Beba Cibralic

Healthcare applications of AI have the potential to produce great benefit, but also come with significant ethical risks. This has brought ethics to the forefront of academic, policy and public debates about AI in healthcare. To help navigate these debates, we distinguish three general modes of ethical theorizing in contemporary secular AI ethics: (1) idealism, which seeks to articulate moral ideals that can be applied to concrete problems; (2) realism, which focuses on understanding complex social realities that underpin ethical problems; and (3) pragmatism, which promotes deliberate methods that allow joint action in the present but also enable to future moral growth and progress. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each of these modes and illustrate their relevance to salient ethical problems arising from AI in healthcare. Finally, we argue that, while all three have merits, pragmatist approaches deserve more attention they have received thus far.

In Reading ‘Black Mirror’: Insights into Technology and the Post-Media Condition, German A. Duarte and Justin Michael Battin offer a new collection of essays that provides different frameworks for understanding, contextualising and appraising the influential science fiction TV anthology series, Black Mirror. While finding that the volume does not always fully cohere and often requires prior familiarity with twentieth-century French and German philosophy, there are a number of essays that are worth ample attention, writes Beba Cibralic.

In this chapter, I explore information-based influence in the context of epistemic security. My aim is to provide a topography of landscape and an assessment of how best to conceptualize contested terms in the discourse on influence. I begin with a foundational question: what is information-based foreign influence? I answer this question in section 2 with a structure that helps make sense of different activities and campaigns associated with information-based influence, which I refer to as ‘lines of effort’. I then compare different kinds of lines of effort: influence operations, information campaigns, psychological operations, information operations, reflexive control, social engineering, and foreign influence efforts. In section 3-6, I examine four core concepts in the discourse – propaganda, disinformation, narratives, and mediatization – and consider their epistemic consequences. I also evaluate how we ought to understand these concepts for analytical purposes. I conclude by summarizing the upshots of the arguments and offering suggestions for future research. .

I contend existing international law frameworks are inadequate for explaining why certain foreign information-based influence campaigns are impermissible or troublesome. Moreover, I posits the warfare paradigm is both limiting and potentially dangerous. I then propose reframing the conversation about foreign information and influence campaigns to focus not on the nationality of the speaker or the source of the idea but rather on whether there is deception or mis/disinformation involved. It is factors like these that arguably render influence impermissible and corrosive to democracy.

Theories of action tend to require agents to have mental representations. A common trope in discussions of artificial intelligence (AI) is that they do not, and so cannot be agents. Properly understood there may be something to the requirement, but the trope is badly misguided. Here we provide an account of representation for AI that is sufficient to underwrite attributions to these systems of ownership, action, and responsibility. Existing accounts of mental representation tend to be too demanding and unparsimonious. We offer instead a minimalist account of representation that ascribes only those features necessary for explaining action, trimming the “extra” features in existing accounts (e.g., representation as a “mental” phenomenon). Our account makes ‘representation’ whatever it is that, for example, the thermostat is doing with the thermometer. The thermostat is disposed to act as long as the thermometer is outside a given range of parameters.. Our account allows us to offer a new perspective on the ‘responsibility gap’, a problem raised by the actions of sophisticated machines: because nobody has enough control over the machine’s actions to be able to assume responsibility, conventional approaches to responsibility ascription are inappropriate. We argue that there is a distinction between finding responsible and holding responsible and, in order to resolve the responsibility gap, we must first clarify the conceptual terrain on which agent is in fact responsible.

How should we regard increasingly autonomous and human-like robots? Kate Darling’s monograph New Breed explores this terrain, with an eye to the conceptual, moral, and legal issues informing the debate. Darling’s thesis is simple: by drawing from humankind’s history with animals, we will learn how to incorporate future robots into our social world. Combining personal narrative, legal history, and case-studies, Darling tells a readable story that may just change what we think about when we think about robots. Although not always persuasive, Darling’s arguments are stimulating and worth debating, writes Beba Cibralic.

An assumption underpinning the literature on human shields is that it is possible to distinguish between a voluntary shield and an involuntary shield. This is a claim I challenge with the purpose of demonstrating that the conventional basis on which we currently determine which human shields are liable to targeting is morally unjustifiable. Given the difficulty in tracking intentions, any presumption on the part of the targeting agent to know ex ante whether a civilian is volunteering to be a shield cannot be adequately substantiated. I argue that, in lieu of categorising human shields as ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’, we accept our epistemic limitations and recognise that we cannot know whether a shield has volunteered in the relevant sense of the word. This leads me to the conclusion that shields ought not be considered direct participants in hostilities, but rather be presumed to be non-combatants.