Benedikt Buechel

This series is comprised of five lectures on Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem published in 1963. It will address different themes raised in the book. They include justice, guilt, responsibility, the banality of evil, action, conscience, authority, thinking, and judging. Today’s lecture is divided into four sections. First, we briefly review Arendt’s biography. Second, we examine Arendt’s methodology, not only in Eichmann in Jerusalem but throughout her work. Third, we examine the context of the Eichmann trial. Fourth, we illuminate the big controversy it sparked and address some of Arendt’s theoretical interventions in the first two chapters, particularly her conception of justice, guilt and responsibility.

Although statelessness within the modern state system has many facets, there has not been any attempt to work out a formal typology. When conceptualising statelessness in singular terms, theorists miss something important: they fail to capture the full moral scope of statelessness. This article addresses this shortcoming. It is divided into four parts. First, I will show how statelessness is categorised under the UN’s framework. Second, I will turn to legal and social theory to argue that statelessness can be best understood through the two concepts of responsibility and recognition. Third, I will identify three different subtypes of statelessness. They derive from the source of nationality deprivation and include voluntary statelessness, structural statelessness and denigrative statelessness. Finally, I will offer some concluding remarks.

A common assumption within the migration ethics literature is that it is only states that have the power to admit foreigners to their territory. However, this assumption misses something important. While it is true that it is states that have the ultimate power to admit, other actors can possess a derivative power from the laws that states put in place. By establishing a system of work visas, for instance, states lend private corporations, and other employers, the power to nominate foreigners for admission by making job offers. For many foreigners, a job offer is what they require to start a new life in a new country. The question then arises how corporations should use this derivative power? One might assume that they should use it as they typically do: to pursue their business interests and by doing so (we hope) benefit their stakeholders including the state and its citizens. However, could there not be other reasons, besides profit seeking, to offer refugees a visa-conferring job? If hiring refugees does not greatly harm their business, it is arguable that corporations could be obliged to use their derivative power to do so on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, some corporations also seem to be obliged to use this power on grounds of corrective justice. This paper advances these possibilities. It has three sections. First, I will look at how much discretion corporations have in terms of employment and migration laws in some European countries. Second, I will present an argument for why corporations are morally permitted to facilitate admission for refugees by offering them a visa-conferring job. In the final section, I will then defend a stronger claim, namely that corporations are possibly obliged to do so on humanitarian grounds or on grounds of corrective justice.

In “Immigration, Jurisdiction and Exclusion”, Michael Blake develops a new line of argument to defend a state’s presumptive right to exclude would-be immigrants. His account grounds this right on the state as a legal community that must protect and fulfill human rights. Although Blake’s present argument is valid and attractive in being less arbitrary than national membership and in distinguishing different types of immigrants’ claims, I dismiss it for being unsound due to a lack of further elaboration. The reason for my rejection is that there is a fundamental problem with the third premise as it stands now. Therefore, I contend that Blake’s argument cannot justify a general exclusion of well-protected would-be immigrants. However, in the final part, I will try to defend a modified version of Blake’s argument from imposed obligations by contending that a state has a presumptive right to exclude if the human rights obligations that are imposed on its residents go beyond a viable threshold.