Benjamin Gregg

Clinical medical ethics (CME) has traditionally focused on individual-level decisions in acute care settings. Today climate change poses an urgent challenge that demands expanding the scope of CME to account for global, systemic, and intergenerational harms. Although some analysts maintain that individual clinicians and patients bear no moral responsibility due to the dispersed nature of climate causality, I contend otherwise. Drawing on deontological, consequentialist, virtue ethics, and feminist frameworks, I argue that clinicians have a moral and professional duty to address climate change as a determinant of patient health. I engage with Hantel, Marron, and Abel (2025), who propose a model of climate-conscious CME grounded in climate justice, ecological responsibility, and relational ethics. It identifies two major implementation challenges: institutional resistance due to economic priorities and political resistance grounded in concerns over medical neutrality. In response, I outline strategies to align clinical guidelines with sustainability goals, to cultivate climate-aware professional virtues, and to promote institutional decarbonization. I also propose reframing climate ethics as a public health issue, using empirical evidence to demonstrate climate-health co-benefits, and engaging diverse stakeholders to reduce ideological resistance. I argue that addressing ecological well-being is not external to but rather integral to the ethical practice of medicine in the twenty-first century.

Legal indeterminacy refers to the lack of determinate knowledge, of what a legal rule means and of how judges should apply it. Where law is indeterminate, no theory, rule, or principle constrains a judge to interpret or apply a law in a particular way. Consequently a case could have several different answers, yet all of them equally valid. The notion that judges make rather than find law implies to many observers consequences such as unequal or arbitrary treatment of individuals. Drawing on an interdisciplinary body of scholarship, I confront the phenomenon of legal indeterminacy with two questions: How is justice possible when aspects of the legal regime seem arbitrary, inconsistent, and subjective? And how should a society deal with indeterminacy? Chapter 1 provides an extended example of the phenomenon of indeterminacy, namely in the legal regulation of speech. Chapter 2 shows that various counter arguments, including several prominent theories of determinacy, do not preclude or otherwise defeat the thesis of indeterminacy. Chapter 3, drawing on pragmatism, develops a theory of "enlightened localism," a form of relativism that can explain why indeterminacy in social norms is not often a problem in the day to day functioning, or even legitimation, of modern polities. The meaning and application of norms often need not be consistent over time or between cases; validity can only be relative. Such relativism presupposes a non-absolute objectivity, where we can give decisions objective grounds for the most part, but not grounds valid semper, ubique, et omnibus. Weakly objective grounds are locally rather than universally applicable. Chapter 4 shows that although such a theory invokes no ultimate foundation for itself, it is expressly not postmodern. Chapter 5 develops enlightened localism as a theory of a democratic legal order under conditions of indeterminacy. Chapter 6 examines indeterminacy in legal community, and chapter 7, how courts of law can respond to that problem. Chapter 8 analyzes indeterminacy in legal rules, and chapter 9, how a micro-sociological methodology can approach the phenomenon empirically. Chapter 10 investigates indeterminacy in normative criticism, and chapter 11, how social critique might deal with indeterminacy

The modern corporation offers significant potential to contribute to the human rights project, in part because it is free from the challenges posed by national sovereignty. That promise has begun to be realized in businesses practicing corporate due diligence with regard to the human rights of persons involved in or affected by those enterprises. Yet due diligence preserves the self-seeking orientation of the conventional corporation and seeks only to protect itself from committing human rights abuses. This approach, typified by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, does not address background conditions and root causes of vulnerability to abuses. My alternative, the human rights corporation, takes an other-regarding orientation that advances human rights within the corporation and in its human, social, economic, and natural environments. It moves beyond the due-diligence carrot-and-stick model to a model in which the corporation produces not only goods and services but human-rights consciousness and -practice as well.

The notion of indigeneity is problematic in deployment because it is indeterminate in meaning. It retains political potential if it is not deployed as a global category to ground a general or universal right of indigenous peoples. Its potential lies in pursuing each particular case of indigenous rights-claims locally: within the nation state. This alternative to legal internationalist indigenism is an “indigenous rights state”: a metaphorical state of self-selected activists who advocate for indigenous internal self-determination within the corresponding nation state. Just as every nation state is significantly different from every other, and just as local goals differ greatly from community to community, so is every indigenous rights state unique. To develop my proposal for an “indigenous rights state” as a means of advancing relevant political interests, I address (1) the political challenges of indeterminacy in politics, (2) the untenable notion of a general or universal right of indigenous peoples, (3) the social construction of indigeneity as a political act in the nation state, (4) possibilities for indigenous internal self-determination in the nation state, (5) my proposal for “indigenous rights states,” (6) and three issues any indigenous rights state confronts: securing individual rights in the context of group rights; the inherent tension between group rights and political liberalism; and the fraught relationship between the idea of an indigenous rights state and the legal, moral, and political aspiration to normative internationalism (the aspiration of the human rights idea, for example).

The modern corporation offers significant potential to contribute to the human rights project, in part because it is free from the challenges posed by national sovereignty. That promise has begun to be realized in businesses practicing corporate due diligence with regard to the human rights of persons involved in or affected by those enterprises. Yet due diligence preserves the self-seeking orientation of the conventional corporation and seeks only to protect itself from committing human rights abuses. This approach, typified by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, does not address background conditions for and root causes of vulnerability to human rights abuses. My alternative, the human rights corporation, takes an other-regarding orientation that advances human rights within the corporation and in its human, social, economic, and natural environments. It moves beyond the due diligence carrot-and-stick model to a model in which the corporation produces not only goods and services but also human rights consciousness and practice as well.

Advocacy of an indigenous right to isolation in the Latin American context responds to multiple depredations, above all to plundering by extractivists. Two prominent international instruments declare a human right to indigenous self-isolation and articulate a principle of no contact between indigenous peoples and the non-indigenous majority population: Indigenous Peoples in Voluntary Isolation and Initial Contact in the Americas and Guidelines on the Protection of Indigenous Peoples. In analyzing both, I argue against the notion of a human right to indigenous isolation and for limited, controlled contact between the indigenous peoples and a narrow segment of the larger society. I propose relational human rights as rights that connect people, as rights-bearers, across borders and differences. They would allow for limited outside observation for possible human rights violations within indigenous communities. I then articulate relational human rights of indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation as rights to agency, health, territory, and identity.

With respect to Helmut Dubiel's study of the early Frankfurt School, I ask: does Critical Theory's first phase offer greater potential than the later period for the project of a new paradigm of analyzing complex modern societies? What potential does this earlier period offer for realizing the aims of subsequent Critical Theory? Can the deficits of the initial period be resolved and, if so, within the boundaries of the same tradition? Can this earlier period inspire future work without closing its horizons?

This review essay examines Seyla Benhabib’s << Critique, Norm, and Utopia >> as both an ambitious engagement with Habermas’s discourse ethics and a critical intervention in the trajectory of Critical Theory. Benhabib concludes with a call for the complementarity of juridical-legal and democratic-participatory perspectives, proposing a revision of discourse ethics that integrates justice with solidarity, and locating emancipatory praxis in the “new social movements.” Yet her strong claims, presented without empirical grounding, diverge sharply from Habermas’s more cautious appraisal of such movements as primarily defensive rather than transformative. The review underscores a central tension in Benhabib’s project: while she criticizes Habermas for reverting to a quasi-philosophy of history that neutralizes historical contingency, her own evolutionary narrative of Critical Theory risks reproducing the same teleological logic, casting Habermas as the culmination of Hegelian and Marxian traditions. Commentators such as Lyotard and Rorty echo this critique, challenging Habermas’s “metanarrative” of humanity as a universal subject. Despite these problems, Benhabib’s text remains a significant contribution, offering refined distinctions, incisive commentary on major figures from Hegel to Adorno, and one of the most thorough examinations of Habermas’s normative philosophy.

