Benedicto Acosta

The patent system can be seen as an institutional mechanism designed to align the interests of inventors and the State regarding inventions and innovation. Individual inventors seek to protect their technological rights to maximise profits and establish monopoly power, while society aims to promote the sharing of this knowledge to prevent it from remaining an industrial secret. Accessible information not only reduces efforts’ duplication but also encourages further innovation. Therefore, patents are intended to serve as a bridging tool between industrial secrecy and the socially beneficial sharing of knowledge that drives scientific and technological progress. However, the issue is more complex, as much of the knowledge contained in patent documents incorporates implicit features. Often, critical types of information necessary for the commercialisation or industrial application of patented inventions cannot be effectively conveyed through the structure of a patent document, nor can they be easily articulated as clear propositions or narratives. This challenge is compounded by the fact that inventions are not directly replicated or tested at patent offices; their evaluation relies solely on submitted documentation and, at best, drawings. As a result, it can be argued that some level of secrecy is an inherent aspect of the patent system. The degree of this secrecy can vary depending on the technological nature of innovations across different sectors and over time. We argue that there is an urgent need for more efficient patent evaluation systems that can better address these informational challenges.

This paper examines how scientific articles aim to secure scientific objectivity. It begins by reconstructing the historical and rhetorical context of the research paper as the dominant medium of scientific communication. The central claim is that the paper’s rhetorical-editorial features—IMRaD structure, clarity, suppression of subjectivity, and stylistic flattening— seek to reinforce the credibility and legitimacy of science while also functioning as evaluative criteria within the publish-or-perish regime. The thesis defended is that the conception of the article as an objective vehicle for producing and communicating knowledge has persisted over time and, rather than weakening, has been reinforced by editorial transformations, impact metrics, and movements such as open science, which together consolidate its centrality. The argument is supported by historical cases and theoretical contributions from historians and philosophers of science.

La importancia de las inteligencias artificiales (IAs) es creciente, tanto en su impacto en la vida humana como en la reflexión académica. El objetivo de este artículo es examinar si, aún cuando estemos dispuestos a asumir que las IAs son capaces de inventar, debemos o no considerarlas inventoras a efectos jurídicos, entendiendo que ello es una condición que les permite, por ejemplo, patentar, e incluso gozar de ciertos derechos morales y de propiedad intelectual más generales. Esta contribución se centra en el examen de las IAs como inventoras a través de la figura de la patente, y defiende que reconocer las patentes de inventos generados por las IAs generaría consecuencias negativas para la justificación misma de la propiedad intelectual en ciencia y tecnología. Se argumenta, más concretamente, que la reparación de los costes de la invención mediante la exclusividad comercial no es del interés de la IA, sino solo de los dueños o de quienes en primer lugar fueron sus inventores. Ello implica la pregunta más fundamental acerca de si las IAs merecen dicho reconocimiento social, un caso que se examina con la ayuda de dos decisiones judiciales recientes. Además, se incide en dos posibles consecuencias prácticas negativas de este reconocimiento, relacionadas con la cantidad y el tiempo de examen de las patentes. La presente contribución resulta de interés para la ética de la tecnología y para el derecho, y puede además inspirar políticas públicas relevantes para la relación de la IA con las personas.

En 2019, un inventor británico solicitó una patente para un inodoro inclinado que buscaba ser incómodo para sus usuarios. Pese a la polémica suscitada, el caso no ha producido ninguna reflexión académica hasta el momento. El objetivo de este artículo es doble: por un lado, analizar la moralidad de este tipo de inventos; por otro lado, derivar consecuencias acerca del compromiso que los sistemas de patentes tienen con ciertos valores morales, como la dignidad de las personas o el orden público. Respecto al primer objetivo, concluimos que, en inventos como los inodoros inclinados, los riesgos superan claramente a los beneficios. Consiguientemente, defendemos, a través del estudio de caso, que los sistemas de patentes no están provistos de herramientas para combatir los inventos inmorales. Esto se debe a que el sistema de patentes no se preocupa por el uso y por el impacto que los inventos tienen sobre las personas, algo que, creemos, puede incluso repercutir sobre la justificación de estos regímenes de propiedad intelectual.

