Barry C. Smith

Perceptual experience enables us to know features of objects in our environment. But what does the experience of tasting enable us to know? By tasting we discover the tastes of foods or liquids; but what are tastes? An objectivist sees tastes as properties of foods and drinks, which are there anyway, independent of how we experience them. On this view, tasting provides us with perceptual knowledge of real features of foods and liquids. By contrast, a subjectivist sees tastes as just features of our own experience: sensations on the tongue answerable to nothing other than themselves. Tastes, on this view, are not _in the foods_; rather foods give rise to tastes _in us_. A metaphysics of tastes that sees them not as properties of foods but as parts of our experience makes the epistemology of tasting an aspect of self-knowledge. Knowing how something tastes is being immediately aware of a certain sort of experience that occurs when we are eating or drinking. On this view, we can know all about tastes so long as we know all about our experience. However, this simple subjectivist story fails to do justice to the epistemology of tasting. The experiences generated when tasting are not unisensory but multisensory, though unified. They are perceptions of flavor and due to touch, taste, and smell. A satisfactory metaphysics and epistemology of flavor leaves room for flavors as configurations of sapid, odorous, and tactile properties of the food and liquids we consume.

In his writings on the later Wittgenstein, Crispin Wright deals in detail with two themes he sees as closely related: the nature of our knowledge of our own intentional states and the nature of rule-following. Wright’s work brings out deep connections between the two issues and he attempts to provide a similar epistemological treatment of both. However, in each case, the first-person perspective of the thinker and rule-follower goes missing from the accounts of the special way we know our own minds and meanings. The chapter shows that other parts of Wright’s work provide him with the resources to provide a fully satisfying account that reconciles the inner and outer aspects of mind and meaning.

This chapter discusses what happens when you hear noises as meaningful speech. The phenomenon is entirely familiar. When someone speaks within range, in a language you understand, you don't just hear their remarks as noises: you hear what is said. You have no choice but to experience the emitted noises as meaningful speech. But what account should philosophers and linguists give of this phenomenon. Speech sounds, linguists tell us, are not found in the world but in the minds of speakers who attach linguistic significance to particular acoustic signals. Philosophers, on the other hand, tell us that the meanings of words must be publicly available in overt speech behaviour, otherwise they would be private and incommunicable. How can we respect both these views while preserving the phenomenological claim that we hear meaning _in_ people's speech?

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE LOGIC RADULPHUS BRITO, Quaestiones super Priscianum minorern. Introduction and critical edition by H.W. Enders and J. Pinborg. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980. 460 pp. 2 fascicules. DM 168 per fascicule. PAUL VINCENT SPADE, Peter of Ailly: concepts and insolubles. An annotated translation. (Synthese Historical Library, Volume 19.) Dordrecht, Holland: Boston, U.S.A.: London, England: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980. xii + 193 pp. Df1.60/$31.40. VINCENT FERRER, Tractatus de suppositionibus. Introduction and critical edition by J.A. Trentman. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1977. 188 pp. No price stated. GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, Late scholastic and humanist theories of the proposition. Amsterdam, Oxford and New York: North Holland Publishing Co., 1980. 237 pp. Dfl.75.00/$36.50. LARRY HICKMAN, Modern theories of higher level predicates: second intentions in the Neuzeit. (Analytica. Investigations in Logic, Ontology and the Philosophy of Language.) Miinchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1980. 191 pp. DM 98. GERMAN TRADITIONS IN LOGIC JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschrift fiir seine Zuhörer (1794). Einleitung und Register von Wilhem G. Jacobs. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1979 (third edition). xxviii +272 pp. DM 23. GOTTHARD GUNTHER, Grundziige einer neuen Theorie des Denkens in Hegels’ Logik. Zweite Auflage. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978. xx+226 pp. DM 26. DIEGO MARCONI (ed.), La formalizzazione della dialettica. Turin: Rosemberg &Sellier, 1979. 474pp. No price stated. SUBSTANCE >M.J. Loux, Substance and attribute: a study in ontology. (Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, volume 14.) Dordrecht, Boston and London: Reidel, 1978. xi + 187 pp. $29.00 (cloth)/$11.95 (paper). DAVID WIGGINS, Sameness and substance. Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. xi + 238 pp. £12.50. EDITIONS OF FREGE GOTTLOB FREGE, Posthumous writings. Translated by P. Long and R. White, with the assistance of R. Hargreaves. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. viii+288pp. £15.00. GOTTLOB FREGE, Philosophical and mathematical correspondence. Translated by Hans Kaal, abridged by Brian McGuinness. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. xviii +214 pp. £15.00. G. FREGE, Schriften zur Logik und Sprachphilosophie. Aus dem NachlaB mit Einleitung, Anmerkungen, Bibliographie und Register herausgegeben von G. Gabriel. 2. Aufl. Hamburg: Meiner 1978. xxx + 224 pp. DM 25. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE ERNEST NAGEL, The structure of science: problems in the logic of scientific explanation. London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, paperback edition 1979. xiii + 618 pp. £4.95 (paper). JENNIFER TRUSTED, The logic of scientific inference: an introduction. Foreword by Sir Peter Medawar. London: The MacMillan Press, 1979. xii + 145 pp. £8.00. G. TORALDO DI FRANCIA (ed.) Problems in the foundations of physics. (Proceedings of the International School of Physics ‘Enrico Fermi’, Course LXXII, Varenna, Italy, 25th July-6th August 1977.) Amsterdam and New York: North Holland Publishing Company, 1979. xvii + 500 pp. US $87.75/dfl.180.00. A.-F. SCHMID, Une philosophie de savant. Henri Poincar6 et la logique mathématique. Paris: Maspéro, 1978. 175 pp. No price stated. LOGIC AND LANGUAGE LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, Notebooks 1914-16. Second edition. Edited by G.H. Von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe. English translation by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. 231 pp. £8.95 SAUL A. KRIPKE, Naming and necessity. Revised and enlarged edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1980. 172 pp. £7.95. M.A.E. DUMMETT, Truth and other enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978. lvii + 470 pp. £24.00. MISCELLANEOUS TOPICS JAAKKO LOUNELA, Die Logik im XVII. Jahrundert in Finnland. (Annales Academiae Fennicae. Dissertationes Humanarum Litterarum, no. 17.) Helsinki: Suomlainer Tiedeakatemia, 1978. vi + 188 pp. No price stated. BERNARD BOLZANO, Grundlegung der Logik. (Selections and synopses from Volumes I and I1 of Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre, second edition.) Edition and introduction by Friedrich Kambartel. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978. lxxi + 380 pp. DM 38 (paper). HERBERT MEHRTENS, Die Entstehung der Verbandstheorie. Hildesheim: Gerstenberg Verlag, 1979. ix + 363 pp. DM 42. JANE BRIDGE [KISTER], Beginning model theory. The completeness theorem and some consequences. (Oxford Logic Guides.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977. viii + 143 pp. $10.00.