The paper defends a post-metaphysical foundation that preserves rational legitimacy without reverting to dogmatic metaphysics. It critiques both traditional ontological metaphysics and radical contingency theories, advocating instead for a transcendental-pragmatic framework grounded in intersubjective language and argumentation. [1] Post-Metaphysical Foundation: The paper explores the idea of a non-metaphysical or post-metaphysical foundation in philosophy. The author traces historical precedents of this method, from Plato and Aristotle to Descartes, Kant, and modern transcendental arguments. [2] Philosophical Paradigms: The evolution of philosophy is framed in three paradigms: Ontological Metaphysics – Concerned with ultimate questions about existence; Transcendental Philosophy of Consciousness – Focuses on conditions for valid knowledge (Descartes, Kant, Husserl); Transcendental Semiotics/Linguistic Pragmatics – A contemporary shift that sees meaning as rooted in language and intersubjective communication. [3] Critique of Metaphysics & Empirical Science: Both traditional metaphysics and empirical science assume an unexamined stance towards their objects. Metaphysics asks the question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" without reflecting on the conditions that allow such a question. Empirical sciences similarly ask "why" about phenomena but do not question the conditions that allow for scientific inquiry. [4] The Linguistic Turn & Transcendental Pragmatics: The linguistic turn (Peirce, Wittgenstein) challenges the solipsistic view of a self-contained consciousness. Understanding is inherently intersubjective and mediated through language. The validity of knowledge and argumentation relies on communicative reason rather than an isolated subject. [5] Critique of Neo-Pragmatism and De-Transcendentalization: Some contemporary thinkers (e.g., Rorty) argue for abandoning transcendental philosophy in favor of pragmatic contingency. The author argues that rejecting all non-contingent foundations leads to contradictions and a return to dogmatic metaphysics. Even recognizing contingency requires presupposing non-contingent conditions for valid argumentation. [6] The Role of Argumentation & Performative Self-Contradiction: Any attempt to deny fundamental rational principles results in a performative self-contradiction. Philosophy cannot reduce everything to contingency without undermining its own ability to make rational claims. The alternative is a transcendental-pragmatic approach that acknowledges intersubjective validity conditions.

Despite numerous obituaries to the contrary, Critical Theory, now half a century old, is still very much alive. The historical context in which the Frankfurt Circle worked has of course changed radically, as have forms of philosophy and social science. Hence no one can be surprised to find that the classical Frankfurt texts no longer shed direct light on contemporary society. Yet the various reconstructions of this tradition's potential for new social theory save it from the fate proclaimed for it by the necrologists. Theory and Politics exemplifies this most recent type of scholarship. It neither consigns the Frankfurt tradition to a past of questionable relevance, nor reverently celebrates it'in an overly selective interpretation

Most conceptions of human rights rely on metaphysical or theological assumptions that construe them as possible only as something imposed from outside existing communities. Most people, in other words, presume that human rights come from nature, God, or the United Nations. This book argues that reliance on such putative sources actually undermines human rights. Benjamin Gregg envisions an alternative; he sees human rights as locally developed, freely embraced, and indigenously valid. Human rights, he posits, can be created by the average, ordinary people to whom they are addressed, and that they are valid only if embraced by those to whom they would apply. To view human rights in this manner is to increase the chances and opportunities that more people across the globe will come to embrace them.

To treat social and political questions normatively is to treat them in terms of "rightness" or "justice" or other notions of normative correctness. The claim to correctness is a claim to moral authority. Yet normative correctness can only be a matter of interpretation, of judgment; to judge is to interpret (unless we suppose the existence of objective and necessary criteria of correctness - a supposition I discuss). The application of norms is itself a judgment, one ever problematic because ever contested by a variety of mutually incompatible answers to the question: what is the source and validity of the norms that an individual or group employs, of the norms that a community or society should employ? Social systems in most liberal democratic states display great stability over time and a basically unchallenged validity at any given time. In such pluralist societies the great majority of citizens displays an uncomplicated allegiance to their society with only minor differences in the levels of that allegiance. But this stability cannot be in what might be taken to be the determinate quality of social norms. Although few people today contend that social norms constitute a body of im-mutable principles, some might argue that normative principles are determinate in the sense of being more or less comprehensive, more or less consistent, more or less unproblematic. On this understanding, determinate normative principles are objective, and determinacy is the condition providing for the possibility of normative principles being transparent, consistent, and rational. Against this view, I argue that in fact no social norm is determinate in the strong sense of requiring someone following that norm to act in a particular way. I proceed in eight steps. First, I offer examples of normative and epistemic indeterminacy. I then articulate a notion of critique as something more than localism and less than universalism. Third, I develop my notion of social criticism as critique from a decentered standpoint. Fourth, I discuss the relativism of critique and, fifth, critique as persuasion not proceduralism. I then propose critique as a form of pragmatism and, seventh, examine the situatedness of critique. I conclude with several examples of substantive questions, briefly exploring various considerations relevant to the application of my position.