La importancia de las inteligencias artificiales (IAs) es creciente, tanto en su impacto en la vida humana como en la reflexión académica. El objetivo de este artículo es examinar si, aún cuando estemos dispuestos a asumir que las IAs son capaces de inventar, debemos o no considerarlas inventoras a efectos jurídicos, entendiendo que ello es una condición que les permite, por ejemplo, patentar, e incluso gozar de ciertos derechos morales y de propiedad intelectual más generales. Esta contribución se centra en el examen de las IAs como inventoras a través de la figura de la patente, y defiende que reconocer las patentes de inventos generados por las IAs generaría consecuencias negativas para la justificación misma de la propiedad intelectual en ciencia y tecnología. Se argumenta, más concretamente, que la reparación de los costes de la invención mediante la exclusividad comercial no es del interés de la IA, sino solo de los dueños o de quienes en primer lugar fueron sus inventores. Ello implica la pregunta más fundamental acerca de si las IAs merecen dicho reconocimiento social, un caso que se examina con la ayuda de dos decisiones judiciales recientes. Además, se incide en dos posibles consecuencias prácticas negativas de este reconocimiento, relacionadas con la cantidad y el tiempo de examen de las patentes. La presente contribución resulta de interés para la ética de la tecnología y para el derecho, y puede además inspirar políticas públicas relevantes para la relación de la IA con las personas.

Responsibility for the activities and products generated by artificial intelligence (AI) is a topic currently debated by scholars. However, less attention has been given to the case of inventions created by AI. Who should be held responsible for these inventions? How can we address the negative consequences arising from AI-generated inventions? In this article, we aim to highlight some unique aspects of responsibility related to this specific type of invention. We examine the possibility of addressing responsibility for AI-generated inventions through the concept of "legal personhood," which we conclude introduces a new set of challenges arguably even more complex to resolve. Therefore, we propose several governance tools and outline two practical approaches that have been attempted. This paper offers a tentative discussion on a novel topic within social AI research.

Social contract is one of the most common schemes for justifying patents. According to this theory, inventors obtain a commercial exclusivity in exchange for the disclosure of the invention, with the final aim of allowing others to use that knowledge in future innovations. Under the rationale of this social contract theory of patents, if a patent system is not guided by impartiality in its decisions, the relation between disclosure of inventions and future innovation becomes an issue, because non-merit factors in patent examination influence the quality of the knowledge disclosed. The aim of this article is to analyse impartiality in patent systems and, by doing so, defend that there is an epistemic side on both impartiality and social contract theory.

Purpose. The main objective of this article is to discuss the suitability of moral and ordre public clauses, and to advance the view that ethical reflection within patent systems is valuable. Methodology. This is a conceptual paper that draws upon the present situation in Europe to illuminate a discussion of the different views about the morality patents, with particular emphasis on criticism of authors who have espoused a narrow interpretation of moral clauses, such as that adopted by the EPO. Findings. This research found that the claim that patent systems are not appropriate places in which to evaluate moral matters and, therefore, they cannot inform us about morality, is false. This is because inventors do not need to wait for authorizing legislation prior to making use of their technology. Hence, moral implications can be evaluated. Practical implications. It is shown how the bioethicist community can be incorporated into patent offices. The responsibilities of examiners and businesses in the process are also discussed. Research limitations/implications. These ideas also lead to important theoretical consequences, especially regarding the debate on value-laden science and technology. However, further efforts are needed to address other patent regimes, such as the non-European. Originality. There have been a limited number of studies that examine the value of ethical considerations within the patent system. This article provides a thought-provoking discussion of moral clauses in Europe. I also suggest new ways of incorporating ethical scrutiny into patent systems.

The present work tries to analyze the moral philosophy of William David Ross. First, Ross's ethics precedents are exposed, focusing on three authors against whom he acknowledges entering into discussion: Kant, the utilitarians and Moore. This is the aim of the second chapter. Next, Ross's proposal is explained through three axes: 1) the theory of moral knowledge, where his well-known intuitionist theory will appear; 2) the doctrine of correction, composed of deontological pluralism; 3) and the doctrine of good, in which its axiology appears. The following three chapters, respectively, will be dedicated to all this. Finally, we provide the critical vision of some Ross followers and propose half a dozen conclusions.

The present work tries to analyze the moral philosophy of William David Ross. First, Ross's ethics precedents are exposed, focusing on three authors against whom he acknowledges entering into discussion: Kant, the utilitarians and Moore. This is the aim of the second chapter. Next, Ross's proposal is explained through three axes: 1) the theory of moral knowledge, where his well-known intuitionist theory will appear; 2) the doctrine of correction, composed of deontological pluralism; 3) and the doctrine of good, in which its axiology appears. The following three chapters, respectively, will be dedicated to all this. Finally, we provide the critical vision of some Ross followers and propose half a dozen conclusions.