Bert Heinrichs

As virtual reality and virtual worlds in general take up more and more space in people’s everyday lives, the question of how virtual actions should be morally evaluated becomes increasingly pressing. One of the main challenges in the ethics of virtual worlds, in our view, is to find a normative framework, that is not overly restrictive but still accounts for common intuitions, such as the immorality of discrimination or harassment in virtual realms. In this paper we ask which criterion could be suitable to allow for a more nuanced evaluation of various potentially immoral virtual actions. First, we introduce a case to distinguish possible harms and immoral behaviors in virtual worlds. We then present a concept of consent inspired by principlism in research ethics and discuss criteria for valid consent and its limits. In applying this to our case, we find that consent can render many allegedly immoral actions in virtual worlds – such as virtual killing or theft – morally permissible, while it cannot be used to justify discrimination or violations of personal identity. A consent-based approach is thus shown to successfully reconstruct common moral intuitions, like those on the gamers’ dilemma. Finally, we address some objections to our argument, namely objections from deontological ethics and virtue ethics. The result of the paper is a framework for the moral evaluation of virtual actions, that allows for a more balanced approach and takes the particular purposes of virtual worlds and the interests of participating individuals into account.

As virtual reality and virtual worlds in general take up more and more space in people’s everyday lives, the question of how virtual actions should be morally evaluated becomes increasingly pressing. One of the main challenges in the ethics of virtual worlds, in our view, is to find a normative framework, that is not overly restrictive but still accounts for common intuitions, such as the immorality of discrimination or harassment in virtual realms. In this paper we ask which criterion could be suitable to allow for a more nuanced evaluation of various potentially immoral virtual actions. First, we introduce a case to distinguish possible harms and immoral behaviors in virtual worlds. We then present a concept of consent inspired by principlism in research ethics and discuss criteria for valid consent and its limits. In applying this to our case, we find that consent can render many allegedly immoral actions in virtual worlds – such as virtual killing or theft – morally permissible, while it cannot be used to justify discrimination or violations of personal identity. A consent-based approach is thus shown to successfully reconstruct common moral intuitions, like those on the gamers’ dilemma. Finally, we address some objections to our argument, namely objections from deontological ethics and virtue ethics. The result of the paper is a framework for the moral evaluation of virtual actions, that allows for a more balanced approach and takes the particular purposes of virtual worlds and the interests of participating individuals into account.

Wissenschaft und Forschung müssen heute klarer reflektieren und deutlicher erklären, was sie tun und warum sie es tun. Dies betrifft nicht nur die Verwendung von öffentlichen Ressourcen, sondern auch Forschungsziele und methodische Ansätze. Insbesondere sind Wissenschaft und Forschung sehr viel stärker als früher zu zeigen aufgefordert, dass ihr Handeln ethisch verantwortungsvoll ist. Dafür müssen ethische Grundprinzipien und verfassungsmäßige Grundrechte regelmäßig gegeneinander abgewogen werden. Heutzutage sind also bereits bei der konzeptionellen Planung ethische und rechtliche Abwägungsfragen mitzubedenken und überzeugend zu beantworten. Neben fachwissenschaftlicher Expertise benötigen Forschende deshalb auch forschungsethische sowie rechtliche Kenntnisse. Ein verbreiteter Ansatz, um verantwortungsvolle Forschung zu gewährleisten, besteht darin, Mechanismen der akademischen Selbstregulierungen zu implementieren. Dies führt dazu, dass Forschende vermehrt in Gremien tätig werden, die die Projekte von anderen Forschenden ethisch begutachten. Der vorliegende Band bietet deshalb einen praxisorientierten Ansatz, der es Forschenden ermöglichen soll, sowohl ethische Probleme ihrer eigenen Arbeit zu identifizieren als auch Begutachtungstätigkeiten zu übernehmen. Er führt in etablierte Konzepte zur Handhabung ethischer Herausforderungen ein und vermittelt auch erforderliches rechtliches Hintergrundwissen für die Teilhabe in Ethik-Gremien und Kommissionen. Schließlich erläutern die Autoren, wie diese Konzepte genutzt werden können, um zu überzeugenden Lösungen für eine verantwortungsvolle Forschung zu gelangen.

