Ben Curtis

Many philosophers today accept the broadly Aristotelian view that one can explain de re necessary properties by invoking essence. These ‘Neo-Aristotelian essentialists’ hold that a property F is an essential property of x iff specifying F gives a correct answer to the Aristotelian ‘what is x?’ question. We are sceptical. According to neo-Aristotelian essentialists, essential properties are not themselves de re modal properties, but they are supposed to explain why things have their de re modal properties. Neo-Aristotelian essentialists accept the following principle (ENL): If x is essentially F, then x is necessarily F. We ask: Why? We first clarify the neo-Aristotelian notion of essence via the Aristotelian “what is x?” question. So far as we can see, the only way to do this is by appeal to the notion of a substance sortal. We then consider the notion of a substance sortal itself, and argue that there is nothing in that notion that even so much as suggests that ENL is true.