Benjamin Berger

This chapter explores two models that Schelling employs in the 1804 System to clarify the ontological relationships between the most general forms of life (plants, infusoria, animals, and human beings). The first model is a more traditional model for thinking about these forms of life; it describes a unilinear, atemporal development from one form of life to another. The second model-which is largely implicit in the System’s philosophy of life-describes a bifurcated series of lifeforms in which more advanced forms emerge from more simple forms in history along two lines of development. The chapter argues that this second model should be interpreted as a moment in Schelling’s intellectual development in which he begins to understand the history of nature as philosophically significant.

Dans cet article, nous nous proposons de souligner la proximité des philosophies de Raymond Ruyer (1902-1987) et de Charles-Augustus Strong (1862-1940). Ruyer est resté discret quant à ce qu’il retenait de sa lecture de Strong ; s’il est clair que la thèse défendue par le philosophe américain sur les rapports de la conscience et du corps a déterminé sa propre position sur le sujet, il n’est pas moins certain que d’autres thèses de Strong ont également retenu son attention. Il ne s’agit pas ici de relativiser l’originalité de la philosophie ruyérienne mais bien de prendre acte de la richesse de l’une de ses sources les plus importantes et méconnues du public français.

This thesis is a study of the relationship between 'nature' and 'spirit' in the philosophies of F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel. I aim to show that Schelling and Hegel are involved in a shared task of conceiving spiritual freedom as a necessary outcome of nature's inner, rational development. I argue that by interpreting spirit as 'emergent' from nature, the absolute idealists develop a 'third way' beyond Cartesian dualism and monist naturalism. For on the idealist account, nature and spirit are neither ontologically discontinuous, as if separated by an insurmountable 'gap', nor are they identical, as if spirit were simply a 'second nature'. Rather, according to both Schelling and Hegel, spirit emerges from nature as its ontologically distinct and non-natural telos. What makes Schelling's and Hegel's philosophies of nature so unique, however, is not simply that they present spiritual freedom as dependent upon nature, but that the ontological specificity of spirit is shown to be rationally necessary. In fact, neither the early Schelling nor Hegel is concerned with the historical emergence of spirit. Rather, both philosophers see the 'emergence' of spirit as an atemporal feature of being that must be derived through sheer reason—be it Schelling’s method of 'depotentiation' or Hegel's dialectical logic. I therefore argue that by bracketing the question of historical emergence, Schelling and Hegel each develop a distinctive logic of emergence whereby spiritual freedom is shown to be necessary thanks to the ontological structure of the impersonal, natural world. In my concluding chapter, I consider Schelling's argument in his Berlin lectures of the 1840s that the idealist logic of emergence must be supplemented with a speculative consideration of historical emergence if philosophy is to be a complete science of reality. From this perspective, it looks as though both Hegel's and the early Schelling's 'logics of emergence', despite all their promise, presuppose the idea that nature's necessary stages need not express themselves in temporal succession in order for them to be fully realised. I conclude the thesis by suggesting that Schelling's Ages of the World was meant to overcome this apparent limit of the 'logic of emergence' without abandoning its fundamental aims. For in the Ages, nature's rationally necessary development is presented as unfolding in time, and time is understood as nothing other than the actual development of nature into spirit.