Definition of the problem In this article, a review of neuroethics is provided. Building on an earlier paper by Müller et al. (2018), we identify continuities and shed light on more recent important developments. Arguments In particular, we show that neuroethics is partly confronted with new substantive challenges. In addition, the question of how to deal with diversity plays a growing role: neuroethics is increasingly reflecting on the extent to which certain social groups are under- or overrepresented in research and ethical discourse, as well as the resulting blind spots. In this context, adopting a global perspective that takes cultural plurality into account is becoming increasingly important for neuroethics. Finally, we point out existing and emerging forms of institutionalization and networking with which the scientific community is responding to these challenges. Conclusion We argue that neuroethics should focus more on inclusive and participatory research concepts.

Starting with a broad use of the term, this chapter examines different types of decision-making and agents. A typology is proposed that can help to avoid confusion and promote understanding, especially in discussions between different scientific disciplines. The typology includes reporting/non-reporting agents, fully/partially transparent agents, and observer-/self-transparent agents. However, the most profound distinction turns out to be between non-discursive and discursive agents. This is mainly because discursivity and responsibility are closely linked. Discursive agents therefore have a special position: they must decide how they deal with other types of agents and what they use them for and how they use them in their own decision-making. So far, only humans can be considered as discursive agents.

This book offers a comprehensive review of current topics in decision making. It covers new findings relating to foundations, mechanisms, and consequences of decisions, sheding light on the cognitive process from different disciplinary perspectives. Chapters report on psychological studies of the cognitive mechanisms of decision making, neuroimaging studies on the neural correlates, studies of patient populations to characterize alterations in decision making in specific disease, as well as discussions concerning philosophical and ethical issues.

Die Forschungs- und Wissenschaftsethik ist diejenige Teildisziplin der Angewandten Ethik, die sich mit ethischen Problemen von Forschung und Wissenschaft beschäftigt. Man kann die Forschungsethik in drei Bereiche gliedern: Ein erster Bereich hat Prinzipien und Normen zum Gegenstand, die für alle Wissenschaftler als Wissenschaftler gelten. Ein zweiter Bereich ist mit Methoden befasst, die in der Wissenschaft zur Anwendung kommen. Ein dritter Bereich der Forschungsethik beschäftigt sich schließlich mit den Zielen von Forschung bzw. mit ethischen Fragen, die solche Ziele aufwerfen.

Unter welchen Bedingungen kann es als ethisch vertretbar gelten, Menschen in biomedizinischen Experimenten als Probanden einzusetzen? Bert Heinrichs unternimmt es, die Ethik der Forschung am Menschen grundlegend und systematisch zu erschließen. Seine ethische Rahmentheorie wird im Hinblick auf drei kontrovers diskutierte Problemkomplexe ausgewertet, nämlich die Forschung mit Minderjährigen, randomisierte klinische Studien und Forschung in Entwicklungsländern. Sie soll helfen, wesentliche Orientierung bei der konkreten Problemlösung zu geben.

Die Forschungs- und Wissenschaftsethik ist diejenige Teildisziplin der Angewandten Ethik, die sich mit ethischen Problemen von Forschung und Wissenschaft beschäftigt. Man kann die Forschungsethik in drei Bereiche gliedern: Ein erster Bereich hat Prinzipien und Normen zum Gegenstand, die für alle Wissenschaftler als Wissenschaftler gelten. Ein zweiter Bereich ist mit Methoden befasst, die in der Wissenschaft zur Anwendung kommen. Ein dritter Bereich der Forschungsethik beschäftigt sich schließlich mit den Zielen von Forschung bzw. mit ethischen Fragen, die solche Ziele aufwerfen.

