Ben Saunders

There has been much discussion of the justifiability of strikes by healthcare workers, but comparatively little discussion of the political processes through which strikes occur. This article focuses on the Trade Union Act 2016, which currently governs strike ballots in the UK. This legislation has important implications for healthcare workers being balloted on strikes (or other forms of industrial action). The article first explains the legal requirements for a strike mandate and illustrates how votes in strike ballots can be counterproductive, bringing about outcomes opposite of what the voter wanted. Second, it argues that the turnout threshold responsible for these surprising results is undemocratic, since it means that outcomes need not reflect the wishes of those balloted. Third, it suggests that this has consequences for how balloted workers ought to vote, if they want the process to be more democratic. In particular, I propose that those who are neutral or indifferent have reason to cast spoiled ballots, in order to negate the turnout threshold. Further, those who oppose a strike also have reasons—if they value democratic decision-making—to vote, even though this may be less effective than abstaining. As I write, in August 2023, junior doctors in the UK are once again being balloted over strike action.1 While the global picture is more varied, strikes by medical professionals have historically been rare in the UK. When British doctors went on strike in 2012, over changes to pensions, it was the first time since 1975.2 Since then, however, industrial action has become more common. Some attribute this to an erosion of patient-centred professional values, which has made workers more prepared to strike in response to deteriorating pay and conditions.3 4 Whether or not this is the explanation, the increased prevalence of strikes has caused some concern. It is often …

A number of authors criticise opt-out (or ‘deemed consent’) systems for failing to secure valid consent to organ donation. Further, several suggest that mandated choice offers a more ethical alternative. This article responds to criticisms that opt-out does not secure informed consent. If we assume current (low) levels of public awareness, then the explicit consent secured under mandated choice will not be informed either. Conversely, a mandated choice policy might be justifiable if accompanied by a significant public education campaign. However, if this entitles us to assume that members of the public are informed, then an opt-out system would also be justified in the same circumstances. The alleged advantages of mandated choice seem to rest on an unfair comparison, between mandated choice with a public education campaign and an opt-out system without one. While it may be that some countries with opt-out systems should do more to inform their publics, I see no reason to assume that this cannot be done. Indeed, advocates of mandated choice seem committed to thinking it possible to raise awareness. If opt-out systems adopt the same methods, such as writing to every individual, this should also address concerns about whether consent is informed.

Mill appears to subscribe to the hedonist view that happiness consists in pleasure and the absence of pain, yet he departs from the Benthamite tradition by suggesting that some pleasures are more valuable than others. I suggest that the value of a pleasure depends on its contribution to happiness. Other things equal, more pleasure is more conducive to happiness than less, but some pleasures are also more valuable than others, quantity being equal. These more valuable pleasures are those that Mill describes as higher in quality. Happiness, then, is a function of quality and quantity of pleasures (with quantity itself being a function of intensity and duration). Quality is distinct from quantity and might be traded off against it, since a great quantity of lower quality pleasure can produce more happiness than a smaller quantity of higher quality pleasure, but it is not a good independent of pleasure.

One way of increasing the supply of organs available for transplant would be to switch to an opt-out system of donor registration. This is typically assumed to operate on the basis of presumed consent, but this faces the objection that not all of those who fail to opt out would actually consent to the use of their cadaveric organs. This paper defuses this objection, arguing that people's actual, explicit or implicit, consent to use their organs is not needed. It borrows David Estlund's notion of ‘normative consent’ from the justification of political authority and applies it to the case of organ donation. According to this idea, when it is wrong to withhold consent to something, the moral force of that lack of consent may be null and void. If it is wrong of a person to refuse to donate their cadaveric organs to others, then it may be that their actual consent is not needed. This supports an opt-out system, which provides protection for those who have genuine reasons to refuse donation, and spares the worries as to what the deceased would actually have wanted

Until relatively recently, few democrats had much to say about the constitution of the ‘demos' that ought to rule. A number of recent writers have, however, argued that all those whose interests are affected must be enfranchised if decision-making is to be fully democratic. This article criticizes this approach, arguing that it misunderstands democracy. Democratic procedures are about the agency of the people so only agents can be enfranchised, yet not all bearers of interests are also agents. If we focus on agency, rather than who is affected, then this leads us to focus on the permissible limits of action, rather than who makes the decision. Just as individual sovereignty is ordinarily limited by the requirement not to injure others, we may apply similar restrictions to what a demos can permissibly do. Thus, any collection of individuals may choose to regulate their affairs collectively for mutual benefit, but should be prohibited from imposing negative externalities on outsiders. On this view, the constitution or definition of the demos is arbitrary, from the democratic point of view. Moreover, democracy does not require the expansion of the franchise, unless injuries cannot be avoided

