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23The papers in this volume are a selection of the papers presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting of 1994. The papers were selected by the 1993-1994 Pacific Division Program Committee, whose members include: Jean Hampton (Chair) (review)Philosophical Studies 77 (193)
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6The Philosopher’s Projective ErrorPhilosophical Studies 132 (3): 581-593. 2007.This paper is a discussion of Michael Thau's interesting critique in Chapter 2 of Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, of the common view that beliefs are internal states.
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Individualism and the Cognitive SciencesDissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 1986.Is the specific intentional character of a thought entirely fixed by states of the thinker's body and brain? Is it entirely fixed by what he can see of his own thought with his mind's eye? A study of the sciences of thought suggests not. ;Individualism, the view that a person's intentional mental states are fixed by his physical, functional, and phenomenal states, is implicit in most modern and contemporary philosophical accounts of the mind, from Descartes to Jerry Fodor. But Putnam, Burge, and…Read more
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67Mental content and hot self-knowledgeIn Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Mit Press. pp. 71-99. 2003.
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28Access and what it is likeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 260-260. 1995.Block's cases of superblindsight, the pneumatic drill, and the Sperling experiments do not show that P-consciousness and Aconsciousness can come apart. On certain tendentious but not implausible construals of the concepts of P- and A-consciousness, they refer to the same psychological phenomenon.
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98Metacognition and consciousness: Review essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. shimamura (eds), Metacognition: Knowing About KnowingPhilosophical Psychology 10 (1): 93-102. 1997.The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the …Read more
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38On a model for psycho-neural coevolutionBehavior and Philosophy 19 (2): 1-17. 1991.According to a model of inter-theoretic relations advocated by Patricia S. Churchland, psychology will need to revise its theories so as to fit them for "smooth reduction" to the neurosciences, and this will lead to the elimination of reference to intentional contents from psychology. It is argued that this model is ambiguous; on one reading it is empirically implausible, on the other its methodology is confused. The connectionist program NETtalk, far from exemplifying the model as Churchland cl…Read more
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58Burge's dualismIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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30Working Without a Net (review)Review of Metaphysics 47 (3): 613-614. 1994.To say that S's belief or action is rational is to say, according to Foley, that from a certain belief perspective it appears to satisfy certain of S's goals. This approach is firmly teleological in character, and does not take "rules" or "virtues" of rationality to be fundamental. Precisely which belief perspective, and which of S's goals, are relevant here? We should acknowledge many notions of rationality, says Foley, depending on how we fix these parameters. We might take all of S's goals to…Read more
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44Self-attributions help constitute mental typesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 54-56. 1993.
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11The "One-Experience" Account of Phenomenal Unity: A Review of Michael Tye's "Consciousness and Persons" (review)PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11. 2005.
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50Review of Michael Tye's Consciousness and Persons (review)PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11. 2005.Consciousness has been defined as that annoying period between naps, and this grumpy definition may not be wholly facetious, if Michael Tye's latest book is right. Tye's main goal here is to develop a theory of the phenomenal unity of experience at a time, and its diachronic analog, the moment-to-moment continuity of one's experiential stream from the time one wakes up to the time consciousness lapses
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32Sensory qualities and 'Homunctionalism': A review essay of W. G. Lycan'sconsciousnessPhilosophical Psychology 4 (1): 147-158. 1991.
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Arizona State UniversityPhilosophy - School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious StudiesRetired faculty
Tempe, Arizona, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |