Bensaude-Vincent Bernadette

Hésitation vaccinale, refus de la 5G, théories du complot suscitent de nombreuses lamentations sur la montée de l'irrationalité et la perte de confiance dans la communauté scientifique. Pour y faire face, certains continuent d'en appeler à l'autorité de la science et des 'faits' comme à des totems. Cet affrontement rend aveugle aux problèmes inhérents à la fabrication des savoirs, et sourd aux préoccupations des publics concernés. Du changement climatique à la pandémie de Covid, les auteurs analysent les récentes controverses et proposent ainsi une réflexion sur les pratiques de recherche et d'expertise en temps de crise. En donnant des clés pour repenser les rapports entre sciences, industrie et démocratie, cet essai salvateur plaide pour une transformation de la méfiance généralisée en une défiance exigeante, seule capable d'activer de nouveaux modes de production et de réception des sciences en société"--Page 4 of cover.

Scientists and engineers who extensively use the term “nanomachine” are not always aware of the philosophical implications of this term. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of nanomachine through a distinction between three major paradigms of machine. After a brief presentation of two well-known paradigms - Cartesian mechanistic machines and Von Neumann's complex and uncontrolled machines – we will argue that Drexler's model was mainly Cartesian. But what about the model of his critics? We propose a third model - Gilbert Simondon's notion of concrete machines – which seems more appropriate to understand nanomachines than the notion of “soft machines”. Finally we review a few strategies currently used to design nanomachines, in an effort to determine which paradigm they belong to

Technoscience is often perceived as an expression of the primacy of utilitarian values that would take over the field of pure and disinterested science. A number of scientists deplore that the age of science for its own sake is coming to an end, that technologyhas overtaken science. This common view expressed by active scientists is shared by cultural historians. In a paper describing technoscience as a cultural phenomenon, Paul Forman comes to a similar conclusion. He argues that technoscience is a reversal of the values attached to science. Whereas modernity was characterized by the high cultural rank of science and scientists, postmodernity is characterized the loss of confidence and tustworthiness of scientists. Modernity, accroding to Forman rested on the primacy of science to and for technology, post-modernity is characterized by the the primacy of technology over science. The modern assumption that scientfic research would bring about not only knowledge but technological applications in addition, has been superseded in the 1980s according to Formann, and basic research is no longer considered as a key source of technologial innovation. Forman also points to this technological turn is the science studies which more and more identified science and technology. I would like to discuss this interpretation from the case study of converging technologies. By converging technologies I first refer to the current research programs launched in various countries. More precisely I refer to the US program entitled Converging technologies for improving human performances launched in 2002 and the European program CTEKS (Converging technologies for the European Society) launched in 2004. They are especially relevant because science is not even mentioned as they seem to focus exclusively on technology. Should we consider these programmes as the confirmation of Forman's claim about the primacy of technology over science? In a preliminary conceptual analysis I will try to disentangle the notion of technoscience from the vague connotation of utilitarianism. Then I will consider to what extent the views and values attached to converging technologies express a prinacy of technology over science. For this purpose it is useful to distinguish between converging technologies as national research programs and the daily practices of research in which technologies converge. I will argue that the views and values that active scientists attach to their research can deeply differ from that of policy makers. However in no case can technosccience be described as a primacy of technology over science.

Meyerson is known as a philosopher who displayed an impressive erudition both in history of science and philosophy, some one who spent his lifetime in reading and writing. His readers can testify (and sometimes complain) that his philosophical claims were based on and tested against a wide range of historical episodes taken from a variety of sciences. Moreover it is clear that he had an intellectualist approach to science, as he was more concerned with theories than with scientific practices. Therefore it does not really matter that he was trained as a laboratory chemist and that he had practised industrial chemistry in his early career. These aspects are biographical details hardly mentioned as mere anecdotes. I would like to question the standard view that chemistry did not really matter or did act as an anti-model in Meyerson‘s philosophy. I will argue that not only chemistry provided a kind of entrance hall in the history and philosophy of science, as Meyerson himself often acknowledged, but it also shaped his philosophy.

It is often assumed that chemistry was a typical positivistic science as long as chemists used atomic and molecular models as mere fictions and denied any concern with their real existence. Even when they use notions such as molecular orbitals chemists do not reify them and often claim that they are mere models or instrumental artefacts. However a glimpse on the history of chemistry in the longue durée suggests that such denials of the ontological status of chemical entities do not testify for any specific allegiance of chemists to positivism. Rather it suggests that the dilemma positivism vs realism is inappropriate for characterizing the ontology of chemistry. This alternative shaped at the turn of the twentieth century in the context of controversies about atomic physics does not take into account the major concern of chemists, i.e. making up things. Only by considering what matters for chemists, their matters of concern rather than their matter theories, can we expect to get an insight on their ontological assumptions. The argumentation based on historical data is twofold. It is wellknown that generating new substances out of initial ingredients which is the raison d'être of chemistry raised a vexing puzzle which has been alternatively solved with the Aristotelian notion of mixt and the Lavoisieran notion of compound. I argue that an essential tension remains intrinsic in chemistry between the two conceptual frameworks. The second section tries to make sense of the long tradition in chemistry of ontological noncommitment. I argue that what is usually considered as a denial of the existence of the basic units of matter would be better characterized as a focus on more important actors on the chemical stage.

La chimie est délaissée des philosophes et historiens des sciences. Cette discipline ne serait-elle pas bonne à penser? Qu’est-ce que ce silence, ce mépris ou cette méconnaissance nous enseignent sur le régime du savoir en chimie? Inversement, la chimie méprisée, méconnue ou simplement ignorée ne signalerait-elle pas les travers des philosophes et les limites de leur pouvoir de conceptualiser et de penser? Cet ouvrage donne un aperçu de la complexité de ces questions en adoptant un point de vue symétrique où se croisent les regards des chimistes et des philosophes. En abordant les problématiques posées par les théories de la matière et en étudiant la question du corps du chimiste et de son statut social, ce volume s’interroge aussi sur l’image de la chimie et sur le rejet du « chimique » au profit du « naturel » très en vogue aujourd’hui.

Although many active scientists deplore the publicity about Drexler's futuristic scenario, I will argue that the controversies it has generated are very useful, at least in one respect. They help clarify the metaphysical assumptions underlying nanotechnologies, which may prove very helpful for understanding their public and cultural impact. Both Drexler and his opponents take inspiration from living systems, which they both describe as machines. However there is a striking contrast in their respective views of molecular machineries. This paper based on semipopular publications is an attempt to characterize the rival models of nanomachines and to disentangle the worldviews underpinning the uses of biological reference on both sides. Finally, in an effort to point out the historical roots of the contrast in the concepts of nanomachines, I raise the question of a divide between two cultures of nanotechnology

Chemistry deserves more philosophical attention not so much to do justice to a long-neglected science or to enhance its cultural prestige, but to undermine a number of taken-for-granted assumptions about scientific rationality and more importantly to diversify our metaphysical views of nature and reality. In brief, this paper does not make the case for a philosophy of chemistry. It rather urges philosophers of science to listen to chemists and discuss what they learn from them. Because over the course of many centuries chemists have developed a special access to nature and a special way of investigating and dealing with material substances, they have confronted a number of epistemological and ontological issues that are worth discussing. Following critical remarks about the disciplinary partition of philosophy, a historical section presents the contributions to philosophy of a few French twentieth-century chemists-turned philosophers to emphasize how they have challenged the dominant philosophical categories. The final section develops one of the lessons that philosophers can learn from chemists: to pay attention to things, to their materiality and activity in order to develop new ontological perspectives.

It is now widely accepted that Research & Development in nanotechnology and biotechnology should be accompanied by research programs in ethics. This paper first critically assesses the initiatives that characterize this “ethical turn” by clarifying its underlying philosophical assump-tions and its consequences. Current trends in nanoethics enhance the concern for responsibility and develop an attitude of prudence. However nanoethics focused as it is on designers’ responsibility, reinvigorates the anthropocentric modern ideal of man as the lord of nature and master of the future. Technological objects are viewed only as means for human needs and sources of profit. An alternative approach to nanoethics considers artefacts as individual entities with a life of their own and takes into account the specificities of the nanoworld

It is often assumed that chemistry was a typical positivistic science as long as chemists used atomic and molecular models as mere fictions and denied any concern with their real existence. Even when they use notions such as molecular orbitals chemists do not reify them and often claim that they are mere models or instrumental artefacts. However a glimpse on the history of chemistry in the longue durée suggests that such denials of the ontological status of chemical entities do not testify for any specific allegiance of chemists to positivism. Rather it suggests that the dilemma positivism vs realism is inappropriate for characterizing the ontology of chemistry. This alternative shaped at the turn of the twentieth century in the context of controversies about atomic physics does not take into account the major concern of chemists, i.e. making up things. Only by considering what matters for chemists, their matters of concern rather than their matter theories, can we expect to get an insight on their ontological assumptions. The argumentation based on historical data is twofold. Generating new substances out of initial ingredients which is the raison d’être of chemistry raised a vexing puzzle which has been alternatively solved with the Aristotelian notion of mixt and the Lavoisieran notion of compound. I will argue that an essential tension remains intrinsic in chemistry between the two conceptual frameworks. But how are we to make sense of the long tradition of ontological non-commitment in chemistry? I argue that what is usually considered as a denial of the existence of the basic units of matter is better characterized as a focus on more important actors on the chemical stage.

Crossing the boundaries - between nature and artifact and between inanimate and living matter - is a major feature of the convergence between nanotechnology and biotechnology. This paper points to two symmetric ways of crossing the boundaries: chemists mimicking nature's structures and processes, and synthetic biologists mimicking synthetic chemists with biological materials. However to what extent are they symmetrical and do they converge toward a common view of life and machines? The question is addressed in a historical perspective. Both biomimetic chemistry and synthetic biology can be described as descendants of an ambitious program developed by Stéphane Leduc who coined the phrase 'synthetic biology' in the early twentieth century. The main intention of this genealogy is to emphasize that although making life in a test tube is a recurrent project there are subtle nuances in the underlying metaphysical assumptions. This comparison is meant to contribute to a better understanding of the cultural issues at stake in the convergence between nano and biotechnologies. It suggests that the demarcation line between life and inanimate matter remains a hot issue, and that all traffics across the borders do not proceed from the same metaphysical assumptions

RÉSUMÉ: Émile Meyerson est, à juste titre, perçu comme un adversaire du positivisme d'Auguste Comte, mais une analyse de quelques passages de ses æuvres étayée par sa correspondance montre combien est ambivalente sa relation à Comte. Nous proposons de poursuivre les réflexions qu'ébauche Meyerson sur sa relation à Comte, pour repenser la notion d'influence, trop souvent perçue comme un flux d'idées passivement reçues et plus ou moins digérées. On montrera que l'æuvre de Comte fut pour Meyerson une sorte de matériau d'idées auquel il fait subir un traitement, tout comme un industriel transforme des matières premières pour élaborer un produit fini.ABSTRACT: Even though Émile Meyerson is rightly seen as an opponent of Comte's positivism, analyzing passages of his works with the help of his correspondence shows the ambiguity of his relation to Comte's philosophy. Drawing on Meyerson's remarks about his relation to Comte's philosophy, this article offers a new perspective on the notion of influence, which is too often perceived as passive or unassimilated reception of a stream of ideas. I argue that Meyerson treated Comte's ideas as a sort of raw matter he transformed into a finished product.

The term “technoscience” gained philosophical significance in the 1970s but it aroused ambivalent views. On the one hand, several scholars have used it to shed light on specific features of recent scientific research, especially with regard to emerging technologies that blur boundaries ; on the other hand, as a matter of fact “technoscience” did not prompt great interest among philosophers. In the French area, a depreciative meaning prevails: “technoscience” means the contamination of science by management and capitalism. Some even argue that “technoscience” is not a concept at all, just a buzzword. In this chapter, on the contrary, we make the case for the constitution of a philosophical concept of technoscience based on the characterization of its objects in order to scrutinize their epistemological, ontological, political and ethical dimensions.

This paper is a critical assessment of the epistemological impact of the systematic quantification of nature with the accumulation of big datasets on the practice and orientation of ecological science. We examine the contents of big databases and argue that it is not just accumulated information; records are translated into digital data in a process that changes their meanings. In order to better understand what is at stake in the ‘datafication’ process, we explore the context for the emergence and quantification of biodiversity in the 1980s, along with the concept of the global environment. In tracing the origin and development of the global biodiversity information facility we describe big data biodiversity projects as a techno-political construction dedicated to monitoring a new object: the global diversity. We argue that, biodiversity big data became a powerful driver behind the invention of the concept of the global environment, and a way to embed ecological science in the political agenda.