Bernardo Andrade

This dissertation reads Levinas’s theory of time as prolegomena to any future ethics of alterity. For an ethics of alterity to be possible, two mutually opposing conditions must obtain. On the one hand, ethical laws must proceed from a fully heteronomous source which absolves itself from any conceptual mediation. On the other hand, such laws must acquire meaning within the mental economy of an ego for whom everything is conceptually mediated. Levinas’s goal is, accordingly, to investigate the meaning of what lies beyond meaning. He wants to allow for something beyond meaning to acquire a foothold within meaning, yet without divesting itself of its alterity. Diachrony, I contend, is what makes this possible. The upshot of my argument is that diachronic time names the genesis, or the constitution, of the meaning of radical alterity.

Levinas repeatedly calls his thought in the 1960s a “return to Platonism.” Whereas most scholars read this statement as part of Levinas’s critique of multiculturalism and moral relativism, I look at Levinas’s Platonism on its own terms as a theory of meaning. Levinas offers a tridimensional theory of meaning based on two kinds of Platonic “separation” (chorismos): (1) a separation between historical variability and ethical universality, corresponding to the relation between sensibles and forms (“eidetic separation”); and (2) a further separation between ethical universality and its ground or condition in the other person, corresponding to the relation between the forms and the Good (“agathistic separation”). Levinas’s Platonism consists in a differentiation between three semantic planes: contextual meaning, a-contextual meaning, and a goodness beyond all meaning, respectively.

In this paper I argue that, to conceive transcendence, Levinas retrieves the Platonic concept of “separation” and deploys it in three ways: metaphysically, semantically, and affectively. Levinas finds in the interaction between being and the Good beyond being of Republic VI 509b a certain “formal structure of transcendence”—one in which a term is conditioned by another while remaining absolutely separated from it. This formal structure is subsequently deployed metaphysically, in the relation between creator and creature; semantically, in the relation between meaning and sense; and affectively, in the relation between the desiring self and its desired aim.

Departing from Anderson’s (2016) suggestion that there are three communities in Peirce’s thought corresponding to his three normative sciences of logic, ethics, and esthetics, I argue that these communities partake in a relationship of dependence similar to that found among the normative sciences. In this way, just as logic relies on ethics which relies on esthetics, so too would a logical community of inquirers rely on an ethical community of love, which would rely on an esthetic community of artists. A community could conduct inquiry together only if it pursued the same goal; and it could pursue the same goal only if it first imaginatively construed it. Any logical or ethical community requires a shared imaginative repertoire of ideal ends.

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus’s critique of divine deliberation in Ennead 6.7 does not seek to banish teleology altogether from his philosophy of nature. Rather, his critique aims to situate teleology within his own metaphysical system so as to reconcile it with the basic principles governing the intelligible universe. In this sense, Plotinus does not propose that we expunge all reference to notions of utility and benefit from our natural explanations; he merely wishes to render those notions coherent with an ontology in which the intelligible always takes precedence over sensible reality. To this end, Plotinus introduces, first, what I call a vertical teleology, where the different animal species create the necessary conditions for the maintenance of higher forms of intelligible life, such as genera. Second, Plotinus advances what I call a horizontal teleology, where the various animal organs serve to provide a minimal coefficient of noetic content to each species in its respective ontic level. Plotinus thus sketches the outlines of a properly ‘noetic’ teleology in Ennead 6.7.

In this paper, I argue that Plotinus does not limit the sphere of free human agency simply to intellectual contemplation, but rather extends it all the way to human praxis. Plotinus’s goal in the first six chapters of Ennead 6.8 is, accordingly, to demarcate the space of freedom within human practical actions. He ultimately concludes that our external actions are free whenever they actualize, in unhindered fashion, the moral principles derived from intellectual contemplation. This raises the question of how the freedom of practical actions might relate to the freedom of intellectual contemplation. After considering two previously offered models—a model of double activity, and an Aristotelian model of practical syllogism—I offer a third alternative, namely a model of moral attunement, according to which our rational desires assume a kind of ‘care of the soul’ through active supervision. Practical life is thus imbued with freedom to the extent that the soul supervises its actions to conform to its will and choice of the good.