In this thesis, I argue for a realistic account of what conceptual engineering can hope to achieve
when engineering concepts. I criticize conceptual engineers for not taking the implementation
challenge, and problems with the feasibility of their proposals, into account when proposing to
change concepts, threatening to trivialize conceptual engineering. In addition, conceptual
engineers have had a tendency to expect too much from concepts, and suggest extensive changes
to the meaning to all uses…
Read moreIn this thesis, I argue for a realistic account of what conceptual engineering can hope to achieve
when engineering concepts. I criticize conceptual engineers for not taking the implementation
challenge, and problems with the feasibility of their proposals, into account when proposing to
change concepts, threatening to trivialize conceptual engineering. In addition, conceptual
engineers have had a tendency to expect too much from concepts, and suggest extensive changes
to the meaning to all uses of a concept. As a solution, I suggest Fabianism, which is to have
apparent goals, and realistic tactics to achieve those goals. Specifically, I suggest three remedies,
which is to (a) view concepts as embedded in frameworks, and (b) make less extensive changes
to the meaning of (c) only some (or one) uses of concepts. Essentially, I argue that we should
engineer conceptual frameworks, and not individual concepts. In the second part of the thesis, I
explore an implication of Fabianism on the way that conceptual engineers assess concepts,
concluding that we should assess concepts by the functions they perform in a conceptual
framework, which has not been the predominant view of concept assessment in conceptual
engineering.