Bart Zantvoort

According to Adorno, all attempts to change society “immediately come up against the overwhelming force of inertia in the prevailing situation, and seem condemned to impotence.” This article explores the way the phenomenon of social and institutional inertia has been addressed in recent Critical Theory. It poses two central questions: firstly, what is social inertia, and what causes it? And secondly, how do we judge when institutions or social norms are “inert” or “obsolete”? It first briefly discusses the historical background of the problem of inertia, obsolescence and second nature in Hegel, Marx and the first generation of the Frankfurt School, and then discusses the central questions primarily with reference to recent work by Jaeggi and Menke and, to a lesser extent, Rosa and Von Redecker.

According to Merleau-Ponty, the problem with dialectical materialism from Marx to Trotsky was that it was insufficiently attentive to the inertia of institutions and the real weight of history: it ‘lacked a means of expressing the inertia of the infrastructures, the resistance of economic and even natural conditions, and the swallowing-up of “personal relationships” in “things.”’ In response, Sartre tried to show in his Critique of Dialectical Reason how the world that we create starts to exercise power over us in the form of ‘practico-inert’ structures and institutions. However, these inert institutions do not confront us as passive blocks of objective reality that are simply too difficult to change, as the classic Hegelian notion of social reality as ‘second nature’ would suggest. Instead, they suck us in and suck us dry, absorbing our energies with a kind of vampiric force. Already in Being and Nothingness, Sartre described the way we get enmeshed in material reality like dealing with slime: the more you struggle to free yourself, the more stuck you become. In general, inertia for Sartre is not passive objectivity; rather, we are constantly ‘falling into inertia’. But what is the nature of this inertia, what is the vampiric or ‘slimy’ force of institutions, and how can we resist it? This paper will examine Merleau-Ponty’s claim that Sartre is unable to think inertia, consider whether the theory of the ‘practico-inert’ in the Critique of Dialectical Reason is an adequate response to this concern, and develop the notion of slime (‘le visqueux’) as a ‘middle ground’ between subjectivity and objectivity.

_Essays addressing, from various angles, the relationship between Europe and philosophy in today's crisis-ridden contexts such as xenophobia and migration._ _Reimagining Europe_ comprises a series of contributions which address, in various ways, the relationship between Europe and continental philosophy/phenomenology. Europe is in crisis: a crisis that no longer designates a moment of decision, a critical point between a before and an after, but a state, a permanent mode of being, a constant emergency. At this juncture of Europe, the aporia of language confronts the aporia of history. We cannot speak, we must speak, we shall speak. As such, the contributions all engage with the idea that the question "what is Europe?" must measure up a series of questions, namely: what was it to be? What does it mean to initiate and sustain a project, such as Europe, if only at times, after the fact? The questions of internal and external borders, of homogeneity and coherence, identity and equality, legitimacy and rights, democracy and representation can only be raised insofar as the question of Europe, its destiny, and destination, is raised as a whole.

Freedom and slavery. Hegel on habit This article is an introduction to the Dutch translation of Hegel’s analysis of habit in paragraphs 409–410 of the Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit, which is published in this issue. The analysis of habit is placed in context through a discussion of the preceding paragraphs, which describe how human consciousness detaches itself from its immersion in nature and consider the relation between habit and madness. This is followed by a discussion of the ambiguous nature of habit, which according to Hegel is both necessary for thinking and freedom but at the same time leads us to act mechanically and without thinking and thus turns us into slaves of habit. The final section argues that the problematic, ‘enslaving’ aspect of habit is not a passing phase that is overcome at higher levels of development, as Hegel sometimes seems to suggest. Both Hegel’s theory of ethical life and the modern state as ‘second nature’ as well as the ‘pure thought’ of philosophy remain rooted in habit and can therefore not be detached from the dark side of habit, which threatens the rationality and integrity of modern ethical life and philosophy.

The concept of resistance has always been central to the reception of Hegel's philosophy. The prevalent image of Hegel's system, which continues to influence the scholarship to this day, is that of an absolutist, monist metaphysics which overcomes all resistance, sublating or assimilating all differences into a single organic 'Whole'. For that reason, the reception of Hegel has always been marked by the question of how to resist Hegel: how to think that which remains outside of or other to the totalizing system of dialectics. In recent years the work of scholars such as Catherine Malabou, Slavoj Žižek, Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda has brought considerable nuance to this debate. A new reading of Hegel has emerged which challenges the idea that there is no place for difference, otherness or resistance in Hegel, both by refusing to reduce Hegel's complex philosophy to a straightforward systematic narrative and by highlighting particular moments within Hegel's philosophy which seem to counteract the traditional understanding of dialectics. This book brings together established and new voices in this field in order to show that the notion of resistance is central to this revaluation of Hegel.

The term ‘inertia’ is often used to describe a kind of irrational resistance to change in individuals or institutions. Institutions, ideas and power structures appear to become entrenched over time, and may become ineffective or obsolete, even if they once played a legitimate or useful role. In this paper I argue that there is a common set of problems underlying the occurrence of resistance to change in individuals, social structures and the development of knowledge. Resistance to change is not always irrational or problematic; it is also necessary to allow stable personal identities and social structures to survive in a constantly changing world. I offer a historical and theoretical framework for the question of inertia. Finally, I argue that philosophy has often seen its task to be the critique of ossified, inert or obsolete ideas and social structures, but that it has neglected the positive dimension of resistance to change. Normal 0 false false false EN-GB X-NONE X-NONE

There is a complicated relation between social and political inertia – the failure of institutions to respond adequately to social, technological and environmental change – and social acceleration – the tendency of social change to go faster and faster. Social stasis and acceleration are not simply opposed but also causally related. This article contrasts two theories of political and social inertia. Francis Fukuyama argues that political inertia is a result of a cognitive and institutional rigidity which is ultimately grounded in human nature, and that therefore inertia is a feature inherent in political systems. Hartmut Rosa, by contrast, sees inertia as a specifically modern phenomenon, which is the result of the inability of political institutions to cope with the accelerating rate of change in other social systems. It will be argued that a broad approach combining historical, institutional and normative perspectives is needed to explain political inertia.