Benoît Basse

En examinant les discours les plus emblématiques produits par la philosophie moderne au sujet de la peine de mort, notre intention n'est nullement de "peser le pour et le contre" en vue de déterminer quelle position s'avère la plus raisonnable. Assumant d'emblée le point de vue abolitionniste, notre question est la suivante : dans quelle mesure est-il possible de fonder en raison le refus catégorique de la peine capitale? A cet égard, le détour par l'histoire de la philosophie nous montre à quel point cette raison est avant tout divisée contre elle-même. En effet, au terme d'un travail visant à sonder la cohérence interne des partisans de la peine de mort (Locke, Kant, Stuart Mill) ainsi que de ses adversaires (Beccaria, Bentham), il nous est apparu impossible de conclure à un simple défaut de rationalité de la part des uns ou des autres. Ce que l'on constate au contraire, c'est que chaque démonstration se déploie à partir d'un certain nombre de principes éthiques indémontrables. Bien plus, chaque grande philosophie pénale est susceptible de donner lieu à des prises de position radicalement opposées. Mais pour peu que l'on se refuse à concevoir un abîme insurmontable entre la raison d'une part, et ce que d'aucuns nommèrent le "coeur" d'autre part, la philosophie morale peut bénéficier d'une approche dans laquelle le raisonnement et la sensibilité se complètent, au lieu de constituer une alternative. Paradoxalement, c'est dans l'oeuvre de Jean-Jacques Rousseau qu'il nous a semblé possible de repérer les éléments permettant de fonder au mieux l'abolition, tout en évitant le double écueil du rationalisme dogmatique et de l'émotivisme relativiste.

It is clear enough that utilitarianism contributed to the softening of many penal systems in the world by arguing that very cruel punishments should be excluded every time a less cruel one would be just as effective. But does utilitarianism as such oppose the death penalty ? It is well known that Beccaria and Bentham criticized capital punishment on utilitarian grounds. But the fact that John Stuart Mill held a speech in favour of the death penalty at the House of Commons in 1868 suggests that there is no necessity for a utilitarian thinker to oppose it. Otherwise, it would be possible to claim that John Stuart Mill betrayed, so to speak, the principle of utility by defending such a punishment. But nothing, it seems, allows us to say so. On the contrary, we would like to suggest that Mill’s disagreement with Bentham and Beccaria originates from his own empirical judgement on the following question : is death penalty the most cruel punishment for murder ? In other words, whether we like it or not, there is no way we can hold that Mill was less faithful than Beccaria and Bentham to the principle of utility when supporting the death penalty.

Cet ouvrage se donne pour tâche d’examiner les discours les plus emblématiques produits par la philosophie moderne au sujet de la peine de mort. Assumant d’emblée le point de vue abolitionniste, notre intention n’est nullement de « peser le pour et le contre », mais de poser la question suivante : dans quelle mesure est-il possible de fonder rationnellement le refus catégorique de la peine capitale ? À cet égard, le détour par l’histoire de la philosophie nous montre à quel point la raison est avant tout divisée contre elle-même. En effet, au terme d'un travail visant à mettre à l’épreuve la cohérence interne des partisans de la peine de mort (Locke, Kant, Stuart Mill), ainsi que de ses adversaires (Beccaria, Bentham), il nous est apparu impossible de conclure à un simple défaut de rationalité de la part des uns ou des autres. Ce que l'on constate au contraire, c'est que chaque démonstration se déploie à partir d'un certain nombre de principes éthiques indémontrables. Bien plus, chaque grand courant de la philosophie pénale est susceptible de donner lieu à des prises de position radicalement opposées. Mais pour peu que l'on se refuse à concevoir un abîme insurmontable entre la raison d'une part, et la sensibilité d'autre part, la philosophie morale peut bénéficier d'une approche dans laquelle le raisonnement et « le cœur » se complètent, au lieu de constituer une alternative. À cet égard, c'est dans l'œuvre de Jean-Jacques Rousseau qu’il nous a semblé possible de repérer les éléments permettant de fonder au mieux l’abolition.