The New Constellation By Richard J. Bernstein Polity Press, 1991. Pp. 358. ISBN 0–7456–0920–1. £39.50 hbk, £12.95 pbk. Essays in Quasi‐Realism By Simon Blackburn Oxford University Press, 1993. Pp. viii + 262. ISBN 0–19–508244–9. £16.95 The Contents of Experience Edited by Tim Crane Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 275. ISBN 0–521–41727–9. £30.00. Life‐World, Modernity and Critique: Paths between Heidegger and the Frankfurt School By Fred Dallmayr Polity Press, 1991. Pp. x + 244. ISBN 0–7456–0819–1. £35.00. Risky Business By Elaine Draper Cambridge University Press, 1991. 315 pp. ISBN 0–521–37027–2. £30.00 hbk. Nietzsche et la rhétorique By Angéle Kremer‐Marietti Presses Universitaries de France, 1992. Pp. 269. ISBN 2–13–044918–2. FF 210. The Lives of Michel Foucault By David Macey Hutchinson, 1993. Pp. 599. ISBN 0–09–1753449. £20.00. Essays on Aristotle's De Anima Edited by Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty Clarendon Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 439. ISBN 0–19–824461–4. £45.00. Pseudo‐Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas By Fran O'Rourke E. J. Brill, 1992. Pp. xvi + 300. ISBN 0–90–04–09466–0. $85.75. Universalism vs. Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics Edited by David Rasmussen MIT Press, 1990. Pp. 308. ISBN 0–26268063–7. $18.75 pbk. Objections to Physicalism Edited by Howard Robinson Clarendon Press, 1993. Pp. vi+326. ISBN 0–19–824256–5. £32.50. The Question of Being. A Reversal of Heidegger By Stanley Rosen Yale University Press, 1993. Pp. xxiii + 344. ISBN 0–300–05356–8. $37.50. Inequality Reexamined By Amartya Sen Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. xiv + 207. ISBN 0–19–828395–4. £20.00. Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology By Jacques Taminiaux Translated and edited by Michael Gendre State University of New York Press, 1991. Pp. 233. ISBN 0–791–40685–7. $59.50. The Epistemology of Religious Experience By Keith E. Yandell Cambridge University Press, 1993. Pp. viii + 371. ISBN 0–521–37426‐X. £35.00.

The new Chomskian orthodoxy denies that our linguistic competence gives us knowledge of a language, and that the representations in the language faculty are representations af anything. In reply, I have argued that through their intuitions speaker / hearers, (but not their language faculties) have knowledge of language, though not of any externally existing language. In order to count as knowledge, these intuitions must track linguistic facts represented in the language faculty. I defend this idea against the objections Collins has raised to such an account.

Moment to moment there can be sights, sounds, feels, tastes, and smells, informing us of the world around us and of ourselves. Being conscious encompasses all this and more. What is it to be conscious of each of these things? Can I be conscious of all of them at the same time? Am I conscious of each of them in the same way and to the same extent? They seem to flesh out the continuous and unified details of my current conscious state. But is that right, or do I only become conscious of each thing as I notice it, shifting attention from one thing to another? It’s hard to say. And that’s because it is hard to get to grips with each conscious moment as it transpires. Yet that’s what philosophical reflections on consciousness seem to require. How are we aware of these conscious states? How well can we know them as we undergo them? And can our answers to these questions tell us anything about the nature of consciousness? I here argue that we cannot rely on just our intuitive take on our own experience to know what is going on there. What we seem to pick out, whether by misleading talk of “what it’s like,” or by “untutored attention,” do not necessarily provide constraints on account of the nature of consciousness. Instead, we need philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists working together to elicit information from different sources in order to arrive at a collective view of how the different types of evidence and information fit together to produce the best explanation of the phenomena of consciousness we are interested.

Self-knowledge is the focus of considerable attention from philosophers: Knowing Our Own Minds gives a much-needed overview of current work on the subject, bringing together new essays by leading figures. Knowledge of one's own sensations, desires, intentions, thoughts, beliefs, and other attitudes is characteristically different from other kinds of knowledge: it has greater immediacy, authority, and salience. The contributors examine philosophical questions raised by the distinctive character of self-knowledge, relating it to knowledge of other minds, to rationality and agency, externalist theories of psychological content, and knowledge of language. Together these original, stimulating, and closely interlinked essays demonstrate the special relevance of self-knowledge to a broad range of issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language.

An argument is offered that externalism can compromise the first‐person transparency of mental contents. The premises are John McDowell's view that experience is passively structured by concepts, and the Simple Theory of Colour advocated by John Campbell, according to which those properties that are the actual semantic values of colour concepts are just as they appear to normal observers under standard conditions. An example is offered to suggest that it must be an epistemic possibility that the semantic values of such concepts, as externally determined, are not the properties the Simple Theory takes them to be. The possibility highlights a mismatch between the properties that the colour concepts present as their semantic values and their actual, externally determined semantic values. Such a mismatch is shown to induce an incoherence into colour concepts leaving them unfit passively to structure our colour experience. Under such circumstances, it would not be transparent to a subject on the basis of colour experience, whether those experiences are conceptually structured by concepts answering to the Simple Theory, or precisely what content they carry.

MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE LOGICSMARK D. JOHNSTON, The spiritual logic of Ramon Llull. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1987. xi + 336 pp. £35.00E. J. ASHWORTH, Thomas Bricot: Tractatus Znsolubilium. Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1986. xxiii+ 155 pp. 44 Dfl.CYPRIANI REGNERI, Demonstratio logicae verae iuridica. Edited by G. Kalinowski. Bologna: Cooperativa Libraria Universitaria Editrice Bologna, 1986. xxviii + 167 pp. No price stated.GIROLAMO SACCHERI, Euclides vindicatus. Edited and translated by George Bruce Halsted: second, expanded, edition. New York: Chelsea Publishing Company 1986. xxx + 255 pp. $16.95.THE NINETEENTH CENTURYT. HAILPERIN, Boole's logic andprobability. Second edition. Amsterdam, New York,Oxford and Tokyo: North-Holland, 1986. xii + 428 pp. $76.00.WALTER PURKERT and HANS JOACHIM ILGAUDS, Georg Cantor 1845-1918. Basel/Boston/Stuttgart: Birkhauser Verlag, 1987. 262 pp., 26 plts. SFr. 48.MAX H. FISCH, Peirce, semeiotic, andpragmatism: essays by Max H. Fisch. Edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner and Christian J. W. Kloesel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. xiv + 464 pp. $45.00.LOGIC AND LANGUAGEJOËLLE PROUST, Qusesting de forme. logique et proposition analtique de kant á Carnap. Paris Fayard, 1986. xxviii + 504 pp. FF 160H. PALMER, Presupposition and transcendental inference. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985. 208 pp. £15.95EDITIONSALFRED TARSKI, Collected papers. Edited by Steven R. Givant and Ralph N. McKenzie. Vol. I, 1921-1934, 659 pp. Vol. 11, 1935-1944, 699 pp. Vol. 111, 1945-1957, 682 pp. Vol. IV, 1958-1979, 757 pp. Basel, Boston, Stuttgart: Birkhäuser,1986. SF 1280KURT GöDEL, Collected works, Volume 1. Edited by Solomon Feferman, John W. Dawson Jr., Stephen Kleene, Gregory H. Moore, Robert M. Solovay and Jean van Heijenoort. New York: Oxford University Press; Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1986. xviii + 474 pp. £25.00.MISCELLANEOUSJ. MACNAMARA, A border dispute. The place of logic in psychology. Cambridge, Mass. and London: M. I. T. Press. 1986. xviii + 212 pp. £22.50.G. LOLLI, La macchina e le dimostrazioni. Bologna: il Mulino, 1987. 157 pp. L. 15.000.