To counter possibilities for human rights as cultural imperialism, (1) I develop a notion of human rights as culturally particular and valid only locally. But they are an increasingly generalizable particularism. (2) Because the incommensurability of different cultures does not entail an uncritical tolerance of just about anything, but rather allows for an objectivating stance toward other communities or cultures, locally valid human rights have a critical capacity. (3) Locally valid human rights promote a community's self-representation and thus allow for diversity, rejecting the coercive (mis)representation of a community or culture as incapable of representing itself

This important study of the relationship between historical developments and the work of the scholars associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research yields fascinating insights into the actual workings of the Institute and the relationships among its members. The book has already had a major impact in Germany, where it has opened up the subject for argument and analysis by a new generation of scholars.Theory and Politics first explores the effect of political experience on the process of theory construction from 1930 to 1945. The central figure in this examination is Max Horkheimer, whose work is seen as the key to the shift in the Frankfurt School's focus from materialism to Critical Theory to a "critique of instrumental reason." Within each of the three periods defined by these foci the author examines external historical-political events (including the School's emigration to America) and their reflection in the group's changing conception of the relation of theory to practice as well as in its detailed theoretical position. Along the way he helps to clarify such questions as the Schools's evolving attitudes toward the Soviet Union, fascism, science, and the desired utopia.The book then examines what may have been the strongest stage of Critical Theory - the program for interdisciplinary research that emerged in the early 1930s. The author acutely portrays Horkheimer's conception of a synthesis between philosophy and empirical social science that would result in a form of social research relevant to the central problems of the day.As Martin Jay notes in his foreword, Helmut Dubiel has become not only an analyst of Critical Theory but a gifted contributor to its ongoing reception and development. He is currently a research fellow at the University of Frankfurt. Theory and Politics is included in the series, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy.

I propose human rights as self-authored through a personality structure of "assertive selfhood." To that end I identify three features of self-authorship: emergent through collective political action; as a critical stance; and borne by non- idiosyncratic norms. So conceived, human rights require a field of recognition as a social structure supportive of claims to assertive selfhood. I show that the capacity to self-grant depends critically on the participant's personality structure as well as on the structure of some of the social institutions he or she inhabits. But like any political vision, the project for self-granted human rights has distinct limits, above all with respect to the many inequalities among potential self-authors.

This article explores the role of proceduralism in managing political conflict and cultural diversity, with particular attention to the integration of Muslim immigrant communities in Europe. Proceduralism, understood as governance through agreed-upon rules of decision-making, provides a framework for participation across deep moral and cultural divides. Yet conventional proceduralism, often “color-blind,” risks perpetuating inequality by ignoring structural barriers to representation. The article develops a “color-conscious proceduralism” that foregrounds fairness, equality, and minority rights while accommodating majoritarian decision-making. Drawing on the distinction between thick and thin normativity, it argues that thin proceduralism—anchored in minimal shared commitments—offers the most viable basis for democratic integration in pluralistic societies, allowing cooperation among strangers without demanding consensus on ultimate values. Case studies of European Muslim communities illustrate both the promise and limits of this approach: while thin proceduralism enables compromise over interests and supports recognition-based identity formation, it struggles with actors guided by fundamentalist ideologies resistant to democratic compromise. The article concludes that proceduralism, if reimagined as normatively thin yet equality-conscious, can sustain civil order, enhance immigrant integration, and manage persistent normative conflict in culturally diverse democracies.

Most conceptions of human rights rely on metaphysical or theological assumptions that construe them as possible only as something imposed from outside existing communities. Most people, in other words, presume that human rights come from nature, God, or the United Nations. This book argues that reliance on such putative sources actually undermines human rights. Benjamin Gregg envisions an alternative; he sees human rights as locally developed, freely embraced, and indigenously valid. Human rights, he posits, can be created by the average, ordinary people to whom they are addressed, and that they are valid only if embraced by those to whom they would apply. To view human rights in this manner is to increase the chances and opportunities that more people across the globe will come to embrace them. Andrew Koppelman reviews this effort critically.

This article examines the jurisprudential implications of legal indeterminacy through a sustained comparison of pragmatism and postmodernism. Both approaches reject transcendental foundations, deny the existence of universally “correct” meanings of law, and embrace localism over universalism. Yet their similarities end there. Postmodern jurisprudence, exemplified by Lyotard, Derrida, and Foucault, tends toward parochialism, radical subjectivism, and skepticism about the possibility of normative critique or individual autonomy. By contrast, a pragmatist jurisprudence—drawing on antifoundationalism and “enlightened localism”—retains the capacity for critique, pluralism, and self-determination without resorting to mass delusion or transcendental claims. It advances a “weak objectivism,” enabling provisional but meaningful judgments of justice across communities. Against the postmodern notion of plural justice, pragmatism defends a concept of singular justice—indeterminate yet regulative, situated yet non-parochial—emerging through inclusive deliberation and intersubjective practice. The article argues that pragmatism, unlike postmodernism, sustains the democratic and normative aspirations of law under conditions of indeterminacy, offering a more robust and politically viable jurisprudence.