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77. ReputationIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 207-251. 1995.
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3SachregisterIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 302-316. 1995.
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93. Strategische Eigenschaften von Situationen, in denen Versprechen gegeben werdenIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 62-93. 1995.
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26. Wiederholtes SpielIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 175-206. 1995.
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497Simple Games of Information TransmissionAnalyse & Kritik 34 (2): 315-338. 2012.Communication is an inherently strategic matter. This paper introduces simple game theoretic models of information transmission to identify different forms of uncertainty which may pose a problem of trust in testimony. Strategic analysis suggests discriminating between trust in integrity, trust in competence, trust in (the will to invest) effort and trust in honesty. Whereas uncertainty about the sender's honesty or integrity may directly influence a rational receiver's readiness to rely on send…Read more
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222In Defense of Moderate EnvyAnalyse & Kritik 22 (1): 98-113. 2000.In contrast to Axelrod’s advice “don’t be envious” it is argued that the emotion of envy may enhance cooperation. TIT FOR TAT does exhibit a certain degree of envy. But, it does so in inconsistent ways. Two variants of TIT FOR TAT are introduced and their strategic properties are analyzed. Both generate the very same actual play as TIT FOR TAT in a computer tournament without noise. However, if noise is introduced they display some greater degree of stability. This is due to the fact that they f…Read more
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6Anhang I: Iteriertes Versprechensspiel mit unvollständiger InformationIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 287-289. 1995.
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26Olli Lagerspetz: Trust. The tacit demand (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (4): 433-435. 1999.
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115. Humes Theorie der Versprechen : Übereinkunft und SelbstsuchtIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 134-174. 1995.
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12Can the Social Contract Be Signed by an Invisible Hand? (edited book)RMM. 2013.The title of this special topic in RMM is borrowed from a 1978 paper of Hillel Steiner in which he argues against Robert Nozick's invisible hand conception of the emergence of the state. Steiner believes that central institutions of social order such as money and government need some form of conscious endorsement by individuals to emerge and to persist over time. Tony de Jasay's critique (in Philosophy 85, 2010) of Bob Sugden's plea for a Humean version of contractarianism (see RMM, Vol 0) moti…Read more
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9LiteraturIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 295-299. 1995.
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159GottvertrauenAnalyse & Kritik 25 (1): 1-16. 2003.Faith in the sense of trust in God is discussed as a somewhat extreme case of trust. Trust in general is understood as an emotional attitude and determined by the way a trusting person perceives the world and the person trusted. Interpersonal trust as the most common form of trust is characterized by connectedness - the trusted person is perceived as acting according to norms, values or goals shared by the trusting person - and by a participant attitude in the sense of Strawson. Trust in God dif…Read more
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12Anhang II: Reputation und InteraktionswahrscheinlichkeitIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 290-294. 1995.
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193On the emotional character of trustEthical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2): 171-189. 2001.Trustful interaction serves the interests of those involved. Thus, one could reason that trust itself may be analyzed as part of rational, goaloriented action. In contrast, common sense tells us that trust is an emotion and is, therefore, independent of rational deliberation to some extent. I will argue that we are right in trusting our common sense. My argument is conceptual in nature, referring to the common distinction between trust and pure reliance. An emotional attitude may be understood a…Read more
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68. Humes Theorie der Versprechen : Moralische Norm und PflichtgefühlIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 252-286. 1995.
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64. Die VersprechensregelIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 94-133. 1995.
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521Making Sense of Categorical ImperativesAnalyse & Kritik 28 (1): 71-82. 2006.Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover, se…Read more
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11Über den quasi-naturrechtlichen Charakter der Pflicht, Versprechen zu haltenIn Rainer Hegselmann & Hartmut Kliemt (eds.), Moral Und Interesse: Zur Interdisziplinären Erneuerung der Moralwissenschaften, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. pp. 47-64. 1997.
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4PersonenregisterIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 300-301. 1995.
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50. EinleitungIn Versprechen: Überlegungen Zu Einer Künstlichen Tugend, De Gruyter. pp. 1-17. 1995.
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7Norms as reasons for ActionArchiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 95 (4): 563-578. 2009.Social norms are based on social standards. The relevant standards come in two forms. Compliance with social standards of evaluation may be understood as goal-oriented behavior under the constraints of external and internal sanctions. Compliance with norms, which directly refer to specific ways of conduct, may not. Therefore, although norm-guided behavior may be consistent with utility maximizing, no satisfying account of norm compliance can be given within a Rational Choice framework or any oth…Read more
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Christine Chwaszcza, Praktische Vernunft als vernunftige Praxis. Ein Grundriss (review)Philosophisches Jahrbuch 112 (1): 252. 2005.
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Rational Choice and Rule-Following BehaviorRationality and Society 19 (4): 425-450. 2007.While Rational Choice Theory (RC) may be understood as a theory of choice, which does not necessarily reflect actual deliberative processes, rule-following behavior is definitely based on a certain form of delibera- tion. This article aims at clarifying the relationship between the two. Being guided by instrumental rules, i.e., rules reducible to the maximiza- tion principle, is perfectly consistent with the fundamental behavioral assumptions of RC. But human individuals use other forms of rules…Read more