Um gängigen Missverständnissen, die der Begriff „Ethikkommission“ mit sich bringt, entgegenzuwirken, schlägt der Autor Heinrichs vor, die Kommissionen stattdessen in „Patientenschutzkommissionen“ umzubenennen. Um der Hauptaufgabe des Probandenschutzes gerecht zu werden, sollten Ethikkommissionen die Aufklärungs- und Einwilligungsprozedur überprüfen, die Risiken und Belastungen der Probanden einschätzen und Gerechtigkeit im Hinblick auf Rekrutierung und Auswahl gewährleisten. Heinrichs verwirft die Lösung, Ethikkommissionen als reine Rechtsanwendungsbehörden zu verstehen, da Prozesse ethischer Bewertung unumgänglich seien.

Will brain imaging technology soon enable neuroscientists to read minds? We cannot answer this question without some understanding of the state of the art in neuroimaging. But neither can we answer this question without some understanding of the concept invoked by the term “mind reading.” This article is an attempt to develop such understanding. Our analysis proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, we provide a categorical explication of mind reading. The categorical explication articulates empirical conditions that must be satisfied if mind reading is to be achieved. In the second stage, we develop a metric for judging the proficiency of mind reading experiments. The conception of mind reading that emerges helps to reconcile folk psychological judgments about what mind reading must involve with the constraints imposed by empirical strategies for achieving it.

Position papers on artificial intelligence (AI) ethics are often framed as attempts to work out technical and regulatory strategies for attaining what is commonly called trustworthy AI. In such papers, the technical and regulatory strategies are frequently analyzed in detail, but the concept of trustworthy AI is not. As a result, it remains unclear. This paper lays out a variety of possible interpretations of the concept and concludes that none of them is appropriate. The central problem is that, by framing the ethics of AI in terms of trustworthiness, we reinforce unjustified anthropocentric assumptions that stand in the way of clear analysis. Furthermore, even if we insist on a purely epistemic interpretation of the concept, according to which trustworthiness just means measurable reliability, it turns out that the analysis will, nevertheless, suffer from a subtle form of anthropocentrism. The paper goes on to develop the concept of strange error, which serves both to sharpen the initial diagnosis of the inadequacy of trustworthy AI and to articulate the novel epistemological situation created by the use of AI. The paper concludes with a discussion of how strange error puts pressure on standard practices of assessing moral culpability, particularly in the context of medicine.

Zu den Grenzfragen des Lebens. Bioethik als Feld intensiver Auseinandersetzung im fachwissenschaftlichen Diskurs und kontroverser Diskussionen in der breiten Öffentlichkeit. Das Handbuch erläutert die Grundlagen und gibt einen Überblick über Bereiche, in denen bioethische Fragen relevant sind, wie Menschenwürde, Leben, Tod und Krankheit. Daneben widmet es sich den speziellen bioethischen Problemen wie etwa Zulässigkeit von Sterbehilfe, Präimplantationsdiagnostik oder embryonaler Stammzellenforschung und zeigt die Schnittstellen der Bioethik zu anderen Disziplinen und gesellschaftlichen Bereichen auf (Bioethik in der Lehre, Biopolitik, Biorecht und Ethikkommissionen).

In this paper, we address the question of whether AI should be used for suicide prevention on social media data. We focus on algorithms that can identify persons with suicidal ideation based on their postings on social media platforms and investigate whether private companies like Facebook are justified in using these. To find out if that is the case, we start with providing two examples for AI-based means of suicide prevention in social media. Subsequently, we frame suicide prevention as an issue of beneficence, develop two fictional cases to explore the scope of the principle of beneficence and apply the lessons learned to Facebook’s employment of AI for suicide prevention. We show that Facebook is neither acting under an obligation of beneficence nor acting meritoriously. This insight leads us to the general question of who is entitled to help. We conclude that private companies like Facebook can play an important role in suicide prevention, if they comply with specific rules which we derive from beneficence and autonomy as core principles of biomedical ethics. At the same time, public bodies have an obligation to create appropriate framework conditions for AI-based tools of suicide prevention. As an outlook we depict how cooperation between public and private institutions can make an important contribution to combating suicide and, in this way, put the principle of beneficence into practice.

