any of the morally objectionable features of judicial law-creation, including …Read more
  •  66
    Harming the dead, once again
    Ethics 96 (1): 162-164. 1985.
    This article responds to criticism by Don Marquis of my previous article, "Harming Someone after His Death." I argue that because the idea of surviving interests in not plausible, the harm-as-loss-theory is not on all fours with the harm-as-invasion-of-interests theory (especially when it comes to the harm of murder), and that the former is preferable.
  •  33
    Review essay / A theory of criminal justice
    Criminal Justice Ethics 1 (2): 60-64. 1982.
    Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, xviii + 521 pp
  •  86
    The meaning of a precedent
    Legal Theory 6 (2): 185-240. 2000.
    A familiar jurisprudential view is that a judicial decision functions as a legal precedent by laying down a rule and that the content of this rule is set by officials. Precedents can be followed only by acting in accordance with this rule. This view is mistaken on all counts. A judicial decision functions as a precedent by being an example. At its best, it is an example both for officials and for a target population. Even precedents outside of law function as examples when they have conduct-guid…Read more
  •  26
    On preferential admission
    Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (3-4): 255-273. 1980.
  •  115
    Harming someone after his death
    Ethics 94 (3): 407-419. 1984.
    I argue for the possibility of posthumous harm based on an account of the harm of murder. I start with the deep-seated intuition that when someone is murdered he (or she) is harmed (over and above the pain of injury or dying), and argue that Feinberg's account that assumes that harm is an invasion of an interest cannot plausibly accommodate this intuition. I propose a new account of the harm of murder: it is an irreversible loss of functions necessary for worthwhile existence. I suggest a (p…Read more
  •  63
    Discretion and Dispositive Concepts
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.
    In this essay, I argue against a way of approaching the issue of Judicial discretion that finds its clearest exposition and highest development in recent works by Ronald Dworkin. This approach is too narrow. It ignores a kind of Judicial discretion whose existence has been maintained by jurists with discretionist sympathies, and which is philosophically significant. The kind of discretion it ignores raises the issue of the justification of adjudication as clearly as does the kind of discretion …Read more