Bela Szabados

This book provides the first in-depth exploration of the importance of music for Ludwig Wittgenstein’s life and work. Wittgenstein’s remarks on music are essential for understanding his philosophy: they are on the nature of musical understanding, the relation of music to language, the concepts of representation and expression, on melody, irony and aspect-perception, and, on the great composers belonging to the Austrian-German tradition. Biography and philosophy, this work suggests that Wittgenstein was a composer of philosophy who used the musical form as a blueprint for his own writing and thought. For Wittgenstein music is not alone, but connects and resonates with our cultural forms of life. His relation to composers, especially to Richard Wagner and Gustav Mahler, enables Wittgenstein to address the question of how to do philosophy and compose music in the breakdown of tradition. Unlike his conservative musical sensibility, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is open to musical experiments. Reflecting on his remarks on music makes it possible to compare the therapeutic aim of his philosophical activity with that of music, and thus notice affinities between Wittgenstein and John Cage. Béla Szabados has a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Calgary and is professor of philosophy at the University of Regina. His publications include Wittgenstein Reads Weininger (2004), Wittgenstein at the Movies (2011) and Wittgenstein on Race, Gender, and Cultural Identity: Philosophy as a Personal Endeavour (2010)

Hypocrisy and privacy are commonly thought to be completely different, yet it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to distinguish them. We consider various ways in which they might be differentiated, especially the attempt to do so on the basis of their moral standing. We argue, by case and through discussion, that there is more moral ambiguity about each concept than generally acknowledged. Finally, we offer some additional speculations about the similarities and differences between the two, with a view to aid moral discernment.

pour l'autre en nous et parmi nousAn apologia seeks to cover up the revolutionary moments in the course of history. The establishment of continuity is dear to its heart. It only gives importance to those elements of a work that have already generated an after-effect. It misses those points at which the transmission breaks down and thus misses those jags and crags that offer a handhold to someone who wishes to move beyond them.I am all the same convinced that these notes [in Culture and Value] can be properly understood and appreciated only against the background of Wittgenstein’ s philosophy and, furthermore, that they make a contribution to our understanding of that philosophy.

Caputo’s book is enigmatic. It is, on the one hand, a remorseless screed directed against those who proclaim to the world “the totalizing truth or logos that engulfs the other.” As such, it contains predictable characterizations of a variety of logocentric villains as historically disparate as Plato and the “Polish Pope, John Paul II,” in which their contributions to philosophical discourse are alternatively parodied and vilified as being hostile to that spirit of openness to the “toute autre,” spirit that which, we are told, animates the deconstructive enterprise. On the other hand, it is possible to discern within the book a certain structure that, however much it may belie Caputo’s expressed revulsion of closure, makes the book interesting and instructive. In this regard, three closely related themes present themselves. The first of these is particular and exegetical, comprising an attempt to explore in some detail the rather surprising claim that the point of view of Derrida’s work as an author is religious and that his recent writings especially contain elements of a religion “about which no one, not even his mother, understands anything.” The second, no less surprising, is the wider, more philosophically interesting thesis that Derridian deconstruction, and perhaps deconstruction itself, is to be situated within the framework of faith, the same passionate religious faith that animated the writings of St. Augustine, Meister Eckhart, and Kierkegaard. The third is the attempt to capitalize on the political mission of Derridian deconstruction which is characterized as the “delimitation of totalization in all its forms,” an objective that retains a faithful, though somewhat unclear, connection to Marx.

While Wittgenstein commentators dismiss his remarks on women and femininity as trivial and unworthy of attention, I focus exactly on what they consider parenthetical and of no philosophical value. First, I document Wittgenstein’s attitudes toward women and femininity, and subject his remarks to critical analysis. Secondly, I retrieve and explore some aspects of Otto Weininger’s influence on Wittgenstein. Thirdly, by introducing considerations of chronology and circumstance, I argue that while the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus endorsed Weininger’s views on women and sex, the mature Wittgenstein of the Investigations repudiated them without ceasing to adrnire his work or its spirit. Finally, I sketch crucial, unnoticed differences between Weininger and the mature Wittgenstein concerning femininity and philosophical method. The author’s intention is to contribute to the project of challenging the supposed divide between the understanding of philosophical thought, on the one hand, and socio-cultural contexts and biography on the other.

I argue that Wittgenstein was no lifelong musical formalist. I further contend that the attribution of musical formalism obscures, while the break with it I propose explains, the role that music played in the development of his philosophy of language. What is more, I sketch a perspective on the later Wittgenstein’s remarks on the music and musical understanding that supports my claims. Throughout my discussion, rather than assimilating Hanslick’s and Wittgenstein’s views on music, I point to similarities and differences between them, suggesting that taking snapshots and putting them side by side sheds more light on how they are related to each other

What are the differences between hypocrisy, change of mind, and weakness of will? Each typically involves a gap between word and deed, yet they do not seem morally equivalent. Moreover, they are intuitively different concepts, even though the conceptual boundaries between them are fuzzy. This paper explores diverse examples, attempting to identify elements which may be distinctive of each concept, with special attention to hypocrisy. It also provides a discussion of the appropriateness of such use of examples in moral philosophy.

What is a hypocrite? What role does hypocrisy play in our lives? Why is it thought to be such an ugly vice? Is it ever acceptable? What do we lose in our indifference to it? Hypocrisy: Ethical Investigations seeks to illuminate the concept of hypocrisy by exploring its multiple roles in our moral and political lives and struggles. The authors provide a critical examination of a wide range of perspectives on the nature, varieties, and significance of hypocrisy, arguing that it is a key concept in the investigation of the field of morality in general, including its moralizing excesses.

Emotions are in as a philosophical topic. Yet the recent literature is bent on grand theorizing rather than attempting to explore particular emotions and their roles in our lives. In this paper, I aim to remedy this situation a little by exploring the emotion of embarrassment. First, I critically examine R.C. Solomon’s conceptual sketch and try to distinguish “embarrassment” from “shame”, “humiliation” and “being amused”. Secondly, I argue that “private embarrassment” is a coherent and useful idea and social scientists and philosophers who dismiss it as unintelligible are mistaken. Thirdly, I discuss the question why is embarrassment (unlike other emotions) catching. Fourth, I make the heretical suggestion that doing philosophy is essentially embarrassing for Socratic interlocutors. Throughout the paper there is a discussion of possible links between embarrassment and loss of self-esteem.