It is generally assumed that applied ethics originated in the United States in the 1960s as a reaction to new social challenges (particularly in the field of medicine), to some extent superseding the metaethical analyses of moral language dominant at that time. This widespread portrayal of applied ethics as an unforeseen reaction of philosophy to new social challenges is inaccurate. In this article, I seek to show that applied ethics should be regarded as a philosophical innovation whose origins can be traced back to the ethics of Kant and the Neokantianism of Hermann Cohen. It is my central thesis that the key step in its development occurred with American Pragmatism, or, to be precise, in the intellectual environment around American Pragmatism.

Unterschiedlichste Anwendungsformen künstlicher Intelligenz bestimmen schon heute den Alltag vieler Menschen – von Einsatz von KI-Systeme in Finanzgeschäften über die Vergabe von Studienplätzen bis hin zur Steuerung von Pflegerobotern, Autos und Waffensystemen. Diese vielfältigen neuen Möglichkeiten und Visionen wecken einerseits Hoffnungen auf persönlichen und gesellschaftlichen Nutzen und Fortschritt; andererseits rufen sie aber auch Bedenken, Ängste und gelegentlich auch grundsätzliche Ablehnung hervor. Angesichts dieser Ambivalenz sind ethische Analysen gefordert, die ausloten, wie ein verantwortungsvoller Umgang mit KI gestaltet werden sollte. Der Band greift viele dieser Probleme auf und unterzieht sie einer eingehenden philosophischen Analyse. Die Auseinandersetzung ist nach klassischen Teilbereichen der Philosophie gegliedert, aus deren Perspektive heraus jeweils spezielle Teilaspekte oder einzelne Anwendungsformen von KI beleuchtet werden. Das Themenspektrum reicht entsprechend von Fragen der Handlungstheorie und Philosophie des Geistes über wissenschaftstheoretische Problemstellungen bis hin zu ethischen Fragen die beispielsweise den Einsatz von KI in der Medizin und im Wirtschafts- und Arbeitsleben betreffen. In Auseinandersetzung mit aktuellen Debatten werden eigenständige Positionen entwickelt.

In this paper, we use some elements of the philosophical theories of Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom for examining the interactions between humans and machines. In particular, we adopt the concept of the space of reasons for analyzing the status of artificial intelligent agents. One could argue that AIAs, like the widely used recommendation systems, have already entered the space of reasons, since they seem to make knowledge claims that we use as premises for further claims. This, in turn, can lead to a sense of alienation because AIAs do not quite play by the rules of the space of the reason. We, therefore, ask somewhat pointedly whether aliens have entered the space of reasons. A closer look reveals that it is a misconception to consider AIAs as being in the space of reasons. In fact, they should be seen as very sophisticated tools. Since these tools affect our own acting in the space of reasons, special regulations are required for their proper use.

BackgroundAdvance research directives (ARD) have been suggested as a means by which to facilitate research with incapacitated subjects, in particular in the context of dementia research. However, established disclosure requirements for study participation raise an ethical problem for the application of ARDs: While regular consent procedures call for detailed information on a specific study (“token disclosure”), ARDs can typically only include generic information (“type disclosure”). The introduction of ARDs could thus establish a double standard in the sense that within the context of ARDs, type disclosure would be considered sufficient, while beyond this context, token disclosure would remain necessary.Main bodyThis paper provides an ethical analysis of ARDs, taking into account the results of numerous empirical studies that have been performed so far. It will be argued that a revised understanding of informed consent can allow for context-sensitive disclosure standards. As a consequence, ARDs that include type disclosure can be acceptable under suitable circumstances. Such an approach raises a number of objections. A thorough examination shows, however, that they are not sufficient to justify a rejection of the approach.ConclusionThe approach presented in this paper avoids introducing a double standard. It is, therefore, more suitable for the implementation of ARDs than established approaches.