A few months after the publication of the French translation of his book Causing Death and Saving Lives, Jonathan Glover was kind enough to return to some of the theses defended in this book. In forty years, this work has become a classic of applied ethics in the English-speaking world. Glover tackled a series of questions involving the lives of men and women, including abortion, infanticide, suicide, euthanasia, the death penalty and war. We asked him here about the method he considers the best in moral philosophy, and returned to his criticism of certain dominant ideas at the time. Jonathan Glover also discusses some of the positions of his former students Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan.

For this special issue dedicated to Jonathan Glover, Peter Singer was asked to reflect on the influence that the book Causing Death and Saving Lives had on him, as well as the Glover seminar in Oxford that Peter Singer attended in the late 1960s. One of Peter Singer's recurring arguments is the criticism of the traditional distinction between acts and omissions. But Glover is no stranger to this questioning, even if the two thinkers do not seem to want to draw exactly the same conclusions. What is at stake is this: what are we really responsible for and how demanding should our morality be?

I introduce here a special issue dedicated to the British philosopher Jonathan Glover. Recognized as an important figure in applied ethics in the Anglo-Saxon world, Glover does not yet enjoyed the same reputation in the French-speaking world. In 2017, forty years after the original publication of Causing Death and Saving Lives, I published a French translation of the same book, entitled Questions de vie ou de mort. In this editorial, I begin by recalling the reasons why Glover considered it necessary in the 1960s to give ethics a more "applied" character. Then I present in broad terms the ethics of "making people die" defended by Glover, resolutely pluralist, and not strictly utilitarian as some may have thought. Finally, I introduce the contributions to this special issue, as well as the three interviews I conducted with Jonathan Glover, Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan.

Nous introduisons ici un Cahier spécial consacré au philosophe britannique Jonathan Glover. Reconnu comme une figure importante de l’éthique appliquée dans le monde anglophone, Jonathan Glover commence fort heureusement à susciter de l’intérêt dans le monde académique francophone. C’est la notion de cohérence pratique qui sera au cœur des trois contributions composant ce dossier. En quels sens peut-on parler de cohérence dans le domaine de la pratique? Et quel type d’exigences implique-t-elle? Dans cet éditorial nous nous efforçons de montrer que le souci d’introduire de l’ordre et de l’harmonie parmi nos jugements moraux conduit Glover à défendre un pluralisme au niveau des principes.

For this special issue dedicated to Jonathan Glover, Peter Singer was asked to reflect on the influence that the book Causing Death and Saving Lives had on him, as well as the Glover seminar in Oxford that Peter Singer attended in the late 1960s. One of Peter Singer's recurring arguments is the criticism of the traditional distinction between acts and omissions. But Glover is no stranger to this questioning, even if the two thinkers do not seem to want to draw exactly the same conclusions. What is at stake is this: what are we really responsible for and how demanding should our morality be?

I introduce here a special issue dedicated to the British philosopher Jonathan Glover. Recognized as an important figure in applied ethics in the Anglo-Saxon world, Glover does not yet enjoyed the same reputation in the French-speaking world. In 2017, forty years after the original publication of Causing Death and Saving Lives, I published a French translation of the same book, entitled Questions de vie ou de mort. In this editorial, I begin by recalling the reasons why Glover considered it necessary in the 1960s to give ethics a more "applied" character. Then I present in broad terms the ethics of "making people die" defended by Glover, resolutely pluralist, and not strictly utilitarian as some may have thought. Finally, I introduce the contributions to this special issue, as well as the three interviews I conducted with Jonathan Glover, Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan.

A few months after the publication of the French translation of his book Causing Death and Saving Lives, Jonathan Glover was kind enough to return to some of the theses defended in this book. In forty years, this work has become a classic of applied ethics in the English-speaking world. Glover tackled a series of questions involving the lives of men and women, including abortion, infanticide, suicide, euthanasia, the death penalty and war. We asked him here about the method he considers the best in moral philosophy, and returned to his criticism of certain dominant ideas at the time. Jonathan Glover also discusses some of the positions of his former students Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan.