•  169
    More on making mind matter
    with Ernest Lepore
    Philosophical Topics 17 (1): 175-191. 1989.
  •  13
    More on Making Mind Matter
    with Ernest Lepore
    Philosophical Topics 17 (1): 175-191. 1989.
  •  4
    What Davidson Should Have Said
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 36 (1): 65-78. 1989.
    According to Davidson, a theory of meaning for a language L should specify information such that if someone had this information he would be in a position to understand L. He claims that a theory of truth for L fits this description. Many critics have argued that a truth theory is too weak to be a theory of meaning. We argue that these critics and Davidson's response to them have been misguided. Many critics have been misguided because they have not been clear aboutwhat a theory of meaning is su…Read more
  •  50
    What Davidson Should Have Said
    with Ernest Lepore
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 36 (1): 65-78. 1989.
    According to Davidson, a theory of meaning for a language L should specify information such that if someone had this information he would be in a position to understand L . He claims that a theory of truth for L fits this description. Many critics have argued that a truth theory is too weak to be a theory of meaning. We argue that these critics and Davidson's response to them have been misguided. Many critics have been misguided because they have not been clear aboutwhat a theory of meaning is s…Read more
  •  33
    Three Trivial Truth Theories
    with Ernest Lepore
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (3). 1983.
    According to Tarski, a theory of truth for a language L is a theory which logically implies for each sentence S of L a sentence of the form:S is true-in-L if and only if p,where rS1 is replaced by a canonical description of a sentence of L and rp1 is replaced by that sentence if L is contained in the metalanguage or by a translation of S if it is not so contained. Tarski constructed consistent and finitely axiomatized theories of truth for various formal languages and showed how to explicitly de…Read more
  • Why There Is Anything except Physics
    In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation, Oxford University Press. 2008.
  •  34
    It has been argued contra Humean accounts of scientific laws that on Humean accounts laws are flukes since they are merely true generalizations and it would be an accident or a fluke for a generalization to obtain unless there was a non-Humean law "backing" it. This paper argues that this kind of objection is mistaken. It goes on to describe an account of laws called "the Package Deal Account" that is a descendent of Lewis' BSA on which it is not an accident that our universe has a best systemat…Read more
  •  19
    Humean laws and explanation
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (3): 373-385. 2019.
    My primary focus in this paper is on an objection to Humean account of laws and specifically to David Lewis’ “best systems analysis”. The objection is that the laws according to the BSA fail to account for the ability of laws to explain. In contrast governing laws are alleged to account for the role of laws in scientific explanations by virtue of their governing role. If governing is required for laws to be explanatory then Humean accounts like Lewis’ are dead in the water since explanation is c…Read more
  •  40
    The package deal account of laws and properties
    Synthese 199 (1-2): 1065-1089. 2020.
    This paper develops an account of the metaphysics of fundamental laws I call “the Package Deal Account ” that is a descendent of Lewis’ BSA but differs from it in a number of significant ways. It also rejects some elements of the metaphysics in which Lewis develops his BSA. First, Lewis proposed a metaphysical thesis about fundamental properties he calls “Humean Supervenience” according to which all fundamental properties are instantiated by points or point sized individuals and the only fundame…Read more
  •  24
    Knowledge and the Flow of Information
    Philosophy of Science 49 (2): 297-300. 1982.
  •  10
    Mind in a Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 655-662. 2002.
  • Freedom from Physics: Quantum Mechanics and Free Will
    In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology, Oxford University Press. 2004.
  •  1
    Philosophy of Cosmology: an Introduction (edited book)
    with A. Ijjas
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  25
    A companion to David Lewis (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2015.
    In _A Companion to David Lewis_, Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer bring together top philosophers to explain, discuss, and critically extend Lewis's seminal work in original ways. Students and scholars will discover the underlying themes and complex interconnections woven through the diverse range of his work in metaphysics, philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, ethics, and aesthetics. The first and only comprehensive study of the work of David…Read more
  • Physicalism and its Discontents (edited book)
    . 2001.
  •  87
  •  12
    Comments on Jaegwon Kim’s M ind and the Physical World
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3): 655-662. 2002.
    NRP is a family of views differing by how they understand “reduction” and “physicalism.” Following Kim I understand the non-reduction as holding that some events and properties are distinct from any physical events and properties. A necessary condition for physicalism is that mental properties, events, and laws supervene on physical ones. Kim allows various understandings of “supervenience” but I think that physicalism requires at least the claim that any minimal physical duplicate of the actual…Read more
  • Knowledge, Names, and Necessity
    Dissertation, Stanford University. 1975.
  •  228
    Mind matters
    with Ernest Le Pore
    Journal of Philosophy 84 (11). 1987.
  •  224
    The measurement problem: Some “solutions”
    with David Z. Albert
    Synthese 86 (1). 1991.
  •  5
    From physics to physicalism
    In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents, Cambridge University Press. 2001.
    The appeal of materialism lies precisely in this, in its claim to be natural metaphysics within the bounds of science. That a doctrine which promises to gratify our ambition (to know the noumenal) and our caution (not to be unscientific) should have great appeal is hardly something to be wondered at. (Putnam (1983), p.210) Materialism says that all facts, in particular all mental facts, obtain in virtue of the spatio- temporal distribution, and properties, of matter. It was, as Putnam says, “met…Read more
  •  17
    Preface
    Synthese 62 (1): 1-1. 1985.
  •  63
    Dyadic deontic detachment
    Synthese 54 (2). 1983.
  •  61
    The truth pays
    Synthese 43 (3). 1980.
    Why is truth valuable? Why are true beliefs generally preferable to false beliefs and why should we often be willing to expend energy and resources to obtain the truth? Pragmatist theories of truth, whatever their shortcomings, are the only ones which attempt to answer these questions. According to James’ version of the pragmatic theory.
  •  14
    On The Likelihood Principle and a Supposed Antinomy
    with Robert Laddaga and Roger Rosenkrantz
    PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978. 1978.
    Allan Birnbaum has alleged that use of a likelihood criterion can find strong evidence against a true hypothesis with probability one. It is shown that, correctly applied, use of the likelihood function does not lead to any such result. Specifically, Birnbaum's example involves composite hypotheses, and, from a Bayesian point of view, the support of a composite hypothesis can be adequately assessed only by averaging the likelihoods of its constituent simple hypotheses.
  •  257
    Why is there anything except physics?
    Synthese 170 (2). 2009.
    In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and…Read more