Ben Schermbrucker

What is the fundamental nature of the physical universe? This paper generates new insights into this question through examining how brute fact metaphysics intersects with our best cosmological theories of the universe’s origin. To do this, I first make the case that fundamental physical things are – by necessity – ontologically brute. Ontological bruteness, I maintain, provides a rationale for the counterfactual claim that there is no reason why a fundamental has one physical identity rather than another. The paper then gives an overview of modern cosmology. This empirically oriented analysis is enjoined to a metaphysical argument that – since science’s candidate fundamentals are impermissibly complex – we can appeal to brute fact metaphysics to meaningfully entertain the possibility of simpler fundamentals. The paper then investigates a particular simple fundamental I take to be most plausible: consciousness (understood as the intrinsic nature of matter). This discussion draws on cosmic-level evolution and panpsychism. While I remain agnostic about whether consciousness’ instantiation in fundamental-level physics and cosmology will be empirically verified, the paper draws attention to a number of emerging experimental paradigms that can – at least in principle – contribute to this project.

It is frequently claimed that panpsychism is unable in principle to generate evidence or predictions. After exploring how this impasse owes to panpsychism's commitment to brute physicalism, I argue that organismic panpsychism (OP) can retain this commitment and yet be empirical in principle. I then explore ways in which OP can be defended against a range of objections. These objections primarily relate to OP's metaphysics, its dependency on string theory, and its appeal to future states of science. Finally, OP's ability to avert a worrying consequence of Russellian panpsychism is discussed.

There is a strong secular consensus that death terminates subjective consciousness. In this paper I show that this consensus can be meaningfully doubted for entirely secular reasons. After formulating the strongest possible argument which supports this consensus, I argue that it inconsistently excludes Constitutive Russellian Panpsychism (CRP) from consideration. CRP, I maintain, is fully consistent with the possibility of post-thanatological consciousness. To flesh out this account, I develop an account of the Panpsychist Self (PS) that can be axiomatically derived from CRP. I then show that the PS has the right metaphysical structure to ensure that the persistence of consciousness beyond brain death aligns with the persistence of our individual selves.

It is uncontroversial that philosophy amplifies the salience and scope of literary themes. However, it is less clear whether philosophy relates to the way in which literary texts ought to be represented in curriculum-based high school assessment tasks. These tasks mostly take the form of essays in which literary works must be viewed as complex, strongly patterned texts. Ideally, this results in essays in which an author’s use of language reveals a sustained, multifaceted engagement with a particular set of authorial concerns. And yet, despite this focus, virtually all school curricula neglect the underlying genesis and nature of such complex patterns. In particular, how is it that authors generate them at all? It shall be a guiding claim that philosophy is well suited to explore this issue. Moreover, I shall argue that such an understanding can have positive practical outcomes for students, promote holistic pedagogy, and illuminate ways in which high school literary studies can better intersect with tertiary literary studies.