It is important to be able to offer an account of which activities count as scientific research, given our current interest in promoting research as a means to benefit humankind and in ethically regulating it. We attempt to offer such an account, arguing that we need to consider both the procedural and functional dimensions of an activity before we can establish whether it is a genuine instance of scientific research. By placing research in a broader schema of activities, the similarities and differences between research activities and other activities become visible. It is also easier to show why some activities that do not count as research can sometimes be confused with research and why some other activities can be regarded only partially as research. Although the concept of research is important to delimit a class of activities which we might be morally obliged to promote, we observe that the class of activities which are regarded as subject to ethical regulation is not exhausted by research activities. We argue that, whether they be research or not, all the activities that are likely to affect the rights and interests of the individuals involved and impact on the rights and interests of other individuals raise ethical issues and might be in need of ethical regulation.

In this paper, I examine whether the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and automated decision-making (ADM) aggravates issues of discrimination as has been argued by several authors. For this purpose, I first take up the lively philosophical debate on discrimination and present my own definition of the concept. Equipped with this account, I subsequently review some of the recent literature on the use AI/ADM and discrimination. I explain how my account of discrimination helps to understand that the general claim in view of the aggravation of discrimination is unwarranted. Finally, I argue that the use of AI/ADM can, in fact, increase issues of discrimination, but in a different way than most critics assume: it is due to its epistemic opacity that AI/ADM threatens to undermine our moral deliberation which is essential for reaching a common understanding of what should count as discrimination. As a consequence, it turns out that algorithms may actually help to detect hidden forms of discrimination.

This document presents the Bonn PRINTEGER Consensus Statement: Working with Research Integrity—Guidance for research performing organisations. The aim of the statement is to complement existing instruments by focusing specifically on institutional responsibilities for strengthening integrity. It takes into account the daily challenges and organisational contexts of most researchers. The statement intends to make research integrity challenges recognisable from the work-floor perspective, providing concrete advice on organisational measures to strengthen integrity. The statement, which was concluded February 7th 2018, provides guidance on the following key issues: § 1. Providing information about research integrity§ 2. Providing education, training and mentoring§ 3. Strengthening a research integrity culture§ 4. Facilitating open dialogue§ 5. Wise incentive management§ 6. Implementing quality assurance procedures§ 7. Improving the work environment and work satisfaction§ 8. Increasing transparency of misconduct cases§ 9. Opening up research§ 10. Implementing safe and effective whistle-blowing channels§ 11. Protecting the alleged perpetrators§ 12. Establishing a research integrity committee and appointing an ombudsperson§ 13. Making explicit the applicable standards for research integrity

In this paper, I will suggest an unorthodox hybrid theory of ethical justification that combines, on an ontological level, a realist approach with constructivist elements. On an epistemological level, the realist part of the theory will be squared with an intuitionist account. Eventually, the suggested hybrid theory will take the form of an intuitionist ethics of persons. I will start with briefly sketching the ontological shape of the relevant concept of person whereby I will extensively draw on Kant and endorse a realist reading of his ethical theory (2.). Subsequently, I will explain why and how constructivist elements must complement the picture (3.). Then, I will focus on the epistemological shape of the theory. In particular, I will suggest an intuitionist reading of Kant’s doctrine of “the fact of reason” (4.). Next, I will briefly comment on classical intuitionism and on Bernard William’s notion of convergence in ethics (5.). Subsequently, I will compare my approach with Robert Audi’s attempt to refine a Rossian type of intuitionism (6.). Finally, I will revisit the charge of dogmatism that has traditionally been raised against intuitionism (7.).