Interference is paternalistic when it restricts an individual’s freedom for their own good. Anti-paternalists, such as John Stuart Mill, object to this for various reasons, including that the individual is usually a better judge of her own interests than the would-be paternalist. However, Wilkinson argues that a Parfitian reductivist approach to personal identity opens the door to what he calls ‘identity-relative paternalism’ where someone’s present action is restricted for the sake of a different future self.1 This is an interesting argument, but it is not clear whether it involves permissible paternalism. At the risk of stating the obvious, permissible paternalism must be both permissible and paternalistic. Wilkinson’s identity-relative paternalism could be either, but not obviously both. If the present and future selves are different individuals, then interference is potentially permissible but no longer paternalistic. Alternatively, they are identical, in which case the interference is genuine paternalism, but cannot be justified by appeal to their distinctness. Wilkinson may escape this dilemma by invoking Parfit, who challenges the common notion that identity is all or nothing.2 According to Parfit’s revisionary view, the present and future self may share some connections but not others. However, once we have identified these similarities and differences, there is no further question whether or not they …

Endörfer has recently argued that proponents of the harm principle are wrong to exempt market harms as potential justifications for state interference. I argue that – contrary to suggestions in Endörfer’s article – John Stuart Mill did not exempt market harms from his harm principle. On Mill’s view, the state can (as a matter of principle) legitimately interfere with free markets to prevent market harms where they occur but, on the whole, it is better policy not to interfere. Mill’s general preference for free trade rests on utilitarian considerations and not on his harm principle, which does not exclude market harms.

The spread of vaccine misinformation may contribute to vaccine refusal/hesitancy and consequent harms. Nonetheless, censorship is often rejected on the grounds of free expression. This article examines John Stuart Mill’s influential defence of free expression but finds that his arguments for freedom apply only to normal, reasonably favourable circumstances. In other cases, it may be permissible to restrict freedom, including freedom of speech. Thus, while Mill would ordinarily defend the right to express false views, such as that vaccines cause autism, he might have accepted restrictions on anti-vaccine misinformation during the present pandemic. This illustrates that even the staunchest defenders of free speech can permit temporary restrictions in exceptional circumstances.

The novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has refocused attention on the issue of mandatory vaccination. Some have suggested that vaccines ought to be mandatory, while others propose more moderate alternatives, such as incentives. This piece surveys a range of possible interventions, ranging from mandates through to education. All may have their place, depending on circumstances. However, it is worth clarifying the options available to policymakers, since there is sometimes confusion over whether a particular policy constitutes a mandate or not. Further, I illustrate a different kind of alternative to mandatory vaccination. Rather than seeking less coercive alternatives to a mandate, we might instead employ an alternative mandate, which requires people to do something less than get vaccinated. For instance, we might merely require people to attend an appointment at a vaccine clinic. Whether this mandatory attendance policy is justified will depend on specific circumstances, but it represents another way to promote vaccination, without mandating it. In some cases, this may represent an appropriate balance between promoting public health goals and respecting individual liberty.

This paper defends an ‘opt-out’ scheme for organ procurement, by distinguishing this system from ‘presumed consent’ (which the author regards as an erroneous justification of it). It, first, stresses the moral importance of increasing the supply of organs and argues that making donation easier need not conflict with altruism. It then goes on to explore one way that donation can be increased, namely by adopting an opt-out system, in which cadaveric organs are used unless the deceased (or their family) registered an objection. Such policies are often labelled ‘presumed consent’, but it is argued that critics are right to be sceptical of this idea—consent is shown to be an action, rather than a mental attitude, and thus not something that can be presumed. Either someone has consented or they have not, whatever their attitude to the use of their organs. Thankfully, an opt-out scheme need not rest on the presumption of consent. Actual consent can be given implicitly, by one's actions, so it is argued that the failure to register an objection (given certain background conditions) should itself be taken as sign of consent. Therefore, it is permissible to use the organs of someone who did not opt out, because they have—by their silence—actually consented

Douglas Diekema influentially argues that interference with parental decisions is not in fact guided by the child’s best interests, but rather by a more permissive standard, which he calls the harm principle. This article first seeks to clarify this alternative position and defend it against certain existing criticisms, before offering a new criticism and alternative. This ‘harm principle’ has been criticized for (i) lack of adequate moral grounding, and (ii) being as indeterminate as the best interest standard that it seeks to replace. I argue that these are not serious problems. I take Diekema’s negative point to be right—our actual standard for intervention is not literally the best interests of the child—but I disagree with his proposed replacement. First, Diekema’s proposed harm threshold should be more carefully distinguished from Mill’s harm principle. Second, there is no reason to assume that the standard for permissible intervention coincides with the threshold for harm (or serious harm). Thus, I propose that the best alternative to the best interests standard is not a harm principle, but rather a sufficiency threshold between adequate (or ‘good enough’) and inadequate (or ‘substandard’) parenting.