In uttering a sentence we are often taken to assert more than its literal meaning — though we sometimes assert less. Robyn Carston and others take this phenomenon to show that what is said or asserted by a speaker on an occasion of utterance is usually a contextuallyenriched version of the semantic content of the sentence. I shall argue that we can resist this conclusion if we recognize that what we think we are asserting, or take others to be asserting, involves selective attention to one of the ways a sentence could be true and neglects others. Most of the time people converge in their selective attention and so communication is not impaired. Though in the case of sentences involving predicates of taste, people’s attention to different aspect of the truth conditions leads to seemingly intractable disputes. I will propose a treatment of such cases on which speakers mean the same by a sentence, assert no more than its semantic content, hold conflicting opinions about its truth-value, and are both right.

MEDIEVAL LOGICCARLOS A. DUFOUR, Die Lehre der Proprietates Terminorum. Sinn und Referenz in mittelalterlicher Logik. München, Hamden, Wien: Philosophia, 1989. 312 pp. 148 DM.NORMAN KRETZMANN and BARBARA ENSIGN KRETZMANN The Sophismata of Richard Kilvington. Oxford: Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press, 1990. xx + 156 pp. £27.50.LOGIC AND MATHEMATICSSOULEYMANE BACHIR DIAGNE, Boole. Paris: Editions Belin, 1989. 262pp. 75 Ffr.M.-M. TOEPELL, Über die Entstehung von David Hilberts “Grundlagen der Geometrie”. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1986. vii + 293 pp. 82 DM.VOLKER PECKHAUS, Hilbertprogramm und Kritische Philosophie. Das Göttinger Model1 interdisziplinarer Zusammenärbeit zwischen Mathematik und Philosophie. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990. vi + 291 pp. 78 DM.E. WELTI, Die Philosophie des Strikten Finitismus, Entwicklungstheoretische und mathematische Untersuchungen iiber Unendlichkeitsbegriffe in Ideengeschichte und Mathematik, Bern, Frankfurt am Main und New York: Peter Lang, 1986. xxix + 652pp. $79.90.Philosophy of logicMARK A. NOTTURNO, Perspectives on psychlogism. Leiden, New York, Copenhagen and Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1989. viii + 504 pp. 225 Dfl/$112.50.ROBERT N. MCLAUGHLIN, On the logic of ordinary conditionals. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990. xvii + 202 pp. $54.50 /$17.95.JAAKKO HINTIKKA and MERRILL HINTIKKA, The logic of epistemology and the epistemology of logic: selected essays. Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.J. NORMAN and R. SYLVAN, Directions in relevant logic. Foreword by N. D. Belnap. Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. xii + 453 pp. £72.00.LOGIC AND LANGUAGEC. J. F. WILLIAMS, What is identity? Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. xx + 207 pp. £25.00.GREGORY MCCULLOCH, The game of the name. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. xvi + 320pp. £30.00, £9.95.GRAEME FORBES, Languages of possibility. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. x + 181 pp. £27.50.

The problem of self‐knowledge is examined and the linguistic strategy for tackling it is explored. The strategy attempts—as in Davidson's and Wright's discussions of self‐knowledge—to ground knowledge of one's mind on knowledge of what one means in speaking one's mind. If knowing what one is saying in speaking a language is to provide a means of knowing one's own mind, it cannot simply be a part of it. But if no account of knowledge of what one means is offered, there will be a lacuna in the strategy. The paper considers what form a full account should take, and argues that it will have to combine first‐personal, third‐personal and sub‐personal elements of our knowledge of language. All three elements are necessary to explicate what is made available in, and expressed by, instances of disquotational knowledge, such as ‘Snow is white’ means that snow is white.. Immediate and authoritative knowledge of which sentences are grammatical depends on the internal workings of the language faculty and their impact on the conscious experience of the speaker, but immediate and authoritative knowledge of word meaning is not solely a matter internal to the speaker. Knowledge of word meaning is knowledge of public norms that govern our use of words, which introduce third‐personal standards into our first‐personal use. It is argued that our knowledge of word meaning is immediately authoritative about objective standards governing the proper use of our words, and so the authority attaching to these disquotational pronouncements is substantial and not merely an artefact of disquotation. Without an account of that knowledge the lacuna in the linguistic strategy remains.