University of Oxford
Faculty of Philosophy, Lady Margaret College
DPhil, 2020
Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
  •  94
    Counterfactual Worlds
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 54 (3): 533-574. 2025.
    This paper extends Kit Fine’s (2012a, 2012b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c) truthmaker framework to provide a novel task semantics for tensed counterfactual conditionals. Instead of taking possible worlds to be primitive elements in a model, possible worlds will be defined in terms of states, parthood, tasks, and times where the task relation encodes the possible transitions between states. Rather than invoking primitive relations for similarity or imposition, possible worlds will be compared at a time in…Read more
  •  1185
    Identity and Aboutness
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (6): 1471-1503. 2021.
    This paper develops a theory of propositional identity which distinguishes necessarily equivalent propositions that differ in subject-matter. Rather than forming a Boolean lattice as in extensional and intensional semantic theories, the space of propositions forms a non-interlaced bilattice. After motivating a departure from tradition by way of a number of plausible principles for subject-matter, I will provide a Finean state semantics for a novel theory of propositions, presenting arguments aga…Read more