In the event of a pandemic, demand for vaccines may exceed supply. One proposal for allocating vaccines is to use a lottery, to give all citizens an equal chance, either of getting the vaccine or of surviving. However, insistence on strict equality can result in seriously suboptimal outcomes. I argue that the requirement to treat all citizens impartially need not be interpreted to require equal chances, particularly where citizens are differently situated. Assuming that we want to save lives, we should also seek to use vaccine efficiently, so far as this is compatible with equality. Thus, in allocating vaccine, we may want to be sensitive to different levels of need and/or effects on vaccine production. While such policies may result in unequal chances, they may even improve everyone’s chances. In such cases, the resultant inequality is not a violation of impartiality, but a consequence of considering each person’s claim seriously.

It is widely assumed that the strongest case for permitting non‐medical sex selection is where parents aim at family balance. This piece criticizes one representative attempt to justify sex selection for family balance. Kluge (2007) assumes that some couples may seek sex selection because they hold discriminatory values, but this need not impugn those who merely have preferences, without evaluative commitments, for a particular sex. This is disputed by those who see any sex selection as inherently sexist because it upholds stereotypes about the sexes. This article takes an alternative approach. I argue that, even if we accept that preference‐based selection is unobjectionable, a policy permitting selection for family balancing does a poor job of distinguishing between value‐based and preference‐based selection. If we wish to permit only preference‐based sex selection we should seek to identify parents’ motives. If we wish to justify a family balancing policy, other arguments are needed.

Donald Trump promised to build a wall along the US–Mexico border and to make Mexico pay for it, but this seems to violate the principle of ‘no taxation without representation’ on which the United States was founded. Some democratic theorists propose even more radical principles of inclusion, such as that all those affected by or subject to a decision should have a say in it. But even a more moderate principle, requiring that those who pay must be represented, is sufficient to show that Trump's proposed border wall lacks democratic legitimacy.Export citation.

In a recent article, Fiona Woollard draws attention to a number of problems, both theoretical and pragmatic, with current discourse around infant feeding. References both to the ‘benefits of breastfeeding’ and ‘harms of formula’ are problematic, since there is no obvious baseline of comparison against which to make these evaluations. Further, she highlights the pragmatic consequences of these linguistic choices. Saying that formula feeding harms babies, for instance, is likely to exacerbate feelings of guilt and shame felt by many mothers who use formula, for various reasons. Since I agree with much that Woollard says, this response is mostly sympathetic, but I wish to draw attention to one point that is largely missing from her analysis. The pragmatic effect of an utterance depends significantly on who is speaking, to whom, and in what context. Thus, we might differentiate between what it is appropriate to say in a professional context, such as an academic journal, from what one might say in a policy document or to a new mother. While we should always be careful about the language that we use, we need not assume that the same language is appropriate in all contexts nor that equal care is always required.

It has traditionally been assumed that organ donation must be altruistic, though the necessity of altruistic motivations has recently been questioned. Few, however, have questioned whether altruism is always a good motive. This paper considers the possibility that excessive altruism, or self-abnegation, may be intrinsically bad. How this may be so is illustrated with reference to Tom Hurka’s account of the value of attitudes, which suggests that disproportionate love of one’s own good—either excessive or deficient—is intrinsically bad. Whether or not we accept the details of this account, recognising that altruistic motivations may be intrinsically bad has important implications for organ procurement. One possible response is to say that we should take further measures to ensure that donors have good motives—that they are altruistic is no longer enough. An alternative is to say that, since altruistic donation need not be intrinsically good, we have less reason to object to other motivations.

There has been much argument over whether procreative selection is obligatory or wrong. Rebecca Bennett has recently challenged the assumption that procreative choices are properly moral choices, arguing that these views express mere preferences. This article challenges Bennett's view on two fronts. First, I argue that the Non-Identity Problem does not show that there cannot be harmless wrongs – though this would require us to abandon the intuitively attractive ‘person-affecting principle’, that may be a lesser cost than abandoning some more firmly-held intuition. But, even if we accept Bennett's claim that these choices are not moral, that does not show them to be mere personal preferences. I argue that there is a class of non-moral ‘categorical preferences’ that have much the same implications as moral preferences. If a moral preference for able-bodied children is problematic, then so is a non-moral categorical preference. Thus, showing that these preferences are not moral does not show that they are not problematic, since they may still be categorical