Ben Berger

This chapter explores two models that Schelling employs in the 1804 System to clarify the ontological relationships between the most general forms of life (plants, infusoria, animals, and human beings). The first model is a more traditional model for thinking about these forms of life; it describes a unilinear, atemporal development from one form of life to another. The second model-which is largely implicit in the System’s philosophy of life-describes a bifurcated series of lifeforms in which more advanced forms emerge from more simple forms in history along two lines of development. The chapter argues that this second model should be interpreted as a moment in Schelling’s intellectual development in which he begins to understand the history of nature as philosophically significant.

Dans cet article, nous nous proposons de souligner la proximité des philosophies de Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987) et de Charles-Augustus Strong (1862-1940). Ruyer est resté discret quant à ce qu’il retenait de sa lecture de Strong ; s’il est clair que la thèse défendue par le philosophe américain sur les rapports de la conscience et du corps a déterminé sa propre position sur le sujet, il n’est pas moins certain que d’autres thèses de Strong ont également retenu son attention. Il ne s’agit pas ici de relativiser l’originalité de la philosophie ruyérienne mais bien de prendre acte de la richesse de l’une de ses sources les plus importantes et méconnues du public français.

Chez Ruyer, il y a une rupture flagrante entre le « panmécanisme » des débuts, élaboré dans l’Esquisse d’une philosophie de la structure, et le panpsychisme de la maturité. Nous verrons que son inscription dans le premier lui donna l’occasion d’entrer dans ce qu’il repère comme étant la « grande voie naturelle de la philosophie ». Celle-ci consiste à chercher, en l’homme, la trace du mode d’être commun à l’ensemble des individualités psycho-biologiques. L’appartenance de Ruyer à cette « grande voie » ne s’est jamais démentie, de sorte que l’on peut dire du « panmécanisme » de départ, que Ruyer a rapidement abandonné, qu’il fut fécond au moins d’un point de vue méthodologique.

This article presents the argument that our understanding of the nature of the relationship between modern constitutionalism and religious difference has suffered with the success of the story of legal tolerance and multiculturalism. Taking up the Canadian case, in which the conventional narrative of legal multiculturalism has such purchase, this piece asks how the interaction of law and religion - and, in particular, the practices of legal tolerance - would look if we sought in earnest to understand law as a component, rather than a curator, of cultural diversity in modern liberal societies. Understanding the law as itself a cultural form forces us to think about the interaction of law and religion as an instance of cross-cultural encounter. Drawing from theoretical accounts of cross-cultural encounter and philosophical literature about the nature of toleration, and paying close attention to the shape of Canadian constitutional doctrine on religious freedom (law’s rules of cross-cultural engagement), this paper suggests that legal toleration is far less accommodative and far more assimilative than the conventional narrative lets on. Influential alternative theoretical accounts ultimately reproduce this dynamic because they similarly obscure the role of culture on both sides of the encounter of law and religion. Indeed, owing to the particular features of the culture of law’s rule, even the more thickly cultural "solutions" proposed in dialogic theory ultimately fail. In the end, this article exposes the very real cultural limits of legal tolerance.

Most scholarly interpretations of Hannah Arendt's political writings account for her idiosyncratic understanding of politics and freedom in one of two ways. They interpret Arendt's more sensational claims about politics either literally or figuratively, but not in both ways. This essay proposes a new interpretation of Arendt's political writings based on a neglected, dichotomous pattern of metaphors in her collected works. That pattern, once mapped, yields insights into the meaning, applications, and limitations of Arendt's controversial political ideals and rhetoric. Neither a wholly literal nor a wholly figurative interpretation will do; I propose a reading that makes use of both strategies and gives Arendt her due while acknowledging her challenges.

ABSTRACT On the surface, Diana Mutz's Hearing the Other Side is a work about empirical realities. But it is also an exercise in normative theory. Mutz's chief empirical findings are that people who are exposed to political disagreement tend to become less politically active and that, conversely, political activists tend not to hear views that challenge their own. These findings raise the question of whether participatory and deliberative ideals are compatible with each other, and, in addition, whether they are either realistic or desirable.