Benjamin Rider

According to many scientists and futurists, technological advancements may soon make it possible significantly to extend average human life expectancy. This is often called "superlongevity." I discuss two arguments against superlongevity-first, a utilitarian argument from Peter Singer, and then an argument of my own. Although neither argument is decisive, I conclude that there are serious concerns about whether superlongevity would be a good idea that we need to reflect on as we consider the possibility.

In this article, we reflect on our experiences teaching a PWOL course called Philosophy for Living. The course uses modules focused on different historical philosophical ways of life (Epicureanism, Stoicism, Confucianism, Existentialism, etc.) to engage students in exploring how philosophy can be a way of life and how its methods, virtues, and ideas can improve their own lives. We describe and compare our experiences with two central aspects of our approach: engagement with diversity and the use of immersive experiences and assignments. In particular, we discuss how we recognize and center various forms of diversity in philosophy—cultural and gender diversity, but also diversity in how and in what forms philosophy can be done and what “philosophy as a way of life” can be. We also examine how the experimental and experiential aspects of immersive assignments promote deeper understanding and create possibilities for personal transformation.

Plato’s Gorgias depicts Socratic psychotherapy, showing Socrates aiming at “what’s best” for those he talks to (521d). The negative aspect of Socrates’ efforts—refuting claims, shaming people for misplaced values—has been well documented and discussed. Focusing on the conversations with Gorgias and Callicles, I highlight a neglected positive side to these interactions: How Socrates seeks to draw on what these characters deeply care about—here, leadership—to inspire philosophical reflection on how they live.

In recent years, Plato’s Lysis has received much attention from professional scholars, but could it be used as a text in introductory classes? It is true that the Lysis poses challenges as an introductory text—its arguments are fast-paced and abstract. But I argue that the Lysis is actually an excellent pedagogical text, well suited to engage novices and introduce them to philosophy’s distinctive methods and way of thinking. It works particularly well as a text for engaging students in active learning, insofar as it opens up a space for improvisation and exploration, providing tools for the readers and inviting them to take an active role in constructing their own understandings

The past half-century has seen a surge of interest in Aristotle’s ethics. For participants in this revived neo-Aristotelian tradition, Aristotle’s writings and distinctive ethical approach provide an important touchstone and inspiration for their own ideas. But this has happened before. In the classical world, from his own students and colleagues to the great commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Aristotle’s followers adapted, debated, and reworked their master’s ideas, often in the context of debate with rival schools. Inwood’s short book outlines the trajectory and main developments of this tradition, tracing a history of active and often innovative philosophers working to make sense of and defend their..

In the Alcibiades I, Socrates argues for the importance of self-knowledge. Recent interpreters contend that the self-knowledge at issue here is knowledge of an impersonal and purely rational self. I argue against this interpretation and advance an alternative. First, the passages proponents of this interpretation cite—Socrates’ argument that the self is the soul, and his suggestion that Alcibiades seek self-knowledge by looking for his soul’s reflection in the soul of another—do not unambiguously support their reading. Moreover, other passages, particularly Socrates’ cross-examination of Alcibiades, suggest the contrary reading, that self-knowledge includes knowledge of qualities peculiar to the individual.

Epicurus argued that death is no misfortune, because when a person dies, he no longer has sensation, and sensation is a necessary condition of value for a person. This argument, however, faces a powerful objection. Contemporary philosophers argue that death is bad precisely because it deprives one of good experiences one would have had, had one not died. I analyze and evaluate the Epicurean response to this objection, showing how, according to Epicurus, this objection reflects mistaken and unhealthy ideas about how lives should be evaluated. Uncovering and addressing these modes of evaluation constitutes a central aim of Epicurean therapy.

In Plato's Lysis, Socrates' conversation with Lysis features logical fallacies and questionable premises and closes with a blatantly eristic trick. I show how the form and content of these arguments make sense if we interpret them from the perspective of Socrates' pedagogical goals. Lysis is a competitive teenager who, along with his friend Menexenus, enjoys the game of eristic disputation. Socrates recognizes Lysis' predilections, and he constructs his arguments to engage Lysis' interests and loves, while also drawing the boy into thinking philosophically about the issues that the arguments raise about love, freedom, and happiness