Social philosophers have long been interested in the connections between the social world and our ways of thinking or talking about it. Some suggest a tight connection between our language and the sorts of social kinds we encounter. The thought is that labels, that is, linguistically expressed concepts, sometimes confirm their own application: that labelling someone or something as a K, for some kind concept K, makes that person or thing a K. I argue that generally, being labelled as a K is neit…
Read moreSocial philosophers have long been interested in the connections between the social world and our ways of thinking or talking about it. Some suggest a tight connection between our language and the sorts of social kinds we encounter. The thought is that labels, that is, linguistically expressed concepts, sometimes confirm their own application: that labelling someone or something as a K, for some kind concept K, makes that person or thing a K. I argue that generally, being labelled as a K is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a K. Then, I explain that familiar social critiques don’t require the thought that label-application causes or constitutes kind membership.
