Independent

My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: yes I accept a structured form of C.I. Lewis's pragmatic apriori, though I do not take such forms of knowledge to be bearers of truths.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept another alternative Abstract objects are ontologically neutral, like patterns. Much of our cognitive vocabulary is neutral in this way. It is not a big deal.
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no The question is too unclear to answer Too unclear. Sentences or utterances? Truth-bearing or not?
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Agnostic/undecided
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism There is obviously a real world that is independent of my mind. And if it is dependent on some other mind, then that mind is so alien from mine that I could not consent to it being called a mind.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept an intermediate view Lean towards athiesm in my beliefs, but don't think belief needs to be the most important part of religious experience. I advocate quietism in public life.
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Reject both I'm too much of a skeptic about the fine-grained details of what is known to qualify as either of these.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism The question is too unclear to answer It depends on the kind of proposition in question, and the context in question. Paradigmatically subjective truth-bearing propositions are amenable to relativism, while paradigmatically objective truth-bearing propositions lend themselves to invariantism. Contextualism seems like a good default interpretive strategy, but it's only a first pass; eventually, as we get more information about each other, contexts get carved at sharper joints.
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Agnostic/undecided
Logic: classical and non-classical There is no fact of the matter It depends on context of discourse. In factually defective discourse where intuitive inclinations towards judgment are assertable, and where communication goes through successfully, non-classical logics (e.g., intuitionism and paraconsistency) are fruitful.
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept both
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept: moral anti-realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Accept: physicalism
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept both Mainly internalism, except when it comes to necessities. On that, I deny the force of the is/ought distinction.
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept both
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Accept more than one Contractualism, consequentialism, and virtue ethics are all valuable aspects of moral reasoning. Any aspect of moral deliberation that does not overlap with these categories is little more than a formal expression of what it would look like to have the right answers, without actually giving us a credible story on how to get them.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: disjunctivism I am willing to accept disjunctivism about perceptions, not sensations. That having been said, it is an open question as to whether or not perception is more central to experience than sensation.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept another alternative I accept a version of the bundle theory that makes reference to grounded narratives.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Accept another alternative This feels like a kooky Cold War-era battle of labels. I'm a social democrat with modern liberal sensibilities. Virtually none of my beliefs fit well into those categories.
Proper names: Fregean and Millian There is no fact of the matter There are other alternatives to these two; you can adopt a mediated reference theory without appealing to kooky Fregean senses.
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific anti-realism
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Lean toward: survival All other things equal.
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept more than one Reject deflationism, accept correspondence and epistemic views.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: metaphysically possible